I waited at Kissaki with the main body, in order to be able quickly to recognize and make use of any favourable opportunity. As was to be expected, the enemy had, owing to our withdrawal to Kissaki, abandoned his concentration on Morogoro; he had sent a few detachments direct over the Uluguru Mountains, but his other columns had separated and followed us, extending far to the east and west. The hope of being able to defeat one or more of these columns separately was fulfilled beyond expectation. West of the Uluguru Mountains General Brits had divided his division into brigade columns (two mounted and one infantry), which had difficulty in keeping touch. Soon large hostile camps were discovered a day’s march west of Kissaki, and on the 7th September, 1916, Captain Otto’s Detachment, which was encamped at a plantation near Kissaki, was attacked by a large force of European horse, and by native and white infantry. It turned out later that this force consisted of General Enslin’s Mounted Brigade, and of portions of the infantry brigade of General Brits’s Division. The turning movement which the enemy was making round the left wing of Otto’s Detachment was allowed to continue until the outflanking detachment had got right round in rear of Captain Otto, near the Boma of Kissaki. Evidently the enemy did not expect German reserves to be posted under cover still further back. These reserves were now loosed upon him. The gallant 11th Field Company, under Lieutenant Volkwein of the Reserve, worked through the dense bush close up to the outflanking enemy, and immediately attacked with the bayonet, cheering. With that the enemy’s beautiful plans completely collapsed; our further advance simply rolled him up, and he was completely defeated. The almost impenetrable bush made it impossible vigorously to push the enemy, or to undertake a pursuit on a large scale; but the bulk of his troops was broken up, and the small fragments were scattered in the bush in hopeless confusion. The led-horses and horse-holders were captured, and about fifteen Europeans taken prisoner. Even the next day an English soldier arrived from quite another direction; he had lost himself with his led-horses in the dense bush and had no idea where to go. The man had plenty of humour; he threw his rifle and ammunition across a small stream and said: “It’s just luck; I might have taken the right road or the wrong one. I had the bad luck to take the wrong one. That’s my fault.”
Tafel’s Detachment, which was encamped north of Kissaki, on the road we had come by, had only partially joined in the fight on the evening of the 7th. I had kept it back, as I thought that, simultaneously with the attack on the 7th from the west, another one would be made from the north along the road. And General Brits undoubtedly did hold this perfectly sound intention; but the execution failed. General Nussy’s Mounted Brigade, without having any idea of the action of the 7th, marched along towards Tafel’s Detachment from the north on the 8th. It was just as thoroughly beaten as its friends had been the day before. In the dense bush it was, on the 8th, even more difficult to survey the fighting, and a considerable number of prisoners taken by the 1st Company managed to escape.
In the two days we took some thirty European prisoners, and some of them were sent back to the enemy, on taking an oath not to fight again in this war against the Germans or their allies. The humanity of this step, which was, under tropical conditions, in the best interest of the prisoners themselves, was not recognized by the English. They suspected spying, seized the German envoy who brought back the prisoners, sent him far into the bush with his eyes bound, and then let him go where good luck might take him. It was a wonder that the man, who was exhausted by prolonged wandering about, found his way back. This shows how difficult the English made it for us to avoid unnecessary severity towards the enemy. At the same time, the English private soldiers had faith in the treatment we meted out to our prisoners. While the battlefield was being cleared, in which both English and German medical officers took part, wounded Englishmen begged to be treated by the German doctor. And later on, also, wounded men remarked that they would hardly have been cured if they had been treated by English medical personnel.
It was my opinion that these satisfactory successes at Kissaki had not brought us a final decision against the troops of General Brits, and I still believe that in the dense bush and the rugged country an energetic pursuit, which alone would have secured the desired result, was impossible of execution. My attention was all the more drawn towards the force pursuing Stemmermann’s Detachment, as it had already come within two days’ march north-east of Kissaki. During the last few days the situation there had not been favourable; the broken ground had in several instances caused our already weak forces to be disseminated. Some portions had been ambushed, the troops were very fatigued, and several people were suffering badly from nerves. On the 9th September Stemmermann’s Detachment approached the village of Dutumi, which was known to me from previous reconnaissance. I thought the enemy would press on on the following day, and considered the opportunity favourable for achieving a success at Dutumi by rapidly moving my main body there from Kissaki. In the evening we marched away from Kissaki by the fine broad road, and reached Dutumi that night. Captain Otto remained at Kissaki with five companies. On arrival I decided to make use of the factor of surprise, and to make an enveloping attack in the early morning on the enemy’s left wing, which was identified close in front of Stemmermann’s Detachment. I knew that this wing was in the plain, while, looking from our side, the enemy’s centre and right stretched away to the left up the foot-hills of the Uluguru Mountains. It was because of these foot-hills that the chances of attack were less favourable on our left.
Early on the 9th September, Schulz’s Detachment attacked from our right. Rifle and machine-gun fire soon started, and the enemy’s light artillery also opened fire; but the thick high elephant grass, with which the plain was covered, made it impossible to form a clear idea of things. I thought the attack was going well, and proceeded to the left in order to get a view of the situation. The heights there were also densely overgrown. It was very fatiguing to get along and difficult to find anybody. I was clambering about, fairly exhausted in the heat of a tropical noon, when I luckily heard the sound of tin pots, and found I was right in concluding that some European was just having lunch. It was Captain Goering, who had taken up his post in the bush on a height which afforded a good view. Here, towards three p.m., I received the unwelcome news that the attack by Schulz’s Detachment on our right had not attained its object. It had been simply impossible to get at the enemy through the dense elephant grass. If, therefore, any decisive action was to be taken on that day at all, it could only be done on our left. Even here, owing to the difficult country, success was not very probable. The advancing companies got into a very intersected mountain tract, in which they shot at the enemy, and were shot at by him without any result, and at dusk returned to their original positions.
During the following days the enemy directed his attacks mainly against our left, and was frequently driven back by counter-strokes. But, on the whole, it was evident that success was only possible if the enemy proved very unskilful. On the other hand, our communications, which from now on no longer ran to Kissaki, but towards Behobeho in the south-east, were in a great degree threatened by the enemy. I therefore abandoned Dutumi, and withdrew the main body an hour’s march to the south, across the Mgeta river, where the Force occupied an extensive fortified camp, which it continued to hold for months. By this move the rich fields of Dutumi were unfortunately given up. In the poor country of Kiderengwa we had to depend mainly on supplies from the rear, which were sent up from the Rufiji. Unfortunately the fatigues of this transport work, combined with sickness caused by tse-tse, very soon led to the almost complete loss of our pack-donkeys. From Kiderengwa our fighting patrols attacked the enemy’s communications, which ran to the north-east from Dutumi, as well as the Dutumi-Kissaki road, which soon became alive with enemy detachments and transport.
Various observations now concurred in disclosing remarkable movements on the part of the enemy. Both east and west of the Uluguru Mountains movements of troops in such strength were seen to be taking place towards Morogoro, that the natives said: “Wana hama” (“They are moving elsewhere”). A large number of the South African Europeans, of whom, by the way, many had come to the end of their strength, were sent home. Other observations disclosed a movement of troops towards the east. Generally speaking, a period of rest ensued, which was only interrupted by minor expeditions of patrols and occasional artillery bombardments.
General Smuts realized that his blow had failed. He sent me a letter calling upon me to surrender, by which he showed that, as far as force was concerned, he had reached the end of his resources.