On the 17th October, I quitted Ubena with the main body, leaving behind there, sick or wounded, General Wahle, two other Europeans, and some Askari. I reached Kidugala on this day. Koehl’s detachment followed on the 18th October. On the same day, the Boma Ubena was occupied by some 100 enemy Askari, while 200 to 300 advanced northwards to the Iringa road. We learnt from captured newspapers that Cambrai had fallen on the 29th September and that the Belgians had advanced 3 kilometres west of Roubaix. We read, too, of the cessation of hostilities in Bulgaria, of the retirement of Count Hertling, and of the capture of St. Quentin and Armentières. But positions could be given up for so many different reasons that I did not attribute any decisive importance to this news.
Our further march past Ngombowano and Brandt led us through a district well stocked with cattle. Missions and schools had been deserted, but we were very glad to find garden fruits, especially mulberries and peaches. In the bush we also found great quantities of wild figs and other sweet and tasty fruits. Small patrol encounters indicated that enemy troops were moving direct from Lake Nyassa northwards into the Brandt district. In Ruiwa we found large English depots, and we had to destroy a whole warehouse full of leather. We went on to the mission of Old Utengule, also well known to me from peace time, and now lying deserted. We then reached Mbozi mission, where the English had assembled the men from the district, examined them, and sent them to New Langenburg, probably in order to turn them into Askari there. At Mbozi there was a large English depot, containing, among other things, 75 loads of salt and 47 loads of coffee.
It was difficult to feel our way through the district. In the main it was but little known to us, and for years the enemy had been altering it by building storehouses and transport roads. To have reconnoitred in advance would have made too great a demand on our time and strength, besides depriving us of the advantage of surprise. The inhabitants were very hostile to the English and rendered us valuable service, but their information was too often very vague. While we rested a day in Mbozi and replenished our stores, our patrols were far afield, one towards Galula (St. Moritz’ mission), another towards Itaka, one in the direction of New Langenburg, and one in that of Fife. Some of them would be away for weeks, and we could not wait for their reports.
This much, however, became clear, that a main communication road of the enemy ran past Mbozi from Fife via Rwiba to New Langenburg. On this road we captured a lot of stores and several supply columns on the march. The existence of this road showed that a large English depot must lie in the neighbourhood of Fife. It would probably be possible to capture this by swift action, before stronger enemy forces arrived there. On the morning of 31st October a fighting patrol was dispatched against Fife. On the evening of the same day natives and patrols reported the advance of strong enemy forces on the New Langenburg-Rwiba road. In the early morning of the 1st November I moved off with the whole force, advancing in the first instance towards Mount Rwiba. There the track showed that a strong enemy column had passed the Rwiba hill shortly before us, in the direction of Fife. This enemy force had not been observed by a German fighting patrol that had been sent out to Mount Rwiba.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA
THE second patrol dispatched by us on the 31st October towards Fife had halted at Mount Rwiba. I had now to advance with the whole force towards Fife, in order to reach it before the enemy, or to attack if our first patrol should prove to be engaged there. The ten-hour march (actual marching time) from Mbozi to Fife was a tremendous strain on the force, but the reports of our patrols, the track of the enemy, and his notes found on the trees, proved beyond a doubt that the enemy was doing everything possible to reach Fife on the same day, the 1st November. The great distance which they, too, had to march justified us in assuming that our patrol, which I expected would reach Fife on the 31st October, or at the latest on the 1st November, would be equal to preventing the enemy occupying the depot at Fife on the 1st. In the course of the afternoon we fired on several patrols, without halting in our advance. Late in the afternoon weak enemy detachments in the hills near Fife were quickly thrown back. I myself, with Spangenberg’s detachment, which had moved off the road to the right, advanced along a mountain ridge on to a point where we judged that Fife would lie.
The ground was becoming more open, being mainly covered with knee-high bush and grass, when a few hundred yards before us we observed men moving about and tents pitched close together. The men were moving about in such unconcerned fashion that I almost took them for our own patrol, but at 200 yards we were received with violent and at first very well directed rifle and machine-gun fire. It was fortunate that our men did not answer it, for I had happened to get in advance and was between the two parties. After a time the enemy, who had apparently become very excited, began to fire high. It started to grow darker, so that my patrol was able to get back to our line. We had, at any rate, reached certainty. We knew that the enemy with a strength of several companies was lying before us in an entrenched position with a good field of fire. His advanced detachments had been thrown back. His depots lay in part outside the trenches, and later fell into our hands. I did not want to undertake the storming of the position, which would have been costly, but the opportunity seemed favourable to bombard the enemy, massed as he was in the position, with our trench-mortar, and also from a height with our gun, as well as with rifle and machine-gun fire if he should show himself. Our machine guns were accordingly moved forward in the night close to his position and entrenched. Reconnaissance for a good gun position was postponed to the next day.
It was probable that the opening of our trench-mortar and gun-fire would lead the enemy advancing from New Langenburg to attack us. Such an attack against our heights would have been very difficult. But in spite of the bombardment on the 2nd November, which was observed to cause some losses, no new enemy appeared. The definite success for which we hoped against the camp was not achieved, since our trench-mortar was destroyed at one of the first shots by a prematurely bursting shell. Flat trajectory fire alone could do nothing against the well-protected enemy. In the afternoon, therefore, our main body, with its herds of cattle more than 400 strong, marched off, between Fife and the Mwenzo mission towards Rhodesia. When we had reached camp, we saw heavy columns of smoke rising from the depots at Fife, to which Müller’s detachment had set fire after our departure. From the direction of the Mwenzo mission we heard short bursts of fire on several occasions.