An American Diplomat in China

by Paul S. Reinsch

But American enterprise had already affected the daily life of the Chinese in the field opened up by the Standard Oil Company. In fact, the lamp of Standard Oil had lighted China.

Now enter Mr. Yamaza, the Japanese minister. Japan, who had no oil in her lamp, wished to explore for it in China; so did other nations. But the American oil company, in a way which I shall detail, had gotten the concession. Moreover, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had agreed for $20,000,000 to build a merchant fleet for China, convertible into cruisers—this to take the place of an old imperial contract for warships. At China's express request, and not at all because they were in that business, the Bethlehem people also consented to apply three millions of the whole sum to improve a Chinese port. Together with the Hwai River enterprise these American activities had put Japan on the alert. The Japanese press had distorted their significance, and now in the small Bethlehem contract Mr. Yamaza began to see things—a future Chinese mistress of the Asian seas, perhaps, and the Chinese littoral all besprinkled with naval ports. One evening Mr. Yamaza spoke to me about it, and at length; it was plain that his government meant some move.

Now Mr. Yamaza and his first secretary, Mr. Midzuno, were both unusually clever men. They drank a great deal. The minister explained that he did this for reasons of health, because, unless there were something he could give up if he should be taken sick, it might be very bad for him. I recall how Mr. Midzuno entertained a party at dinner by detailing his notable collection of expressions in various languages, of equivalents to the German term "Katzenjammer." Both of these men had previous Chinese experience and were intimately familiar with Chinese affairs. Yamaza was a man of great shrewdness; being under the influence of liquor seemed rather to sharpen his understanding. Taciturn and speaking in hesitating sentences, he would never commit himself to anything, but would deploy the conversation with great skill, in order to give his interlocutor every chance to do that very thing.

On the evening of this conversation we were guests of the manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. An amateur theatrical performance was in progress—three French "one-acters," the chief being "The Man Who Married a Dumb Wife," by Anatole France. Peking foreign society was there in force; the majority were gathered in the large salon where the stage was set, others promenading or conversing in small groups. In the intermission between two plays I encountered the Japanese minister, and, finding that he desired to talk, wandered with him to the smoking room, where we pre-empted a corner, whence during a long conversation we would catch now and then the echoes from the salon as the action on the stage rose to a more excited pitch.

Mr. Yamaza was more talkative than I had ever seen him. As was his custom, he had consumed ardent waters quite freely, but, as always, his mind was clear and alert. "In Shensi and Chihli provinces," he opened up, "the exertions of Japanese nationals in the matter of the concession to the Standard Oil Company have given them a right to be considered. I have been contending to the Chinese that Japan has a prior interest in the oil field of Shensi Province. Do you not know that Japanese engineers were formerly employed there?"

On my part, I expressed surprise that the Japanese papers should make so much noise about the American oil concession, whereas it was quite natural that Americans, who had done business in China for over a century, should occasionally go into new lines of enterprise.

But it soon became manifest that Mr. Yamaza was thinking of the Bethlehem Steel contract. "I must tell you," he said, "of the strategical importance of Fukien Province to my country." Then followed a long exposition. "China," he concluded, "has promised not to alienate this province to any other power, and Japan has repeatedly asserted an interest in that region."

He then repeated various surmises and reports concerning the nature of the Bethlehem contract. I told him quite specifically the nature of the agreement and about its long previous existence. Mr. Johnston, vice-president of the Bethlehem company, at the request of the Chinese Government had viewed various naval ports with the purpose of making an estimate of improvements which were most needed. I could not admit any sinister significance in this visit nor concede that Americans were not free to engage in port construction in any part of China.

While I had not been unguarded in my statements, I had assuredly not looked upon a conversation in such circumstances as a formal one. Yet I soon found out that a memorandum upon it was presented to the Department of State by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, during an interview with Secretary Bryan on the question of harbour works in Fukien. I shall revert to this matter later.

A peculiarity of Chinese psychology was evinced after the Standard Oil contract had been signed. One year was given to select specific areas within which oil production was to be carried on as a joint enterprise of the Chinese Government and the American company, the ratio of property interest of the two partners being 45 to 55. The contract undoubtedly offered an opportunity for securing the major share in the development of any petroleum resources which might be discovered in China; for, once such a partnership has been established and the work under it carried out in an acceptable manner, an extension of the privileges obtained may confidently be looked for. But in itself the contract signed in February, 1914, was only a beginning. It denoted the securing of a bare legal right; and in China a government decree or concession is not in itself all-powerful. If its motives are suspected, if it has been obtained by pressure or in secrecy, if its terms are not understood or are believed to imply unjust burdens to certain provinces or to the people at large, then popular opposition will arise. This may not affect the legal character of the grant or the responsibility of the Government, but it will seriously obstruct the ready and profitable carrying out of the business. The obverse of this situation—the getting of a contract "on the square" and the demonstration that it is fair and just—finds every influence willing to coöperate.