My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

In the afternoon of the 14th November, I cycled back to our main body and told the Europeans what I had learned at the Chambezi, and that it was my intention to carry out the conditions which had been officially communicated to me, conditions the accuracy of which I did not doubt.

Before the prisoners were released Colonel Dickinson, the most senior of them, came to look for me to say good-bye. He said that his period of captivity (it had been more than three months) had given him an interesting insight into our camp life, our marching methods, and the way in which we conducted our actions. He was full of praise for the simplicity of our arrangements and the absence of friction which distinguished our operations. There is no doubt he had been using his eyes.

Our Askari were now informed of the turn of affairs. It was to be anticipated that there would be difficulties when it came to settling up with them for their pay, which was years overdue, and the same applied to the carriers. Yet it was a matter of honour for us to see that these people, who had fought and worked for us with such devotion, should receive their rights. The sum involved—about one and a half million rupees—was relatively small, and so Lieutenant Kempner was sent out on a bicycle to get this sum from the English, or induce them to procure it as quickly as possible. Our repeated efforts were without result. We were told at different times and places that the matter was “under consideration” by the War Office, and there it remained. I never even received a reply to my telegram to the German Government in Berlin. There was nothing for it but to draw up lists of all the back pay that was due, and give the individual carriers and Askari certificates against it.

We then marched by short stages through Kasama to Abercorn. The British gave us further details about the armistice conditions. It appeared that not “unconditional surrender” (as General van Deventer had said originally) but “unconditional evacuation” was what was required. I made several protests against the interpretation of the British War Office, which made the word “evacuation” include surrender and disarming, but I received no answer either from the Governments of the allied countries and the United States, or from the German Government. In view of the doubtful interpretation of the word “evacuation,” I considered whether I should not cut short negotiations and march to join the Belgians or somewhere else. But in comparison to the whole series of peace conditions which affected the Protective Force, this seemed a small point, and in the end I decided to go to Dar-es-Salaam, as General van Deventer required, though certainly in the expectation that in accordance with the terms the English would immediately send us back from there to Germany. As will appear later that expectation was not fulfilled.

Not far north of Kasama we came up with the enemy with whom we had fought our last engagement. They were the 1st battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles. I had to refuse the invitation of Colonel Hawkins (their estimable commander, who was barely thirty years old), communicated to me on the march by Colonel Dickinson, to bring all the German officers to lunch, much though I appreciated such an expression of chivalry. Yet Colonel Dickinson did not neglect to pay me his promised visit on one of the following days, and we had a very pleasant hour over a cup of coffee. I must record that the officers of this battalion, even in the somewhat difficult circumstances in which they were placed, behaved with great tact and with that regard which is due to an honourable foe. Hawkins told me that for reasons of supply he would not have been able to follow us any further, and in fact we had to help him out with cattle, of which we had an ample stock.

Lieutenant Kempner had gone on to Abercorn on his bicycle. When he came back I went there myself in a car which General Edwards had sent for me. My reception by General Edwards, as well as his Staff, was very kind. I put forward my point of view to General Edwards that I did not recognize any duty to surrender of our arms, but was ready to do so if I was thereby conferring some advantage, not on ourselves individually, but on the German Government. I was then informed that the arms we surrendered would form part of the quantity which Germany had to hand over to the Allied Governments in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Further, the surrender of our arms should not have the character of a laying-down of arms.

As regards the Askari and carriers, I was informed that the English would take them to an internment camp at Tabora, until the question of their pay had been settled and their repatriation arranged. The Europeans were to be interned at Dar-es-Salaam until their ship left, presumably, therefore, for a few days. Not only the Askari but the Europeans at Dar-es-Salaam were kept behind barbed wire for a month and a half and more.

The troops arrived at Abercorn on the 25th November. The English flag was waving on the parade-ground where the handing-over of arms took place, and this shows that the character of a surrender of our arms was not altogether avoided. What we handed over was as follows:

1 Portuguese gun, 37 machine guns (7 German, 16 heavy and 14 light English), 1,071 English and Portuguese rifles, 208,000 rounds, 40 rounds of artillery ammunition. The English were mighty quick at getting away the surrendered material. There was not a single modern German rifle among it! The strength of our troops was: the Governor, 20 officers, 5 medical officers, a doctor of the Voluntary Medical Detachment, a senior veterinary officer, a senior chemist, a field-telegraph officer, 125 European other ranks, 1,156 Askari and 1,598 carriers. The arrival of individual detachments was delayed for hours by heavy rain.

The camp for the Askari was surrounded by a thick thorn hedge, and was much too small. This led to a good deal of bad feeling among our Askari, which vented itself in frequent demonstrations against the English Askari. But at length our people resigned themselves to the uncomfortable conditions, and even General Edwards realized that the treatment provided an opportunity for unnecessary friction. We were not ordinary prisoners of war, whose escape he had to fear, but had given ourselves into his hands voluntarily in the performance of an unpleasant duty. He took precautions against similar occurrences during our march to Bismarckburg, and we went there with Hawkins’ battalion and without the slightest friction. On November 28th we bivouacked by the mighty waterfall of the river Kalambo, three hours’ march from Bismarckburg. Here we remained several days, as the departure of the steamer from that place was being continually delayed. Many of my officers continually badgered me to know whether we could not fight on. These suggestions were far from comfortable, as I had already quite enough to do to consider how we should get out of so unpleasant a situation. But putting aside the difficulties involved, I could only feel glad and proud of such a revelation of true soldierly spirit, a spirit which did not shrink, even after we had handed over all our arms, from storming an enemy camp and once more procuring for ourselves the means to continue the war.