The organization of the Force was also constantly improved. By transferring Europeans from the Rifle Companies, when they were numerous, to the Askari Companies, the losses of Europeans in the latter were made good; Askari were enrolled in the European Companies. In this way the Field and Rifle Companies became more similar in their composition, which during the course of 1915 became identical. At Muansa, Kigoma, Bismarckburg, Lindi, Langenburg, and elsewhere, small bodies of troops had been formed under various designations, of the existence of which in most cases Headquarters only became aware after a considerable time. These units were also gradually expanded into companies; in this way, during 1915, the number of Field Companies gradually rose to 30, that of the Rifle Companies to 10, and that of other units of company strength to about 20. The maximum total attained was thus about 60 companies. Owing to the limited number of suitable Europeans and of reliable Askari N.C.O.’s, it was not advisable still further to increase the number of companies: it would only have meant the creation of units without cohesion. In order, however, to increase the number of combatants the establishment of the companies was raised from 160 to 200, and the companies were allowed to enrol supernumerary Askari. To some extent the companies trained their own recruits; but the great bulk of Askari reinforcements came from the Recruit Depots established in the populous districts of Tabora, Muansa and the Northern Railway, which also provided for local security and order. But owing to the great number of newly-raised companies the depots could not furnish enough men to bring them all up to their establishment of 200. The maximum strength attained by the end of 1915 was 2,998 Europeans and 11,300 Askari, including Naval personnel, administrative staffs, hospitals and field postal service.

How necessary were all these military preparations was proved by the news received at the end of June, 1915, that General Botha was coming to the East African theatre from South Africa with 15,000 Boers. That this information was highly probably correct had to be assumed from the outset. The scanty wireless messages and other communications about events in the outside world were yet enough to indicate that our affairs in South-West Africa were going badly, and that the British troops employed there would probably become available for other purposes in the immediate future.

CHAPTER VIII
AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF THE TIME AVAILABLE

AT first, it is true, the anticipated intervention of the South Africans did not seem to be materializing; the English were evidently trying to subdue us with their own forces, without their assistance. In July, 1915, they attacked the Colony at several points. East of Lake Victoria large bodies of Masai, organized and led by Englishmen, and said to number many thousands, invaded the country of the German Wassukuma, which was rich in cattle. However, in the matter of cattle-lifting the Wassukuma stood no joking; they gave our weak detachments every assistance, defeated the Masai, recaptured the stolen cattle, and, as a proof that they had “spoken the truth,” laid out the heads of ninety-six Masai in front of our police station.

Against the main body of our force in the Kilima Njaro country the enemy advanced in considerable strength. In order, on the one hand, to ensure effective protection of the Usambara Railway, and the rich plantations through which it passes, and, on the other, to shorten the distance the patrols had to go to reach the Uganda Railway, a detachment of three companies had been pushed out from Taveta to Mbuyuni, a long day’s march east of Taveta. Another day’s march to the east was the well-fortified and strongly-held English camp of Makatan, on the main road leading from Moshi, by Taveta, Mbuyuni, Makatan, and Bura, to Voi, on the Uganda Railway. Vague rumours had led us to surmise that an attack on a fairly large scale in the direction of Kilima Njaro was to be expected from about Voi. On the 14th July a hostile brigade, under General Malleson, appeared in the desert of Makatan, which is generally covered with fairly open thorn-bush. The fire of a field battery, which opened on the trenches of our Askari, was fairly ineffective, but the enemy’s superiority of seven to one was so considerable that our position became critical. Hostile European horsemen got round the left wing of our own; however, our line was held by the 10th Field Company, which had distinguished itself in the fighting near Longido Mountain, under Lieutenant Steinhäuser, of the Landwehr, and it is a credit to this officer, who was unfortunately killed later, that he held on, although our mounted troops fell back past his flank. Just at the critical moment, Lieutenant von Lewinsky, who was also killed later, immediately marched off to the scene of action, arrived with a patrol, and took this dangerous flank attack in rear. The English troops, consisting of natives, mixed with Europeans and Indians, had very gallantly attacked our front, over ground affording very little cover. The failure of the English flank attack, however, set the seal on their defeat. At New Moshi Station I was kept accurately informed of the progress of the action, and thus, although at a distance, I shared in all the excitement from the unfavourable period at the beginning until complete success was assured.

This success, together with the considerable booty, still further increased the spirit of adventure among both Europeans and Askari. The experience and skill that had by now been acquired enabled us henceforth to prosecute our plan of sending out a continuous succession of fighting and demolition patrols. I do not think I exaggerate in assuming that at least twenty English railway trains were destroyed, or, at least, considerably damaged. Picked up photographs and our own observation confirmed the supposition that a railway was actually being built from Voi to Makatan, which, being so easily accessible to us, and so important, formed a glorious objective for our patrols. The construction of this military line proved that an attack with large forces was in preparation, and that it was to be directed on this particular part of the Kilima Njaro country. The anticipated intervention of the South Africans was therefore imminent. It was important to encourage the enemy in this intention, in order that the South Africans should really come, and that in the greatest strength possible, and thus be diverted from other and more important theatres of war. With the greatest energy, therefore, we continued our enterprises against the Uganda Railway, which, owing to the circumstances, had still to be mainly carried out by patrols, and could only exceptionally be undertaken by a force as large as a company.

Closer acquaintance with the desert country between the Uganda Railway and the Anglo-German border had revealed the fact, that of the various mountain groups rising abruptly out of the plain, the Kasigao was well watered and moderately populous. Being only from twelve to twenty miles from the Uganda Railway, Kasigao Mountain was bound to afford a favourably situated base for patrol work. The patrol of Lieut. Freiherr Grote had already made a surprise attack on the small Anglo-Indian camp situated half-way up its slopes. The riflemen of Grote’s patrol had worked round the camp, which was surrounded by a stone wall, and fired into it with effect from the dominating part of the mountain. Very soon the white flag appeared, and an English officer and some thirty Indians surrendered. A part of the enemy had succeeded in getting away to the mountain and fired on the patrol as it marched off. It was then we suffered our only casualties, consisting of a few wounded, among whom was a German corporal of the Medical Corps. We had also, on one occasion, surprised the enemy’s post on Kasigao Mountain by the fire of a 2.4-inch gun.

Towards the end of 1915, the enemy having in the meantime shifted his camp on Kasigao Mountain, we attacked him once more. During the night a German fighting patrol, under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, had ascended the mountain in nine hours, and arrived rather exhausted near the enemy’s work. A second patrol, under Lieutenant Freiherr Grote, which was co-operating with Ruckteschell’s, had been somewhat delayed by the sickness and exhaustion of its commander. Lieutenant von Ruckteschell sent a reliable old coloured N.C.O. to the enemy to demand surrender. He observed that our Askari was cordially welcomed by the enemy; he had found a number of good friends among the English Askari. But, in spite of all friendliness, the enemy refused to surrender. Our situation was critical, in consequence of exhaustion and want of food. If anything was to be done at all, it must be done at once. Fortunately, the enemy in their entrenchments did not withstand our machine-gun fire and the assault which immediately followed it; they were destroyed, and a large number of them were killed in their flight by falling from the steep cliffs. The booty included abundant supplies, also clothing and valuable camp equipment.