Then President Yuan Shih-kai and the Foreign Office made their mistake. They were panic-stricken at thought of an ultimatum. They were ready to throw tactical advantage to the winds. Losing sight of the advantage held by China in opposing the demands of Group V, they offered concessions on points contained therein, particularly in connection with the employment of advisers.
But when the Foreign Office emissary came to the Japanese Legation with these additional proposals and the Japanese minister saw how far the Chinese could be driven, he stated calmly that the last instructions of his government left no alternative; the ultimatum would have to be presented. This was done on May 7th at three o'clock in the afternoon.
The Chinese might have foreseen that the demands of Group V would not be included in the ultimatum. Nevertheless, they were astonished at their omission, and annoyed at unnecessarily committing themselves the day before. At first sight, the terms of the ultimatum seemed to dispose of these ominous demands. In the first sense of their relief from a long strain, the Chinese understood the stipulation of the ultimatum that "the demands of Group V will be detached from the present negotiations, and discussed separately in the future," as an adroit way of abandoning these troublesome questions. They were soon to learn that their hopes were not in accord with the ideas of the Japanese.
Why, when the Chinese were virtually ready to agree to all the demands actually included in the ultimatum, should the Japanese not have accepted the concessions, even if they fell slightly short of what was asked? Thus they would avoid the odium of having threatened a friendly government with force; a matter which, furthermore, would in its nature tend to weaken the legal and equitable force of the rights to be acquired. The Japanese made two fundamental mistakes. The first was in their disingenuous denials and misrepresentation of the true character of the demands; the second, in the actual use of an ultimatum threatening force. That these mistakes were serious is now quite generally recognized in Japan. Why they were made in the first place is more difficult to explain.
Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, when Yuan Shih-kai realized that he must unavoidably make extensive concessions, he may have sought a certain quid pro quo in the form of Japanese support for his personal ambitions. This would accord with the hint dropped by the Japanese minister at the beginning of the negotiations. If this explanation be correct, one might possibly understand that Yuan himself in his inmost thought preferred that he should be forced to accept these demands through an ultimatum. The possibility of such motives may have to be considered, yet from my knowledge of the negotiations from beginning to end, I must consider utterly fanciful the charge made by Yuan's enemies that it was he who originally conceived the idea of the twenty-one demands, in order that he might secure Japanese support for his subsequent policies and ambitions.
A reason for the harsh measure of the Japanese Government is admissible. The Japanese may have feared that public opinion throughout the world, which was disapproving the character and scope of these negotiations, would encourage the Chinese to hold out in matters of detail and gradually to raise new difficulties. Moreover, the men who wielded the power of Japan were believers in military prestige and may have expected good results from basing their new rights in China directly on military power.
The ultimatum gave the Chinese Government a little over forty-eight hours, that is, until 6 P.M. on May 9th, for an answer. On May 8th, the cabinet and Council of State met in a session which lasted nearly all day, finally deciding that the ultimatum must be accepted in view of the military threats of Japan.
In their reply to the ultimatum a serious tactical mistake was made. I had been informed that it would be accepted in simple and brief language; that the Chinese Government would say it had made certain grants to the Japanese, which would be enumerated, making no mention of Group V. Toward evening of the 9th a member of the Foreign Office came to me, quite agitated, saying that the Japanese Legation insisted that the demands of Group V be specifically reserved for future discussion. "What form," I asked, "has the Chinese answer taken?" "This," he replied: "'The Chinese Government, etc., hereby accepts, with the exception of the five articles of Group V, all the articles of Group I, etc.' But," he added, "when the draft was submitted to the Japanese Legation, they insisted that after the words 'Group V' there be added the clause 'which are postponed for later negotiation.'" It had been thought necessary, my visitor explained, to state in the reply that something had been refused, in order to save the face of the Government. But it is perfectly plain that if Group V had not been mentioned at all, the Japanese would have found it hard to insist upon its being kept open; for it could not be avowed before other nations as part of the matter covered by the ultimatum. As it was, the demands in Group V were given the character of unfinished business, to be taken up at a future date. Thus portentously, they continued to hang over the heads of the Chinese.
Partly in an exchange of notes, partly in a convention, the concessions exacted through the ultimatum were granted. None of these was ever ratified by the parliamentary body, as the Constitution requires. Because of their origin and of this lack of proper ratification, the Chinese people have looked upon the agreements of 1915 as invalid.
The State Department had cabled on May 6th counselling patience and mutual forbearance to both governments. The advice was needed by Japan, but the instructions came too late; the ultimatum had been presented. I should have found that its delivery would have seemed like whispering a gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door had been slammed to.