Mr. Serjeant Bompas. There are papers here, and we wish every one to be put in, no doubt. The form in which we put it is this: that if a letter is directed to consignees giving directions, that is evidence of what is to be done with the cargo, they are directions in respect of it; and the question whether Captain Jennings was the owner of this vessel, or whether it was used as a cover under his directions, is a question for the Jury. That Messrs. Zulueta, on behalf apparently of Martinez, entered into a contract of charter-party with him there is no doubt, according to the statement and admissions in this examination; and they also ship these goods on board the ship of Captain Jennings: they were shipped for the consignee; they were the agents. What was to be done with those goods? The only way that can be ascertained, is by the actual order to the consignees in respect of them.
The second question will be how far Mr. Zulueta was implicated in it, and that will be shown by the conduct pursued, and the concealment he practised; but the question is, what was the object of it? What was to be done? If we see he employs this vessel to accomplish a particular object, we say it was for that purpose. My learned friend says, how can you give in evidence any thing that took place after the vessel left England? How can you say that it was employed for that purpose, except by something done in England? Suppose I show that these goods were ordered by an individual to be used for the purpose of the slave trade, and suppose I can show they were so used, that is, after they were sent. But I am to show by the conduct of Mr. Zulueta that that was the object. They are two separate things; how am I to show that was the object? I show the bill of lading by which they were consigned to certain persons; I show a letter directing those persons how to apply them. Suppose there is no signature to any one of these letters, does that prevent their being given in evidence? You must expect there will be concealment, if there is an illegal voyage; but if these are the orders upon which they are to proceed, how is it to be said that that is not the object of the voyage? I must show what was the object: how is it possible to show that? It is only by showing the orders given in that respect; there is no other way of showing that that was the purpose, except showing something after the vessel left. My learned friend has said many times, how can Mr. Zulueta be affected by any thing that took place after the vessel left England. Suppose a vessel was sent from England for the express purpose of receiving slaves, and did receive slaves; if I can affect him, I must show that it was done afterwards; if it was for slave transactions, I can only show by the directions and orders given to the parties to whom they were consigned what was to be done with them. They were shipped in the name of Captain Jennings by Mr. Zulueta: but what is to be done? If Captain Jennings was the agent of Messrs. Zulueta, the fact of ordering these things to be done would be evidence against Mr. Zulueta. It would be for the Jury to say whether Captain Jennings was employed, or was the real owner of the vessel; whether the owner or the captain. If we could show written orders to dispose of the goods, how could that be done but by putting in the document? If I could show Captain Jennings’s coming to the Gallinas, and stating he must apply these things in a particular way, can he turn round and say I have no instructions? Yes, these are your instructions; and no concealment in the case of a crime can prevent them being given in evidence, because, in that case, the captain is safe in taking out papers not giving general instructions as to the whole of the cargo: but if there is concealment, if a party hides himself, and acts in another name, and you find that vessel with certain documents on board giving directions what is to be done with the cargo, is it to be said that those documents are not receivable in evidence in respect of that cargo? If it is so, it is not possible to give evidence against any one who does not go to Africa to do it. It is nothing to show they sent out a vessel with that object. First, I show that in fact the directions were to send them for the purposes of the slave trade, and I show next that it was so used. If you show it was not so used, if you cut off the latter part, if you say the directions were on board to be so used, I submit it is evidence when the captain gives up the directions to the consignees as to how they are to treat these goods; and therefore, my Lord, I say it is no answer to say they are not signed. If I do not show by Mr. Zulueta’s conduct that he had some guilty knowledge—
Mr. Kelly. I do not take the objection that they are not signed.
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. I do not show that they are signed by Mr. Zulueta, which he says is necessary: in point of fact, I say it is immaterial, because, if a person whom Mr. Zulueta never heard of, had given directions in respect of these goods, that they were to be used for the purpose of slave dealing, he having shipped them, the only question is, did he ship them for that purpose? How do you show that? By his conduct. That he did employ the vessel is proved: he chartered it, and that is the only purpose. I submit that the only way is to show the directions at the time which they were to receive; I submit that the directions are evidence; and the last question is, whether Mr. Zulueta did it with that object.
Mr. Serjeant Talfourd. In this prosecution there are two propositions which the prosecutors are bound to establish; the first is, that this vessel was employed for an illegal purpose; and, secondly, that Zulueta was conscious of it at the time he entered into this contract. Those two propositions are separate and distinct. It is true you cannot establish the second without the first; but it does not follow that you cannot give all the evidence to establish the first without interfering with the second. You must establish the felony, before you show the receipt of the goods. There the object and purpose for which the vessel was fitted out are part of the transaction, and must be shown by legitimate means. It is said by my learned friend, that if Mr. Zulueta was guilty of the offence, he was guilty of it at the time he dispatched the vessel from this country; but it does not follow that all the evidence is to be confined to this country. No one can suppose that, if a vessel is fitted up with these leagers and other fittings, it was not intended to be used on deck in some other than legitimate trade; and, whether she was driven in by stress of weather or not, if she was turned into a slave trader, is it to be said that instructions what was to be done with her, whether they consisted in writing, in words, or acts, are not evidence? I grant it does not establish the guilt of the prisoner, but it is a step to it; and if we are excluded showing the nature of the directions to the consignee of the vessel, who must be known to the prisoner, we are prevented from showing any painting or any alteration done after the ship left this country. They are not evidence as the history of any other slaving transaction, or any other history or confession; they are not for that purpose evidence against the prisoner; but they are evidence against the prisoner in so far as they are acts done in respect of the dispatch of the cargo, and the employment of the vessel.
Mr. Justice Maule. I do not think it is necessary to trouble Mr. Kelly. It seems to me that Mr. Serjeant Talfourd is quite right in saying there are two things to be proved: one, the body of the offence, the slave trading, or the intention to do it, the taking the voyage; and the other is the participation and knowledge of the prisoner in it; and I think it quite true, that it might well be that the first matter might be established, and established completely, quite consistently with the innocence of the prisoner, and yet, notwithstanding, that these papers might be admissible in evidence upon this trial. There is no rule that requires, that in order that a matter may be given in evidence upon a trial between parties, that the evidence should be such as in itself is sufficient to prove the case; if so, all other evidence would be excluded. I admit it is quite competent to the prosecutor to prove, though he has not fixed the knowledge of the prisoner, any fact constituting any suspicion, or a plausibility. I think he might do that: but here the objection is not so much to the subject of proof, slave trading, as the medium of proof—the document seeking to establish it—this being a document not at all traced to the prisoner, nor any body in privity with him; it is merely found on board the vessel, and is not a document that can be read against him. It is not a statement accompanying any act done, it is found on board the vessel, found by some one who may be an agent or accomplice of the prisoner, and handed to Captain Hill. I think the mere circumstance of handing it to Captain Hill does not remove the objection of want of privity between the prisoner and the paper: I think it cannot be given in evidence. If the vessel sailed without any instructions, no doubt it is a very strong circumstance against the honesty and legal purpose of the voyage: if she is in a latitude, where slave trading is carried on, it affords an observation against the legality of the voyage.
Mr. Justice Wightman. I am of the same opinion: I think the document is not admissible, for the reasons stated by my brother Maule.
Mr. Serjeant Bompas not objecting, the prisoner was admitted to bail, and left the dock.
[Adjourned.