My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

When we came to Ili, the English telegraphic station situated there was quickly captured. The papers found there gave useful information as to the movements of the enemy troops. According to this there were considerable stores at Numarroe and Regone; strong forces were to try to overtake us from Alto-Moloque and Mukubi, while one column followed immediately on our track. The enemy, who up to a short time back had been groping in the dark, had apparently received, a few days before, reliable information as to our movements. It was very difficult to find the road to Regone, as no guides could be raised. From Ili, however, a newly erected telephone line of copper wire led to Numarroe. If we followed this line we were sure to come upon something useful. As a matter of fact parts of the enemy columns were near us when we left Ili. The patrols we had left behind even met some Askari whom they took to be friends: they exchanged cigarettes and lights with these and did not realize until afterwards that they were enemies.

During these days I was much occupied with a domestic question. The supply of bread for the European prisoners became difficult in view of the prolonged marches. The men were unskilled and not in a position to help themselves. At last I succeeded in getting over the difficulty, and had considerable quantities of flour prepared by other methods. Captain Krüger, who had charge of the prisoners of war and died soon afterwards, was already very ill and exhausted by hardships; with the best intentions he had not always managed to find the ways and means of meeting the wishes of the prisoners, which were often very exacting.

In the morning of 24th August we crossed the Likungo river, and continued our march towards Numarroe. We could already see, several miles in breadth, the hill and the buildings of Boma Numarroe. During a halt we lunched in the congenial company of Lieutenant Ott, Sergeant-Major Nordenholz and the other officers of the advance guard. We had long grown accustomed during the halts to bring out, without ceremony, a piece of bread and a box of lard or hippopotamus fat. Naval Lieutenant Freund even still possessed some butter from Namacurra. Even the Askari and bearers, who formerly used to wait for their meal until camp was pitched, adopted more and more the “desturi” (manners, customs) of the Europeans. As soon as a halt was called every black would bring out his lunch. It was very jolly when the whole force bivouacked in this way in the forest, in the best of spirits, and refreshed themselves for fresh exertions, fresh marches and fresh fighting.

We were still two hours east of Numarroe when the advance guard was fired on. An enemy company had camped on our line of march and was slowly and cleverly retreating before us from kopje to kopje in the direction of Numarroe. Lieutenant Ott, who was shot through the chest, was in a very serious condition. With the main body led by Goering’s detachment, I made a detour, and, passing the enemy to the south, made straight for the Boma of Numarroe. Before dark our gun was brought into position and fire opened on the Boma and its entrenchments. Goering’s detachment, without loss of time, made a still wider detour to the south in order, by using a ravine, to come close up to the Boma in the rear. The advance guard (Müller’s detachment), which was out of sound of the fighting, was also quickly brought up. The enemy shooting was not bad, and in spite of the distance the rifle bullets of the infantry came very close whenever one of us exposed himself.

It soon grew dark; the firing increased and died down again, until suddenly heavy firing was heard from the direction of Goering’s detachment. Then there was silence. Goering’s detachment had surprised the enemy in the rear and stormed some stubbornly defended trenches. The retreating enemy was, however, not recognized as the enemy by another German detachment and got away. The night was unpleasantly cold; it was pouring with rain and our baggage had not yet come up. On the following day 3 enemy Europeans and 41 Askari were buried by us; 1 European and 6 Askari wounded, 1 European, 7 Askari and 28 other blacks unwounded were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was the enemy Commander, Major Garrod, who commanded the half of the 2nd battalion 4th King’s African Rifles here. On our side, Sergeant-Major Nordenholz was shot through the head; 6 Askari and 1 machine-gun bearer were killed; 3 Europeans, 18 Askari and 4 machine-gun bearers were wounded; 40,000 rounds of ammunition and two light machine guns, in addition to hand-grenades, medical stores and large quantities of supplies, were captured. Among our wounded left behind in the clean, massively built houses was Lieutenant Ott, cheerful as ever. Fortunately, his wound was not so serious as was feared at first, but it was not possible to take him with us.

On August 25th I wanted at all costs to reach the camp of Regone. From captured papers I knew that valuable stores had been taken to Regone to be safe from us, including trench-mortar ammunition. Regone was probably, for the moment, still weakly garrisoned. In view of the proximity of the enemy columns it might, however, be assumed that August 26th would already be too late for a coup de main. The path led through a pass in the steep rocky hills. During the march our advance guard soon came upon the enemy and engaged him, while I, with the main force, passed round this enemy and marched direct on Regone. During the climb over the hilly country, where it was only possible to see a short distance ahead, two German detachments, mistaking each other for the enemy, nearly became engaged. The machine guns were already in position when the mistake was fortunately discovered.

We then advanced further over the hills, while below us, already considerably in the rear, could be heard the machine-gun fire of our advance guard. The march was so difficult, and as we could only cross the hills in single file, our column was so long that Regone, my objective for that day, was not nearly reached. As a matter of fact we had no exact idea where Regone was. Only the fact that we could see in the distance the converging of several paths led us to conclude that Regone must lie there. Half way to Regone we saw a large encampment of tents which I took to be the other half of the battalion which had marched from Regone to the support of Numarroe.

In pouring rain we had to pitch our camp in the bush. On the next day the camp we had observed had been struck. The Boma of Regone was held in considerable strength. An attack on this place over the bare hills offered no prospect of success, and we confined ourselves to skirmishes with patrols and single detachments. As I had seen from his papers, the enemy had given orders that we should be allowed to strike at Regone unhindered and then attacked in the flank or rear by the strong reserves which lay outside. It was therefore necessary to exercise particular caution, and the impetuosity with which Lieutenant Boell’s company, in spite of all these considerations, advanced on the Boma might have had serious consequences. Several enemy camps and columns outside the entrenchments were surprised by our fire and some supplies captured. The captured papers informed us of the approach of strong enemy columns from the south and south-east towards Regone. But there were also troops to the north; whether these were in the neighbourhood of Lioma-Malacotera or at Malema could not be ascertained. It was, however, certain that they were at hand and it was probable that they were approaching Regone, and that from the north.

As a coup de main against Regone offered no prospect of success, and a prolonged enterprise, in view of the intervention to be expected from outside, could not be relied on, I determined to resume the march. On account of the obstacles formed by the rivers and swamps south of Lake Nyassa, the line of march I had formerly decided on to the west appeared ill-advised, especially as the enemy could, with the help of steamers and railways, easily concentrate and maintain a force there. A further march north seemed to me more practicable, passing the lake on the east; it seemed probable that our return to German East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would take our objective to be the natural capital of this district, Tabora. Under this impression he might be expected, in order to save his main force the difficult overland march to Tabora, to withdraw to the Portuguese coast, take ship from there to Dar-es-Salaam, and proceed by rail to Tabora. These calculations were to a large extent realized. It was natural that, having reached the north end of Lake Nyassa, I should continue my march, not to Tabora but in another direction, probably west. In any case, the first thing was to reach the north end of the lake. This could not be done in less than a month and meanwhile the situation might alter considerably.

At Regone we observed the concentration of strong enemy forces, who examined our camps immediately after our departure but followed us only slowly. The country, with its numerous ravines and water-courses, was particularly favourable to us. On the way to Lioma a considerable enemy supply dump was captured, including a large quantity of tobacco. Müller’s detachment, which had gone on ahead to Lioma, soon reported the enemy occupation of this place, but could not obtain any exact information as to his strength. I reached this advance detachment on 30th August with the main force. The position of the enemy entrenchments in the thick bush had not yet been located with any exactness. Apparently he had only just arrived and had not yet completed his works. I therefore attacked immediately. The detachments of Müller and Goering marched round the enemy to take him from the north. Meanwhile the main force gradually closed in along several ravines in the forest.