When in consequence of the attempted division of Morocco, relations between France and Germany became somewhat strained, Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister, made communications to the French Ambassador to the effect that, while no promises could be given to any Foreign Power, yet in Sir Edward Grey’s opinion, if war was then forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public opinion in England would rally to the material support of France. Sir Edward Grey, as related in his own words, said: “I made no promises and I used no threats, but I expressed that opinion.” The accuracy of that opinion has been questioned, in view of the temper of the House of Commons elected at a time when resentment at the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful.
On the basis of the statement made by Sir Edward Grey, the French Government said to the British Foreign Minister, as reported by him:
“If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.”
Sir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and agreed to it. He authorized that conversations should take place, but with the distinct understanding that nothing which would bind either Government should occur. However, the holding of conversations between two Powers concerning military coöperation is in itself a sufficiently serious matter out of which expectations and relationships are apt to arise that cannot be overlooked in future action. The Cabinet was not informed of the authorization given by Sir Edward Grey until later. He did not state how much later.
We know from official sources that Colonel Barnardiston proceeded to Belgium and had interviews with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff concerning combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp. Colonel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief of Staff that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. When the Belgian documents were published in Germany, it was attempted by the press to represent these conversations as an actual convention. These consultations occurred during the first quarter of 1906.
From an official source comes the statement that in July, 1911, the British Government informed the German, that on certain contingencies, Great Britain would support France (if Germany should demand the whole of French-Congo and Agadir as a naval base). What actually happened at this time has never been fully revealed.
In April, 1912, the British military attaché at Brussels informed the Belgian General Jungbluth that Great Britain had 160,000 men available for despatch to the continent, and added that the British Government in certain contingencies during recent events would have immediately landed troops on Belgian territory.
About this time the Cabinet had a discussion of the whole situation and of the special relationship with France; and it was decided that there should be some definite expression in writing, of the latter. Accordingly, in November, 1912, an exchange of notes took place between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador. The British Foreign Minister wrote the following letter:
Nov. 22nd (1912).
“My dear Ambassador: