My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

CHAPTER III
THE FIRST ACTIONS

IN this Manner We Were Fully Employed in the Camp at Pugu, when, on the morning of the 8th August, we heard heavy artillery fire from the direction of Dar-es-Salaam. According to reports which soon reached us, it emanated from two English light cruisers, Astræa and Pegasus, who were aiming at the wireless tower. This tower had been erected in this exposed position because on the coast it could reach further out to sea; it was of importance to us because the high-power station at Tabora was not yet finished, and the two smaller ones at Muansa and Bukoba were of only local use. The tower was not hit by the English, but blown up by us, from a rather excessive fear of its falling into the enemy’s hands. A short time later an observation officer reported that the enemy was apparently preparing to land at Konduchi, a day’s march north of Dar-es-Salaam. The formation of the coast rendered it not unlikely. I therefore immediately ordered the seven companies of Askari[2] available to march off, so as to seize the favourable opportunity of surprising the enemy in the act of landing.

Before they marched off I had a conversation at Pugu Station with the Governor, Dr. Schnee, who was passing through by train to Morogoro. He seemed quite surprised by the English hostilities, and entirely agreed with my proposal to attack them at Konduchi. On the way there I met two gentlemen belonging to the Government at Dar-es-Salaam, who showed me a document dealing with negotiations for surrendering Dar-es-Salaam to the English. As the Governor had said nothing to me about it, and I was also rather in a hurry, I only glanced superficially at it. It did not occur to me that this might be any kind of agreement drawn up with the consent of the Governor. But when, during the night, the force had reached a mountain ten miles north of Dar-es-Salaam, and on the next morning we obtained a view of the harbour and the English cruisers lying off it, it became clear that the report of an attempted landing at Konduchi was a mistake. We were able to establish the fact that the English ships had communicated with the shore, and now it did appear to me probable that negotiations with the enemy had taken place. I now advanced on the town, and, as I could not but fear that in the confusion of the moment a disadvantageous agreement might be concluded at Dar-es-Salaam, I sent Captain Tafel on ahead. He was to announce that I was taking over the executive power, and that negotiations with the enemy must be conducted through me alone. It was only from Captain Tafel that I learned that by order of the Governor negotiations for surrender had actually taken place. My intervention was not approved by the Governor, in whose hands, according to a Protective Force Ordinance intended to meet quite different conditions, supreme military power was actually placed. For the moment this had no practical consequences. Only a few English Marines had landed, and had already gone on board again. But for a soldier it was not inspiring to find that here, under the very eyes of a thousand good troops, an agreement had been concluded which forbade us to undertake any hostile act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy was not so bound, and that we had received no information of a step of such great military importance.

The Königsberg had already put to sea from Dar-es-Salaam several days before, and the surveying vessel Möve, which was in harbour, had been blown up by us on the 9th August. This brought the land forces a valuable military increase, as the captain of the Möve, Lieut.-Commander Zimmer, now came under my orders. Lieutenant Horn at once proceeded with a few seamen to Kigoma, where he manned and armed the small steamer Hedwig von Wissmann. On Lake Tanganyika he chased the Belgian steamer Delcommune, which he surprised and shot to pieces after a few days, thereby securing to us the extremely important command of the lake. The ability rapidly to transfer troops from the Central Railway towards Bismarckburg or Usambara depended entirely upon unimpeded transport on Tanganyika, and played a part in the later course of the operations.

In the north of the Colony, the 1st Company at Arusha had been reinforced by the 13th Company, coming by rapid marches from Kondoa, and by another company formed at Moshi from Police Askari. Further, a large part of the Europeans of the northern districts had combined to form a detachment under Captain von Prince. Most of those troops were in the neighbourhood of Moshi. Taveta, which lies to the eastward, in English territory, was held by the enemy, who thereby secured a valuable sally-port against our European settlements in the north; it was, therefore, an urgent matter for us to capture this important point without delay. It took considerable time before we were able to set the force in motion for this purpose. Many people believed that on the strength of the Congo Act we were bound to remain neutral, and naturally had little confidence in the instructions they received from the new Commandant. It was not until the 15th August that the weakly-held place was taken. The course of the fight proved that the force still required much further training to render it fit to carry out combined operations in unison in the dense bush. In this area the command was assumed by Major Kraut, who happened to be in the north-eastern frontier district for the purpose of frontier delimitations. During the next few days the holder of the supreme military power was successfully persuaded to agree to moving the bulk of our forces to the Northern Railway. Simple as was this movement in itself, under the conditions then existing, it required considerable preparations. There were few Germans to be found who were so well acquainted with the whole country between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro on one side, and Tanga and Mombo on the other, that they could give reliable information about roads and conditions of subsistence. It was necessary to send out reconnaissance officers in order to determine the roads on which a suitable quantity of supplies could be found. But we could not afford to await the results of all these reconnaissances; the marches had to be begun. According to European ideas the country was sparsely populated; and on the existing maps the only notes as to water and food showed whether the supplies available would suffice for bodies of a strength equal to a company at most. Without preparation one could therefore hardly put more than one company on each road without distribution in depth; the training and skill in the collection of supplies which the force had acquired by the end of the war were at that time non-existent. Taking it all round, it came to this, that the march and supply of a single company in the conditions there prevailing required about the same consideration as would a division in Germany. It was also necessary in this move to take into account the risk arising from the fact that companies would for a prolonged period be out of reach of orders. The only telegraphic communication between the Central Railway and the north ran close along the coast, and could therefore be interrupted whenever the enemy intended to do so.

However, the Director of the Postal Service, Rothe, and Secretary Krüger displayed such adaptability in meeting the wishes of the troops, and such energy in starting work on the new line Morogoro-Handeni-Korogwe, and, under the pressure of circumstances, temporarily overcame the normal torpor of the Tropics with such success, that the line was completed in only a few weeks. Owing to the destructiveness of the termites (white ants) it is the rule in time of peace to employ iron telegraph poles, which, owing to the prevalence of giraffe in this particular district, have to be very tall and carry very heavy conductors. In the first instance, however, the construction in this case had to be of a provisional nature, and this, and the use of cable, caused continual breakdowns and repairs.

In the meantime I received reports of the advance of small hostile detachments at Jassini, two marches north of Tanga, and this confirmed me in the belief that the enemy intended to land in that district, and would then rapidly advance into the interior along the Northern Railway. Consequently, the various companies had marched off from different points on the line Dar-es-Salaam-Mpapua, and were for the most part converging on Handeni, while some were directed on other points on the line Tanga-Korogwe, when I was called up on the telephone at Pugu on the afternoon of August 23rd, by Lieutenant von Chappuis, who was encamped at Bagamoyo with the 17th Field Company. He reported that an English light cruiser was lying off Bagamoyo, and had called upon the local Civil Administrator to destroy the telegraph station, threatening to bombard the place in case of refusal. I ordered him to assume control of the executive and to prevent a hostile landing by force of arms. A boat from the man-of-war that attempted to land under the white flag was therefore sent back, and the place was bombarded in consequence, to the great amusement of the company and the native inhabitants, since the enemy scored practically no hits.

At the end of August, Headquarters moved by rail to Kirnamba, near Morogoro. On the way, General von Wahle, who was directing the service on the Lines of Communication from Morogoro, wished me the best of luck in the decisive action which we expected in the neighbourhood of Handeni, and to which his son was also proceeding. From there Headquarters travelled on towards Handeni in two requisitioned motors. After about twenty miles we had to leave them, as the improvement of this road had not been completed beyond that point. Captain von Hammerstein and I went on on bicycles, and gradually caught up the companies on the march. The anticipated landing of the enemy did not take place, and early in September we reached Korogwe. In the meantime an English cruiser had appeared at Tanga and towed away some lighters lying there.

Our next duty was to organize the supply and transport services in the north. Captain Schmid, who had until then directed them as Field Intendant, had become sick, and it was difficult to find a suitable successor. Fortunately we discovered one in Captain Feilke, of the Landwehr, who had for many years directed the Prince Albrecht Plantations in Usambara, a man of great experience. He was at the time in the vicinity of Tanga, and had placed himself at the disposal of the force. He had formerly been Adjutant of the 8th Jäger Battalion, was fifty-two years of age, a man of much knowledge of the world and a skilful officer; he thus combined in the happiest manner the military knowledge and business talent necessary for the difficult post of Intendant. He came immediately, and we drove to New Moshi together. There I met Captain Kraut. On Kilima Njaro preparations had been made for guerilla warfare by establishing supply depots, our patrols were pushing beyond Taveta towards the British Uganda Railway, and numerous minor encounters had already taken place. At that time, however, the force lacked the experience necessary for carrying out distant patrols like those which at a later stage led so successfully to interruptions of the line. The first patrols had arrived at the Uganda Railway in a half-starved condition and had been captured. From New Moshi I went to Himo Camp, where Captain von Prince was holding a fortified position. He accompanied me to Taveta, which was held by an advanced post under an officer. Now we could discuss on the spot the problem of transferring the main body of the Northern Force to Taveta. The local native population was very numerous and placed entire confidence in the European administrators appointed by the force: they continued to sell their products in the market, and our mutual relationship was completely satisfactory.