But this is not all—an establishment has been created, without the most necessary of all engines to give vigour and effect to the exertions of the Magistrates; namely, a pecuniary Fund to defray the expences of detecting criminals, and of rewarding those who bring informations useful to Public Justice. The expence of each Public Office being restricted to two thousand pounds a year, and the establishment in salaries, rents, taxes, and other contingencies exhausting that sum, nothing remains for one of the most necessary purposes of the Institution—the Prevention and the Suppression of Crimes.[159]
It is in vain to expect that either vigour or energy can enter into that part of the System, where a great deal of both is necessary, without Funds.
If criminals, at war with the Community, are to be detected—if risks are to be run to effect this purpose—if it is to be done, (as it must frequently be) at the hazard of the loss of health, and even of life, by watching desperadoes in the night time—if accurate informations are necessary, either to discover where stolen property is deposited, or where the delinquents are to be found; a Fund must be provided, or the Public cannot be protected. Those, whose province it is to watch over the Police must not expect that men, capable of giving them useful information, will return a second time, if they have not some adequate reward bestowed upon them for their labour, risk, and trouble. Without such power of granting small rewards, (so far as that part of his duty which relates to the discovery of property plundered, and the detection of the offenders is of importance to the Public,) a Magistrate is placed in the situation of a person pledged to work, without tools or implements of labour, by which he can in any respect accomplish his purpose. And hence it is, that among the numerous causes assigned in the course of this Work, for the increase of Crimes,—this is none of the least.
Not that it is meant that any additional burthen on the Public, by an extensive expenditure of money, would be necessary—A very moderate sum judiciously and œconomically laid out, would bring to Commissioners of the Police, or to the disbursing Magistrates, through some medium or other, an early account of most of the depredations committed upon the Public, as well as every circumstance relative to coiners and sellers of base money.—This would lead to the detection and apprehension of most of the offenders; and thereby strike such an universal terror, as (assisted by the other salutary regulations proposed in this Work) would soon reduce the number of Thieves, Coiners, and other delinquents; and thus, of course, diminish the ultimate and great additional expence which follows conviction, in all cases where felons are in the course of punishment.
In this view of the subject, it would prove a Regulation calculated greatly to reduce the aggregate expence; for surely, if a few guineas judiciously laid out, in the first instance, would save fifty afterwards to the State, it must be a wise and a good arrangement; and in this way it would probably operate. But this would not be the only saving to the Nation: by preventing crimes, all those concerned in projects of mischief must, instead of preying upon the industry of others, assist the State, by contributing their share to the national stock of labour.
Next to the want of a sufficient pecuniary Fund, the most obvious deficiency in the present System of executive Police in the Metropolis, is that which regards the Magistracy of the City of London; where the case is precisely reversed; for there the funds for the detection and discovery of offenders, may be made as ample as the Corporation shall think fit; but the want of a Stipendiary Establishment must prevent the operation of that System of vigour and energy, which the increase of Criminals and the present state of Society demand.
The Magistrates of the City of London form a body, perhaps the most respectable, and independent of any in the world; but besides the unavoidable, important, and multiplied affairs of the Corporation, in attending the various Courts of the Lord-Mayor—Aldermen—Common Council—Common Hall—Wardmotes—Conservancy—Courts of Requests—Court of Orphans—and General and Quarter Sessions of the Peace, and Justice Hall at the Old Bailey, they have avocations and engagements in business, which must necessarily occupy their minds. It cannot, therefore, reasonably be expected, that they should forego their own important private interests, and bestow upon the business of the Public that attention which their situation as Magistrates seems to require.[160]
The Chief Magistrate cannot, in the nature of things, while the immense load of municipal affairs, joined to his own private concerns, presses constantly upon his mind, bestow either time or attention in considering the cases of delinquents brought before him; or in following up informations, and devising plans necessary to detect offenders; and yet this detail of duty, even from the pass-vagrant to the most atrocious villain, is imposed on him, by ancient immemorial custom and usage; at the very moment when he is overpowered with other official business, of great magnitude and importance; which can be transacted by no other person. Hurried with constant engagements, inseparable from the functions and dignity attached to his high office, and the general government of the City, a Lord-Mayor is just beginning to understand the duties attached to the Chief Magistracy, at the period when he must lay it down.
The other Magistrates of the City having had a precise line of duty anciently chalked out, when Commerce and Society had made less progress, the same System continues; nor would it be proper to expect an augmentation of labour, or a greater proportion of time, from Magistrates who serve the Public gratuitously.—The unremitting attendance and indefatigable industry, which the Public interest requires, it would be vain and unjust to expect, from any but Magistrates selected for that purpose, and that only.[161]