Gratitude.—Gratitude should be considered a holy duty. We call, in fact, holy any moral object regarding which no act could entirely acquit one of the contracted obligation. Now there is no way of acquitting one’s self of a benefit received, because he who receives it cannot refuse to him who grants it the merit and advantage of having been the first in showing his kindness.
The least degree of gratitude is to render to the benefactor equivalent services. It is, also, never to look upon a kindness received as upon a burden one would be glad to be rid of (under pretext that it places the one under obligation in a position inferior to that of his benefactor, which is wounding to his pride). One must, on the contrary, accept it as a moral kindness, that is to say, as furnishing us an opportunity to practice a virtue. (Ibid., p. 130, 132.)
70. Precautions which benevolence requires.—Benevolence should not be exercised without reserve and precaution. In abandoning one’s self to it imprudently, one may do more harm than good. Cicero on this subject recommends three principal precautions:
“One must take care,” he says:
“1. Lest, in wishing to do a person good, one does harm, either to him or to others;
“2. In the second place, let not our benevolence exceed our means;
“3. Finally, let every one be treated according to his deserts.”
1. Those, in fact, whose benevolence injures him who is the object thereof, should be looked upon as flatterers, rather than generous men. Those who injure some, to be generous towards others (as, for example, to omit paying one’s debts, in order to exercise charity), commit the same injustice as if they appropriated what belongs to others. Thus, when Sylla and Cæsar transferred to strangers the property of lawful owners, they were not generous; liberality may exist then where justice is absent.
2. The second precaution is to exercise our benevolence according to our means. Those who wish to be more benevolent than they can afford, are in the first place unjust to their family; since the property, to the inheritance of which it has a right, goes thus over to strangers. Such generosity often leads, moreover, to the enriching of one’s self at the expense of others, in order to provide for liberalities. One sees, thus, many people, more vain than generous, pass for being benevolent. It becomes then a borrowed virtue, which has more of vanity than liberality.
3. The third rule is, whilst dispensing our liberalities, to proportion them to merit; to consider the morals of him who is their object, the attachment he shows us, the different relations he may have with us; lastly, the services he may have rendered us. It were desirable he had all these titles to our benevolence; but if he has them not all, the greatest and largest in numbers should weigh most in the scales.