The creation of the National Army in the United States, in 1917, while in most ways admirably conducted, was open to criticism in several respects, from the eugenic point of view:
(a) Too many college men and men in intellectual pursuits were taken as officers, particularly in the aviation corps. There should have been more men employed as officers who had demonstrated the necessary qualifications, as foremen and others accustomed to boss gangs of men.
(b) The burden was thrown too heavily on the old white Americans, by the exemption of aliens, who make up a large part of the population in some states. There were communities in New England which actually could not fill their quotas, even by taking every acceptable native-born resident, so large is their alien population. The quota should have been adjusted if aliens were to be exempt.
(c) The district boards were not as liberal as was desirable, in exempting from the first quota men needed in skilled work at home. The spirit of the selective draft was widely violated, and necessitated a complete change of method before the second quota was called by the much improved questionnaire method.
It is difficult to get such mistakes as these corrected; nevertheless a nation should never lose sight of the fact that war is inevitably damaging, and that the most successful nation is the one which wins its wars with the least possible eugenic loss.
Leaving the period of preparedness, we consider the period of open warfare. The reader will remember that, in an earlier chapter, we divided natural selection into (1) lethal, that which operates through differential mortality; (2) sexual, that which operates through differential mating; and (3) fecundal, that which operates through differential fecundity. Again, selection operates both in an inter-group competition and an intra-group competition. The influence of any agency on natural selection must be examined under each of these six heads. In the case of war, however, fecundal selection may be eliminated, as it is little influenced. Still another division arises from the fact that the action of selection is different during war upon the armed forces themselves and upon the population at home; and after the war, upon the nations with the various modifications that the war has left.
We will consider lethal selection first. To measure the effect of the inter-group selection of the armed forces, one must compare the relative quality of the two races involved. The evidence for believing in substantial differences between races is based (a) upon their relative achievement when each is isolated, (b) upon the relative rank when the two are competing in one society, and (c) upon the relative number of original contributions to civilization each has made. Such comparisons are fatal to the sentimental equalitarianism that denies race differences. While there is, of course, a great deal of overlapping, there are, nevertheless, real average differences. To think otherwise is to discard evolution and revert to the older standpoint of "special creation."
Comparison of the quality of the two sides is sometimes, of course, very difficult. One may feel little hesitation in giving a decision in the classical war of the Greeks and Persians, or the more modern case of the English and Afghans, but when considering the Franco-Prussian war, or the Russo-Japanese war, or the Boer war, or the American civil war, it is largely a matter of mere opinion, and perhaps an advantage can hardly be conceded to either side. Those who, misunderstanding the doctrine of evolution, adhere to the so-called "philosophy of force," would answer without hesitation that the side which won was, ipso facto, the better side. But such a judgment is based on numerous fallacies, and can not be indorsed in the sweeping way it is uttered. Take a concrete example:
"In 1806, Prussia was defeated at the battle of Jena. According to the philosophy of force, this was because Prussia was 'inferior' and France was 'superior.' Suppose we admit for the moment that this was the case. The selection now represents the survival of the fittest, the selection which perfects the human species. But what shall we say of the battle of Leipsic? At Leipsic, in 1813, all the values were reversed; it is now France which is the 'inferior' nation.... Furthermore, a large number of the same generals and soldiers who took part in the battle of Jena also took part in the battle of Leipsic. Napoleon belonged, therefore, to a race which was superior to that of Blücher in 1806, but to an inferior race in 1813, in spite of the fact that they were the same persons and had not changed their nationality. As soon as we bring these assertions to the touchstone of concrete reality we see at once how untenable and even ridiculous are direct biological comparisons."[156]
Without going into further detail, it is readily seen that, on the world at large, the eugenic effect of a war would be very different according as the sides differ much or little. Yet this difference in quality, however great, will have no significance, unless the superior or inferior side is in general more likely to lose fewer men. Where the difference has been considerable, as between a civilized and savage nation, it has been seldom that the superior has not triumphed with fewer losses. Victory, however, is influenced much less in these later days by the relative military efficiency of two single nations than by their success in making powerful alliances. But such alignments are by no means always associated with better quality, because (a) there is a natural tendency for the weak to unite against a strong nation, (b) to side with a group which is apparently succeeding, and (c) the alliances may be the work of one or a few individuals who happen to be in positions of power at the critical time.