My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

Late in the afternoon I received an urgent message that strong forces of the enemy were advancing in our rear towards the railway at Kissangire, and that the event we feared had actually occurred. I was, therefore, compelled to issue orders for an immediate withdrawal towards Kissangire. The enemy could not yet have reached there in strength, and I hoped to defeat him there by rapidly throwing all my forces against him. Thus it happened that Captain Schulz’s well-directed counter-attack could not be carried through, or produce its full effect. The transfer by night of our force across the Pangani, which was close behind us, and over which we had previously made a number of bridges and crossings, was effected smoothly and without interference. Even on the following day the patrols we had left behind found its north bank clear of the enemy. Our good four-inch gun, which we could not take away owing to its lack of mobility, was blown up. After midnight, that is, quite early on the 22nd March, I arrived at Kissangire Station, and discovered to my very great astonishment that all the reports about strong hostile forces moving on that place were erroneous, and that our withdrawal had therefore been unnecessary. This incident afforded me a remarkably striking proof of the extraordinary difficulty of observing the movements of troops in thick bush, and of the great care every commander must exercise in estimating the value of such reports. But it also demonstrates how difficult it is for any commander to combine his own powers of reasoning and his judgment of the situation with the constantly conflicting reports, both of Askari and Europeans, in order to base his decision on a foundation that even approximately resembles the reality. In the African bush it is particularly important, whenever possible, to supplement the reports one receives by personal observation.

However, our withdrawal could not now be altered, and the most important thing was to re-group our forces. In this operation the decisive factor was water-supply. This, and the necessity for distribution in depth, caused me to leave only a detachment of a few companies on the high ground at Kissangire, from where it observed the seven and a half miles of waterless thorn desert extending to the Pangani. To the east of this detachment at Kissangire, under Major von Boehmken, was Otto’s detachment, pushed up on to the North Pare Mountains in order to close the passes leading over them. Major Kraut took up a position on Ngulu Pass, between the North Pare and Middle Pare ranges. The main body of the force settled down in several fortified camps in the fertile Lembeni country.

In spite of the various withdrawals we had recently carried out, the spirit of the troops was good, and the Askaris were imbued with a justifiable pride in their achievements against an enemy so greatly superior. Only a very few individuals deserted, and they were almost without exception men whose cattle was in the territory now occupied by the enemy, and who were therefore afraid of losing their property.

Almost the entire German civil population had left the Kilima Njaro country; most of them had moved to Usambara into the Wilhelmstal district. The Arusha country had also been evacuated, and the farmers had moved off by ox-wagon by Kondoa-Irangi to Dodoma. The numerous Greeks had for the most part remained on their coffee-plantations on Kilima Njaro, and the Boers of British nationality had stayed in their cattle farms, which extended from the north-west slopes of Kilima Njaro northwards round Meru Mountain and along the western slopes of the latter to the vicinity of Arusha. At Lembeni the regular course of existence had not been interrupted; supply trains rolled right up to the station; the companies which were not in the front line worked diligently at their training, and Headquarters continued its work in the railway station buildings of Lembeni just as it had done previously at Moshi. Airmen appeared and dropped bombs, just as before.

The country was carefully prepared to meet various possible battle conditions, passages were cut through the dense rhinoceros bush, and a field of fire cleared where necessary. Personal reconnaissance took up much of my time, and often led me to the companies encamped in the thick bush and on the dominating heights. The troops had already developed to a tolerable degree in adaptability, and in the art of making the material side of their existence as comfortable as possible. I remember with pleasure the occasions when, in a comfortably arranged grass hut, I was offered a cup of coffee with beautiful rich milk, prepared from the ground-down kernel of a ripe cocoanut. The North Pare Mountains also were frequently the goal of my expeditions. Up there I found a rich and well-watered area of primeval forest, through which it was hardly possible to penetrate off the roads. The water-supply of the country proved to be far more plentiful than the results of former surveys had led us to expect; in this respect also it was shown how the necessities of war cause the resources of a country to be opened up, and utilized to an extent greatly exceeding previous estimates. The natives of North Pare are, like those of Kilima Njaro, masters in the art of irrigating their fields by means of the water coming down from the mountains.

On the 4th April, one of my reconnaissances took me to Otto’s Detachment on the Pare Mountains. From the north-west corner one had a clear view of the enemy’s camp, lying down below at Kahe Station. The obvious idea of bombarding it with one of our long-range guns—in the meantime we had brought to Lembeni one 4-inch Königsberg gun on wheels, and one 3·5-inch gun mounted on a ’73 pattern carriage—could unfortunately not be carried out. With rather too much zeal the troops had thoroughly destroyed the permanent way of the line between Lembeni and Kahe. With the means at our disposal it could not be made sufficiently fit for traffic to enable us to move one of our guns up and down on it with rapidity. All our observations and reports agreed that the enemy, who had formerly often sent patrols and even stronger forces to the south of Jipe Lake, no longer displayed any interest in that district. He had in any case moved his principal forces towards Kahe and also beyond New Moshi westward towards Arusha.

After passing a cold night on the damp height at North Pare I descended to Lembeni on the 5th April. Here I found a report that on the previous day Captain Rothert, who was encamped with the 28th Company beside the Lolkisale, a high mountain in the Masai desert, two days’ march south-west of Arusha, had been attacked by superior forces. The heliograph communication with Lolkisale from the south-west had then been interrupted. It was not till later that the following facts became known. Several mounted companies of the enemy, coming across the desert from Arusha, had attacked the 28th Company, who were in position on the mountain, from several directions. As our people were in possession of the water they could well sustain the fight against the enemy, who had none. On the second day of the action the situation became critical for the enemy, because of this very absence of water. Unfortunately, however, after Captain Rothert was severely wounded, this circumstance was not properly appreciated on our side. The situation was thought to be so hopeless that the company surrendered with its machine guns and ammunition. On this occasion also some of the Askari gave evidence of sound military education by refusing to join in the surrender. They, together with the wounded, rejoined our forces near Ufiome, without being interfered with by the enemy. There they met a new rifle company and the Arusha Detachment, of which the former had arrived from the Central Railway, the latter from the direction of Arusha.

The road to Kondoa-Irangi and the interior of the Colony was now hardly closed to the enemy coming from Arusha. There were three companies in the neighbourhood of Lake Kivu, in the north-west corner of the Colony, under Captain Klinghardt, retired, who had done so well in the actions at Kissenyi; they were moved by march route and on Tanganyika steamer to Kigoma, and from there by rail to Saranda. From there again they marched up towards Kondoa-Irangi. Captain Klinghardt was also given command of the troops already north of Kondoa-Irangi (about two companies) and of another company that came by rail from Dar-es-Salaam. These movements would take a long time. Consequently, the good and well-tried 13th Company, whose peace-station had been Kondoa-Irangi, was at once brought by rail to near Buiko, whence it marched through the Masai desert to Kondoa-Irangi. The march through this waterless and little-known country had to be undertaken before the completion of the reconnaissances, which were in progress; and to do so with what was, according to African ideas, the large force of one company with carriers, in the dry season, and before the heavy rains had set in, involved some risk.

But this risk had to be run; for the force facing us at Kahe, after its reconnoitring parties had been several times repulsed, was showing no signs of advancing against us. At the time, therefore, the enemy was evidently directing his principal effort towards Kondoa-Irangi. As, for the reasons already set forth, it appeared unsound for us to attack from Lembeni towards Kahe, I decided merely to occupy the enemy station in the Kilima Njaro country, and to direct my main force against the hostile group which had meanwhile pushed forward to near Kondoa-Irangi. The execution of this project was not quite easy; much time was needed to cover the distance of 125 miles from the detraining stations on the Northern Railway to the Central Railway on foot, and at any moment a change in the situation might render it necessary for Headquarters immediately to make fresh dispositions. All the troops must therefore be kept within reach. The various detachments could not, as on the march from the Central to the Northern Railway, be set in motion on different and widely-separated roads. The march of our fifteen field and two mounted companies had to be made on one road. The Force was thus confronted with an entirely novel and difficult task. There was no time to lose. The detachments of Captain von Kornatzky, Captain Otto, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock and Captain Stemmermann, each of four or three companies, were moved by rail at intervals of one day, from Lembeni to Mombo and Korogwe. Thence they marched on to Kimamba (station west of Morogoro) to the Central Railway. Manifold difficulties arose. Hard and fast destinations could not be laid down for the detachments for each day, more especially because heavy rains set in which in places so softened the black soil that the troops could literally hardly get along.

Thus it happened that one detachment made quite short marches, and the one behind got jammed on top of it. This, however, was very inconvenient, and interfered both with the regular service of supply on the line of communication, and with the transport of the company baggage, in which the relay-carriers belonging to the line of communication had to be called in to assist. The companies now began, according to ancient African custom, to help themselves, seized the line of communication carriers, regardless of other orders, and simply kept them. As the whole service on the communications depended upon the regular working of the relay-carriers, it also became seriously dislocated.