At Lindi the enemy had strengthened himself more and more, and it was reported that detachments were being transported by sea to Lindi, which hitherto had been posted west of Kilwa. General O’Grady, who had commanded a brigade at Kibata, also appeared at Lindi. The obvious idea that the enemy would advance from Lindi against our weak forces and our main supply area, as had been his intention earlier at Kilwa, appeared to be materializing. Several attacks had been beaten off by Captain Looff’s force west of Lindi. At the request of the Governor three of the companies which had arrived under Major Kraut were not, as had been the original intention, used to subjugate quickly and thoroughly the rebellious inhabitants of Makonde, in the south-east corner of our Protectorate, but were put under the command of Captain Looff. Two of them took part in an attack on Sudi, south of Lindi, where the enemy was strongly entrenched. The attack on the fortified position was bravely launched, but suffered heavy losses, and could not be brought to a successful conclusion.
Later, Captain Rothe was ordered to Lindi with reinforcements consisting of three companies from Mpotora. But the rains spoiled our plans. The crossing of the Matendu had already become difficult. All the rain that had fallen in Donde district collected ultimately in the valley of the Matendu, which in the dry season is simply a series of pools. It had become a strong, rushing torrent, like the Fulda in spate at Cassel, and tore up great trees in its course. By making use of some islands, tree-trunks were got into position under the direction of skilled engineers and a bridge to take transport was built; but a sudden rise in the stream repeatedly swept it away, several men being drowned. A footbridge further downstream met with the same fate; a narrow suspension-bridge of ropes made from twisted bark was only of slight service and was somewhat uncertain as, in view of the alternation of strong sunlight and wet, there was always a danger of the ropes rotting and giving way.
At Nahungu, on the Mbemkuru, similar conditions hindered Captain Rothe’s march. The stream was so strong that the first attempt to cross by the few ferry-boats available failed. Driven out of Nahungu by scarcity of supplies, Captain Rothe marched into the fertile region to the north-east, in this way seriously compromising the plans of Headquarters. It was necessary that this fertile country north-east of Nahungu should be spared to serve as a reserve for the forces south of Kilwa and to provide for a strong reinforcement of these troops should tactical reasons make this necessary. The time that was lost before a message could be got through to Captain Rothe was very vexatious, but finally his division was diverted towards Lindi again in time to take part in some of the fighting.
In view of the need for reinforcement of our troops at Lindi owing to increased tension of the military situation and the projected transference of fresh troops to that area, General Wahle had been withdrawn from Mahenge and had taken over the command of the Lindi front; Captain Tafel succeeded him at Mahenge. In the middle of June, 1917, General Wahle had, after several engagements which had brought to light a considerable increase in the enemy’s strength, retired so far up the Lukuledi river that the enemy seemed to be incautiously exposing his north flank.
I decided to make use of this advantage without, indeed, knowing exactly how it was to be done. So much was clear: that only a surprise attack promised success. I therefore advanced, with four companies and the mountain-battery consisting of two guns, through Nahungu, along the main road leading via Lutende to Lindi. At Lutende were encamped Captain von Chappuis’ company and Lieutenant Wunder’s company, and the rest were further back. I went on ahead to reconnoitre, with my able companion Nieuwenhuizen, who had played the chief part in the horse-drive on Erok mountain. From the height on which Chappuis’ company lay, there was an extensive view: one could see the different farmhouses round Lindi and the Lukuledi river with the steamer President, which had taken refuge there and been rendered useless. It was, perhaps, fortunate that no wild pigs or bush deer had come within range of our guns in this otherwise gameless district, for not far from Chappuis’ camp we crossed the trail of a strong enemy patrol which must only just have passed. The talk of the natives, too, led us to suppose that they had recently seen something interesting. When we questioned them they would tell us nothing. Making a wide détour, we arrived in the evening, after dark, at the camp of Wunder’s company. We reported our observations to the company commander and the capable guide Inkermann, who died a hero’s death a few days later, warning them to keep a sharp look-out. Orders were also given that this camp, situated as it was in an open plain and exposed to fire from the surrounding bush, should be moved. After a cup of tea we returned to our main force about a quarter of an hour’s march to the rear.
On the morning of 30th June we heard increasing rifle-fire from the direction of Wunder’s company. Assuming that the enemy had taken advantage of the lie of the ground and was firing on the camp from the surrounding bush, I immediately advanced with the three companies to the right through the bush, so as to strike the road further south and so take the enemy in the rear. Soon, however, we met some Askari, who told us that a strong force of the enemy had forced its way into the camp, taking the company by surprise and driving it out. A young Askari complained to an old “Betschausch” (sergeant) of the third company that the enemy had taken everything from them. “Niemaza we, tutawafukuza” (shut your mouth, we’ll soon have ’em out), was the defiant answer which at once shamed the excited youth into silence. The sergeant’s answer indeed hit off the position. The enemy, consisting of the 5th Indian Regiment and a few natives, had thought to find only a weak German outpost. He had rashly penetrated into our badly-placed entrenchments and was now in his turn exposed on all sides to a concentrated fire from the bush.
The position was so clear that it called for the quickest possible independent action by the subordinate leaders, and Captain von Chappuis also attacked at once. Staff-Surgeon Mohn (afterwards killed), who had remained in Wunder’s camp and had temporarily fallen into the enemy’s hands, described the very harassing effect of our concentrated fire at short range and the panic it caused among the enemy. Nevertheless, the cover afforded by a few ravines and the undergrowth enabled some of the enemy to get away. These fled wildly. A number so entirely lost themselves that they were picked up in the bush days afterwards by our patrols in a half-starved condition. We inflicted about 120 casualties. In addition to recovering our own ammunition, which had fallen temporarily into the enemy’s hands, we captured the enemy’s ammunition which he had just brought into the camp, about a hundred rifles and some machine guns. Among the severely wounded whom we took to the English camp at Naitiwi, and there handed over, was the commanding officer of the English regiment. He afterwards died of his wound.
We stayed a few weeks longer in the fertile district of Lutende and tried with our patrols to inflict losses on the enemy, whose fortified camps at, and south of, Naitiwi offered no prospect of successful attack. Far to the south we often heard the explosion of air-bombs and of the heavy guns which were bombarding Wahle’s division. Von Chappuis’ company was marched to reinforce Wahle’s force. Apart from some skirmishing our success at Lindi was followed by a lull in the operations.
That this was only the prelude to new efforts on the enemy’s part was borne out not only by the reports of the transport of strong forces to Kilwa, and also by the fact that at the end of May General Hoskins, who had taken over command from General Smuts, had been relieved by General van Deventer. Once more a Boer was in command, and the rumours that fresh European troops were being brought from South Africa seemed to be confirmed. South of Kilwa the enemy attacked our nine companies with three brigades, but Captain von Lieberman, who had taken over from Captain Goering, the latter being seriously ill, succeeded with extraordinary skill in beating off the superior forces of the enemy. On July 6th, at least a brigade made a frontal attack on Captain Lieberman at Unindi and was repulsed with heavy losses. The bold charge of our companies cost us heavily too; among the casualties was Lieutenant Bleeck, who received a mortal wound in the stomach while leading his company. This brave and upright personality had done excellent service both as a fearless patrol-leader and on the Headquarters Staff, and I knew him intimately. Von Lieberman’s right flank was covered against another enemy brigade by Captain Spangenberg with two of the nine companies. He carried out his task and attacked the enemy brigade so energetically with his two companies that, as we heard later, the English reports spoke of an attack by very strong enemy forces.