Among the ground weapons used for discharge of leaflets, there are the following:
- chemical warfare shells converted to leaflet use, especially smokeshells;
- almost every variety of available artillery shell (howitzers having proved especially useful);
- rifle grenades converted for leaflets;
- leaflet bundles with a small quantity of explosive, attached to a quick fuze, packed so as to be thrown in a manner similar to the manual throwing of a grenade.
Mortars were probably the chief leaflet-throwing device on both the European and Asiatic fronts; the Germans went so far as to develop a special propaganda mortar. Smoke shells proved particularly easy to adapt.
The firing of leaflet shells is a responsibility of the unit possessing the guns. Psychological Warfare teams were not issued their own guns, save for unit protection. The actual distribution of leaflet shells was effected, taking the Fifth Army as an example, in the following manner:
- The Army Combat Propaganda Team planned, cleared, printed and packed leaflets suitable for the occasion.
- The Team cleared with the Artillery Officer, Fifth Army, an agreement for an order to use the leaflets.
- The Team's own liaison officers transmit the order to the appropriate divisions and lower echelons. The order itself prescribed the times for picking up the leaflets from the ammunition dumps.
- The Team procures the empty shells and packs them with leaflets.
- The Army order allots 150 leaflet shells per division.
- The Team specifies, in the order, the time-limit within which the shells are to be used.
- Corps and/or division selects the specific targets, the general target being all enemy concentrations within range.
In smaller units, the propaganda unit would often be placed in direct communication with a specific artillery unit, which would be charged with the responsibility for discharging the leaflet shells at opportune times. When a requesting unit asks for leaflets, and itself possesses the guns which could fire leaflet shells, it is entirely possible for the supplier to send leaflets ready-packed in the shells. However, even the most rapid shell-packing job takes considerably more time than the readying of aircraft for leaflet distribution. When it is considered that the plane not only discharges the leaflets, but delivers them from the supply point, all in one operation, it will be seen that close air-ground coordination will often do a quicker, bigger job of leaflet saturation than could be achieved by the requesting, preparing, transporting and firing of leaflet shells.
Contingencies of the Future.
What could a commander do if a delegation called on him, right out in a zone of operations, and demanded a right to be heard? Suppose that he knew their complaints about food, rotation, danger, etc., to be justified, and knew at the same time that the enemy had subverted some of his men into being either dupes or traitors. Suppose his men protested a lack of deep lead-lined shelters the day after enemy leaflets instructed the American soldiers to ask for such shelters. Should he treat all such enlisted men as traitors? Suppose he is faced with the specter of political treason, subversion, and revolution? American officers have not faced such problems since the days in which George Washington was Commander in Chief. War after war, we have gone into the fight with a profound confidence in our ability to win. Future war may hold forth no such assurance. If America is injured, her troops decimated, their homes exploded or poisoned by foreign atomic attack, brand-new questions of psychological warfare will be posed. No living American has ever had to face such problems. This is no assurance that they will never occur. Upon the manhood, the fairness, the sheer intelligence of small-unit commanders there may fall the unexpected task of holding their units together in the face of disastrous psychological attack.
Surrender Leaflets.
Sudden use of surrender leaflets on a victorious or unprepared enemy is not likely to take effect. The Japanese surrender leaflets dropped on the Americans in Southwest Pacific were issued without previous materials readying the Americans. Furthermore, they were dropped when the American situation was plainly improving, and when American soldiers were not likely to be thinking about surrender in order to get individual escape from the war.