1. Slavery cannot arise from a contract between the master and the slave; for to consent to slavery is to renounce one’s manhood, of which no one can dispose at his will.
To renounce one’s liberty is to renounce one’s manhood, and the rights of humanity, even one’s duties. There is no reparation possible for him that renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man, and is depriving his actions of all morality, and his will of all liberty.
2. Such a contract is contradictory, for the slave giving himself wholly and without reserve, can receive nothing in return.
It is a vain and contradictory agreement to stipulate an absolute authority on one side, and on the other unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that one can be under no obligation towards him of whom one has a right to demand everything? and does not this single condition, without equivalent, without exchange, carry with it the nullity of the act? For what right could my slave have against me, since all he has belongs to me, and that his right being my own, this my right against myself is a word without any sense.
3. Even if one had the right to sell one’s self, one has not the right to sell one’s children. Slavery at least should not be hereditary.
Admitting that one could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children; they are born men and free; their liberty is their own; no one has a right to dispose of it but themselves.
Before they have reached the age of reason, their father may, in their name, stipulate conditions for their welfare, but not give them irrevocably and unconditionally over to another; for such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and passes the rights of paternity.
4. Slavery, furthermore, comes not from the right of killing in war; for this right does not exist.
The conqueror, according to Grotius, having the right to kill the conquered enemy, the latter may ransom his life at the expense of his liberty: an agreement all the more legitimate, as it turns to the profit of both.
But it is clear that this pretended right to kill the conquered adversary does not result in any way from the state of war.... One has a right to kill the defenders of the enemy’s State as long as they hold to their arms; but when they lay these down and surrender, and cease to be enemies, they become simply men again, and one has no longer a right on their life.