6. The contrary defect, namely, a sycophantic amiability, which approves of everything and admires everything: example, the Philinte of Molière.
Besides these different illusions which are due to ourselves and our own weaknesses, there are others engendered from without, or at least from the divers aspects under which things present themselves to us:
151. Illusions arising from objects.—1. The mixture of the true and the false, of good and evil which we see in things, is cause that we often confound them. Thus do the good qualities of the persons we esteem cause us to approve their defects, and vice versa. Now, it is precisely in this judicious separation of good from evil that a correct mind shows itself.
2. Illusions arising from eloquence and flowery rhetoric.
3. Ill-natured interpretations of people’s peculiar views founded on mere appearances or hearsay; as, for example: such a one goes with doubtful characters, ergo, he is a bad character himself; such another associates with free-thinkers, ergo, he is a free-thinker likewise; a third criticises the government, ergo, he is a rebel; he approves its acts, ergo, he is a courtier, etc., etc.
4. False deductions drawn from a few accidental occurrences; as for instance: medicine does not cure all diseases, hence it cures none; there are frivolous women, hence all women are frivolous; there are hypocrites, hence piety is nothing but hypocrisy.
5. Error of judging of bad or good advice from subsequent events. As for example: Such or such an event followed upon such and such advice, hence it was good—it was bad.
6. Sophistry of authority. It consists in accepting men’s opinions on the strength of certain qualities they may possess, although these qualities may have nothing to do with the matter in hand. For instance, by reason of their age, or piety, or, what is worse, of wealth and influence. Certainly we do not exactly say in so many words: such a one has a hundred pounds income, and must therefore be right; but there is nevertheless something similar going on in our minds, which runs away with our judgment without our being conscious of it.
In pointing out these various dangers upon which good judgment and upright reasoning are often wrecked, we indicate sufficiently the rules which ought to serve in the education of the mind: for it is enough to be warned against such errors, and be endowed with a certain amount of correct judgment, to recognize and avoid them.
152. Prudence.—From the faculty of judging and having an opinion about things, let us pass on to the third quality of the mind, namely: prudence, which consists, as Aristotle informs us, in deliberating well before doing anything, and which is the art of well discerning our interest in the things concerning us, and the interest of others in the things concerning them.