Finally, so far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism affirm the State, they commend it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.
Jurisprudential criticism has thus far been most clearly set forth by Stammler, who, however, has offered no teaching with regard to the State; but, for instance, Spencer's teaching may rank as an affirmative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism.
Second, the three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at the negation of the State, each one from its standpoint.
So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential dogmatism negate the State, they reject it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.
Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker.
So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism negate the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will disappear.
Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism are the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin.
So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism negate the State, they reject it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.
A negative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism is Tolstoi's teaching.
3. Therefore, the place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience is defined by the fact that they, as a species of doctrine about the State in the philosophy of law,—to wit, as negative doctrines of the State,—stand in opposition to the other species of doctrine about the State, the affirmative doctrines of the State.