Trial of Pedro de Zulueta, jun., on a Charge of Slave Trading, under 5 Geo. IV, cap. 113, on Friday the 27th, Saturday the 28th, and Monday the 30th of October, 1843, at the Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London / A Full Report from the Short-hand Notes of W. B. Gurney, Esq.

by Pedro de Zulueta; William Brodie Gurney

Mr. Kelly. While we were discussing this point, my learned friend called for something else, which I now produce; I do not know that your Lordships decided it. I had objected to the entry in the banker’s book being given in evidence against Mr. Zulueta, unless it was proved that that entry was in some way or other made known to him.

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. I am going to show that certain notes were paid to some person or other, and paid for this vessel; and these letters are evidence to show that he was the owner of the vessel.

Mr. Justice Wightman. There is a certain document taken to the bank, and notes paid for it.

Mr. Kelly. Then I object upon this ground. This is an indictment against Pedro Zulueta. I have not the least objection, that where documents are in existence, and members of the firm are connected with them, that they should be called to explain them; but I do object to any thing being given in evidence, done under the order of another person, unless it is proved to have come home to the knowledge of the prisoner. There is no proof that that entry ever came home to the prisoner, that he ever saw the notes, or that it was by any order signed by him or known to be his signature that these notes were paid, and therefore I object to its being any evidence against him. One can suppose a case like this. It is entirely unlike a mercantile transaction, where notice to one is notice to all the firm. If an action was brought against any one, a document affecting mercantile matters, the act of one partner is the act of all; and where it is a civil action or liability, the act done by the father would be evidence against the son, his partner, and that, though the son was not in England at the time, but was in Spain, and had no notice of the proceedings. Now let us try that: here is a transaction respecting the payment of bank-notes, and if, because it is supposed to be done by the house of Zulueta, it is evidence against this particular member of the firm, without any proof that it was done by him, it would be equally evidence against a member of the firm who was in Spain during the whole of the time; and it might have pleased Sir George Stephen to have selected him as a subject of prosecution; he might have been indicted for equipping this vessel and the other acts charged in the indictment; and if an act done by one member of the firm is evidence against another, it would be evidence against him. I apprehend that, supposing this payment of money to have any thing to do with this transaction, which I apprehend does not appear, unless it is proved it was done with the defendant’s knowledge or by his order, it is no evidence against him; and no act done by another member of the firm is any evidence against him. There is no proof that he saw these notes, or gave any order; and under these circumstances, upon this criminal charge, I submit it is not evidence against him.

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. I am aware of the necessity of the accuracy of the evidence to convict a party on a criminal charge; but I apprehend there is abundant evidence to establish that the notes given were the notes paid for the purchase of the vessel. It is not a case where you have no evidence of Mr. Zulueta having taken a share in the purchase of the vessel; you have evidence of his control over the purchase in his lending the money for the purchase, and that he interfered in the purchase of the vessel. You have also a letter written by him to Captain Jennings in respect of it, and I am going to show that Captain Jennings was present when this sum was paid for the purchase. I am going to trace it to two individuals, Bernardos and Jennings, and I am going to show that these notes were for the purchase of this vessel, and that the prisoner at the bar interferes with the vessel afterwards, as if he was acting as interested in it. I have put in two letters, one from the captain communicating to him as owner, giving an account of the transactions, and asking upon whom he is to draw for the amount required. The letter from Mr. Zulueta states that he will pay all the disbursements; he regrets the captain did not give him the amount, and requests him to go to the Salthouse Dock. In addition to the control over the actual purchase, he states that the money was paid for the purchase, he exercises a control over it, and directs the amount. Then you have the previous letter of Captain Jennings, and you have in these two letters a distinct act of ownership over the vessel, directing where she is to go, and distinctly exercising dominion over her. The question undoubtedly is, whether Captain Jennings was nominally appointed as master, he not being substantially the owner, and whether Mr. Zulueta did not from the beginning to the end transact the business of the vessel. That is for the Jury. I show he exercised control over it, and I show that this money was delivered to a person, and paid in purchase of the vessel. I submit it is quite clear that I am entitled to show that it was paid by these bankers.

Mr. Serjeant Talfourd. I submit that there is another ground on which this evidence is admissible. Pedro Zulueta, the prisoner, has undertaken to give an account of the transaction, and the account given in substance in the evidence is this:—That his house was authorised by Martinez & Co. to advance a certain sum out of the funds in their hands for the purchase of this vessel; that that sum was lent in advance to Captain Jennings by Martinez; that Captain Jennings became the purchaser, and was bonâ fide the owner of the vessel; that is not the precise evidence, but the substance. We propose to show that that account is not true; that the price of the vessel was not 500l.; the extent to which they were authorised to advance, but 650l. That that 650l. was a sum paid in some sort; that it is debited to the account of Martinez & Co.; that that sum was advanced out of the funds at a time when it was impossible that they could have had any communication with Martinez & Co., at the Havannah, to advance beyond the sum of 500l., which was stated to be the sum. Having taken that account, as given in the evidence, we are entitled to show that, in giving this account, the prisoner gave a false account as to a part of the transaction.

Mr. Kelly. If it is competent to my learned friend to give evidence of the falsehood of any statement made before the Committee, I challenge them to show the falsehood of any one statement made, with all the facilities I have given them with the books and documents of the house. But that is not the question: the question is, whether, because Mr. Zulueta has given certain evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons, in which he has stated his participation to a certain extent in the transaction in question, and in which he has stated the general effect of the transaction, any act done by any other member of the firm, or any one connected with the house, is to be made evidence against him. I apprehend, upon the plainest and clearest principles in the law of evidence, it is not; and in order to illustrate my argument I will merely put this case: Mr. Zulueta states, before the Committee of the House of Commons, and truly states, that his house, for a house at Cadiz, negotiated the purchase of this vessel, and the shipment of these goods. As far as that statement goes, for better or worse, it is evidence against him. But my learned friend says, therefore whatever was done by any other member of the firm, as a part of the transaction, is evidence against him. Let me suppose that the prisoner at the bar, having, by a letter read in evidence, authorised the purchase of the vessel; and, in addition to that, which is not yet in evidence, but may be had, directed that his correspondents, in Liverpool should ship goods for a certain place on board the vessel. Having been charged with the knowledge of the secret object and destination of the vessel, suppose his partner, unknown to him, had given some secret instructions to disregard the charter-party—Whatever orders my son, or my house, may have given you, take all these goods to the Gallinas, or any other slave dealing port, and barter them for two hundred slaves—and yet, upon the argument of my learned friend, that would be evidence here. My learned friend says, the prisoner has admitted he negotiated the transaction; and, therefore, any thing done by any member of the firm is evidence against him; that any thing done by any member of the firm, or any thing done by any body connected with the firm, would be a part of the transaction. To say that any thing done, which may be a felonious act, for aught I know, and though in relation to this transaction, not in my knowledge, to make that evidence against him, would be to indict one man for a felony committed by another, because he was a partner of that other, and because that house was concerned in the transaction out of which the felony arose.

(The Judges conferred together.)

Mr. Justice Maule (to Mr. Thomas). I think you stated, that the order upon which the money was paid on the 29th of August, was returned to Zulueta & Co.?—Yes, it was.

When was it returned?—We have no particular periods; but when the pass-book is called for, the vouchers are in the pocket of the book.