The ritual and significance of the Winnebago medicine dance

by Paul Radin

To postulate an historical identity, however, on the basis of a number of common elements, in the face of numerous and important differences, implies a specific attitude toward the nature and significance of the common elements in these ceremonies. We know, indeed, that almost all theoreticians place greater insistence upon the similarities than upon the differences in cultural phenomena. There is perhaps a natural tendency to do so. But quite apart from this tendency, there must likewise be certain definite reasons for such an interpretation. It is essential, consequently, to understand at the very outset the theoretical justification of this position.

II. The Interpretation of the Common Elements—Schurtz’s Theory.—This question has been taken up in extenso by Schurtz,[14] in his work on “Age Classes and Men’s Societies.” Here, as well as in previous theoretical discussions, the presence of a number of similarities has been considered sufficient for establishing the identity of a group of ceremonies that admittedly possess a large number of specific peculiarities. But Schurtz gives us a detailed psychological exposition (and in this lies perhaps his superiority over others who have discussed the same subject) of the reasons which have prompted him to take a certain attitude toward these “similarities.” If Schurtz’s work is therefore selected in preference to that of others, it is because of the fact that, in addition to practically taking the same position as most of the other theoreticians, he has most clearly defined some of the assumptions underlying their position.

Schurtz’s line of argument seems to have been the following. An investigation of civilized as well as of primitive organizations has disclosed a number of similarities. Their historical development is unknown; but the enormous distance separating them geographically, precludes the possibility that these similarities have been due either to borrowing or to dissemination from some one original centre. They must consequently be explained by assuming that they have developed independently, as external manifestations of the unity of the human mind. We are thus led to the assumption accepted by most ethnologists to-day, that the human mind tends to express itself in similar modes of thought and action the world over. The variation in these modes is to be ascribed either to the differences in the nature of the geographical and social surroundings or to the emotional and intellectual individuality of different groups of people, or to both. We are, however, concerned here not so much with the variations as with the common modes of thought and action. It is consequently of prime importance to determine first the nature of these modes, their sequence, and the extent to which this sequence has been conditioned by the modes themselves.

We start at the very outset with an implied assumption; for by “sequence,” Schurtz distinctly understood an ordered sequence. His work is primarily an attempt to determine what this ordered sequence has been, and how it has been determined. The norm of organization in which the human race expressed itself primarily, is, according to him, the age-group. Owing to the historical development of various cultural areas, it is no longer possible to detect this “primary element;” and he consequently finds it necessary to demonstrate its existence from another point of view, which is essentially psychological.

The development of the age-group has followed a very definite sequence—definite, because it has been determined by certain inherent tendencies of the human mind. These tendencies are “the instinct for association”[15] (Geselligkeitstrieb) and “the sexual instinct” (Geschlechtstrieb). Granting the existence of these two tendencies, we have then to inquire how they have conditioned the essential similarities in the evolution of our social life, and the forms in which that social life has expressed itself.

There are two possible assumptions. We may assume that at a certain stage of cultural development groups of people possessed no social individuality sufficiently strong to determine their own development, and that the Geselligkeitstrieb and Geschlechtstrieb alone, or reinforced by other factors, were sufficiently strong to condition development along certain lines; or we may, on the other hand, assume that the primary modes in which people have expressed themselves are necessarily of so simple and generalized a type, that they always were the same. Schurtz has practically assumed a stage in human development when the individuality of the component units of a social group was at a minimum; when there was, so to say, a “group mind,” whose initial development is most easily explained by the influence of inherent tendencies. It must be said, in fairness to Schurtz, that the other alternative mentioned above was probably also in his mind. However, he seems to have elaborated his theory with the first alternative constantly before his eyes.

This unexpressed assumption is of the greatest possible moment in Schurtz’s interpretation, because it immediately establishes a certain fixity for his primary norm; and excluding as it does the possibility of variation, because the two tendencies, as constants, are acting upon social groups whose component members have a minimum of individuality, brings it about that the same primary norm must be simple and generalized in its nature.

Schurtz has thus given us a psychological milieu, and we must now proceed to investigate what are the specific norms of development, the method by which these norms have been determined, the nature of their sequence, and how this sequence has been absolutely conditioned. The first two of these points become clearer if we attack the question of sequence first.

It is apparent from Schurtz’s work that to him the necessity for an ordered sequence was self-evident. This acceptance of an ordered sequence as axiomatic was conditioned primarily by the fact that he implied at the very outset that the ordered sequence present in the evolution of biological phenomena was to be found in an essentially comparable manner in the development of civilization. In the same way Schurtz’s use of the terms “highest” and “lowest” and of “intermediate stages” is only inadequately explained when regarded as derived from the study of history. Neither can we assume that these terms were merely a reflection of the conclusion he had drawn from a comparison of the palpable differences between Europeans and “primitive” people. His whole treatment of “intermediate stages,” and of the factors he calls to his aid in explaining them,—such as divergences due to variations from a type, vestiges, functional changes,—these are all strictly biological not merely in their terminology, but likewise in their general connotation.

The justification for equating the processes which have played a large part in historical and biological evolution seemed, indeed, apparent. In the cultural history of any people, we find elements splitting up and giving rise to innumerable variations. In this divergence we meet again and again with two phenomena,—first, that of the general decay of cultural elements, of their total disappearance in some cases and of their persistence as vestigial remains in others; and, secondly, that of the incessant change, of the re-adjustment and re-interpretation of cultural phenomena, so that elements often take upon themselves functions which they originally did not possess, while these original functions are either partially or totally obscured. Numerous other points, more specific in nature, could be adduced to demonstrate more fully the essential similarity of cultural and biological phenomena.