Elements of Morals / With Special Application of the Moral Law to the Duties of the Individual and of Society and the State

by Paul Janet

75. Three groups of societies.—Cicero and Fénélon remark that there are three sorts of societies among men: the first comprises the whole of humanity; the last, which is the most circumscribed, is what is called the family. But between the family and the human race in general, there is an intermediate society, larger than the one and more circumscribed than the other, and this is what is called the country.

76. Patriotism.—The sentiment which binds us to the country, and which, articulated, becomes a duty, is what is called patriotism. We have already given elsewhere,[59] an analysis of patriotism. Let us repeat what we have said:

Patriotism is one of our most complex sentiments: it is in fact composed of many distinct elements: it is, in the first place, the love of the soil where we were born; and this soil is at first the narrow territory where our youth passed, and which we embraced entire with the eyes and recollections: it is the native village, the native city. But if this is the first sense of country, it falls far short of embracing the whole country. The love for the native church steeple is not patriotism: it is even its opposite often. The soil must extend, widen, and from the natal house, must gradually embrace, by successive additions, the village, the town, the county, the province, the whole country. But what is to determine the extent of this territory? Who is to decide that it shall go so far and no farther? There enter into it many elements: first, the inhabitants, the fellow-citizens, fellow-countrymen; a soil deserted would not be a country; to the love of the territory there must be added the love of those who inhabit it with us, or of our fellow-countrymen; to the nomadic people the country is only their tribe. Conversely, the citizens without the soil are not the country either, for exile in common is not the less exile. Finally, the union of soil and fellow-citizens may still not be the country, at least not all the country; a conquered nation may preserve its soil and its inhabitants, and have lost the country: as Poland, for instance. What, then, are the ties to determine the existence of a country? There are a large number of them, such as the unity of language, the unity of laws, the unity of the flag, historic tradition, and, finally, above all, the unity of government and of an accepted government. A country exists only where there is an independent political state. This political unity does not suffice when the other ties are wanting; when it is a constraint, when peoples united under the same government have different manners, customs, traditions; conversely, unity of language and community of habits, will neither be sufficient when the political unity or a certain form of political unity is wanting. But what, before everything else, constitutes the country, is a common spirit, a common soul, in short, a common name, which fuses into one all these separate facts of which no single one is absolutely necessary, but of which each forms an additional element to the strength of the country. Finally, as a last condition, the association which is to become a country must not, as was the case with the Roman empire, extend over too much territory; for beyond certain limits, patriotism relaxes.

Nature has endowed us with this sentiment of patriotism. There is no one that does not love his country better than other countries, that is not flattered by national glory, that does not suffer from the humiliations and miseries of his native country. But this sentiment is more or less strong, according to temperaments. Often it is nothing more than a sentiment, and does not express itself in actions. It is the reflective faculties which make of patriotism a duty, which duty demands that sentiment pass into action; demands of all the citizens the same acts, whatever be the personal inclinations of each.

The duties imposed on each man in regard to the particular society of which he is a member, are called civil duties. He, himself, in regard to this society, is what is called a citizen; finally, the society itself, considered as one and the same person, of which the citizens are the members, is what is called the State or the city.

On the whole, there is no difference between country and State. Country is at the same time Society and soil. It is called by that name (State) when looked upon in the light of a family of which the citizens are the children, and also when considered in its relations with other nations and other societies. The State is that same society considered interiorly and in itself, not as to its soil and territory, but as to the members that compose it, and in as far as these members form one and the same body and are governed by laws. The country is a more concrete and more vivid expression, which appeals more to the feelings; the State is a more abstract expression, which addresses itself to reason. Besides, we shall understand better what is meant by the State, when we shall have explained the nature of public authority and the laws.

77. Foundation of the State—Rights.—To understand the nature of the State and what is called authority, sovereignty, magistracy, law, one must begin with the notion of rights and of the different kinds of rights.

Duty is the law which imposes on us obligations either toward ourselves or toward others; it is a moral necessity ([p. 11]). Rights is the power we have to exercise and develop our faculties conformably to our destiny, provided we allow other men the same power: it is a moral power (Leibnitz). Each man, by reason of his enjoying liberty and intelligence, is a person, and should not be treated as a thing. “Man is a thing sacred to man,” said the ancients. He is inviolable in his personality and in all that constitutes the development of his personality.

Thence follows an immediate consequence: it is, that every man being man by the same title, no one can claim for himself a right which he is not willing to recognize at the same time in another; hence the equality of rights. Besides, the liberty of one cannot, without contradiction, suppress the liberty of another, whence this other definition: Right is the accord of liberties.

78. The rights of man.—What are the principal rights of man? They are: the right of self-preservation; the right of going and coming, or individual liberty; the liberty of work; the right of property; the liberty of thought; the liberty of conscience; the right of family, etc.