Seneca, in his treatise on Anger, has conclusively shown all the evils this passion carries with it, and of which Horace justly said: “Anger is a short madness.”
Yet, if anger is an evil, apathy, absolute indifference, is far from being a good. Whilst there is a brutal and beastly anger, there is also a noble, a generous anger, namely, that which is at the service of noble sentiments. Plato describes it in the following terms:
“When we are convinced that injustice has been done us, does it not plead the cause of what appears to it to be just? Instead of allowing itself to be overcome by hunger, by cold, by all sorts of ill-treatments, does it not overcome them? It never ceases a moment to make generous efforts toward obtaining satisfaction, and nothing but death depriving it of its power, or reason persuading or silencing it, as the shepherd silences his dog, can stop it.”[133]
Aristotle also approves of this generous anger, and blames those with souls too cold:
“One can only call stupid those who cannot be aroused to anger about things where real anger ought to be felt.... He who does not then get angry appears insensible and ignorant of what just indignation means. One might even believe him, since he has no feeling of courage, unable to defend himself when necessary. But it is the cowardice of the slave’s to accept an insult and to allow his kin to be attacked with impunity.”[134]
But that which is not easy, as Aristotle remarks, is to find an exact and proper medium between apathy and violence:
“It is difficult to determine with accuracy the manner, the persons, the occasions, and the length of time for which one ought to be angry, and at what point one ceases to act rightly or wrongly. For he who transgresses the limit a little is not blamed, whether it be on the side of excess or deficiency: and we sometimes praise those who fall short, and call them meek; and we call the irascible manly, as being able to govern ... the decision must be left to particular cases, and to the moral sense.”[135]
163. Personal dignity.—A generous anger, as has been seen, has its principle in the sentiment of personal dignity, with which the duty of self-respect is connected.
Man’s free will is what essentially constitutes the dignity of human nature, the moral personality. Man’s duty toward himself as a moral personality is then dependent upon his will.
This duty of self-respect, of the moral personality, has been admirably expressed by Kant, and we can do no better than transcribe here the passage: