This is another repetition of the observation made before, that it was a shipping order in the transactions of their house, and that he had only executed the orders given by a foreign correspondent. Then he is asked, “To what part of the coast of Africa has that business been chiefly conducted?—I believe, almost exclusively to the Gallinas.”
Then he goes on, and this is the part of the evidence upon which Mr. Serjeant Bompas relies—this is really the only part of this body of evidence given by this young man upon which the learned Serjeant relies in support of the prosecution—“Do you know the nature of the trade of Pedro Martinez at the Gallinas?—I know from general report, that Don Pedro Martinez himself is supposed to deal in slaves, and I believe it is so.” “Is he known at the Havannah as a dealer in slaves?—I do not know, but I believe so. I do not know why it should not be known at the Havannah, if it is known in other parts.” From that my learned friend says he does know it. You must take the whole of the evidence together. He says his house “never had any thing to do with any slave transaction, nor does he know that any vessel that ever went from their house was engaged in slave transactions, but he had heard that Pedro Martinez was engaged in the slave trade;” but you have it from other parts of the case, that he was a large dealer in other transactions quite lawful.
Now this is a statement, not of what this young man knew at the time he participated more or less in the transaction now under your consideration—these transactions took place in 1840—this examination takes place in July 1842. He does not say, that at the time they sent the Augusta they knew that Pedro Martinez was engaged in the slave trade; he says, “I know it,” speaking in the present tense, meaning “I now know it.”
Now, Gentlemen, I beg your attention to a question I besought my learned friend to read, I besought in vain—I thank God I have now the means of reading it—
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. Yes, I did read it.
Mr. Kelly. “Have you reason to suppose that a large portion of the trade that they carry on at the Havannah is the slave trade?”—His answer is, “I had no reason to know any thing of the kind; I have known more of their transactions with the slave trade since these things have been mooted than I ever knew before; I have had more knowledge of these things lately than I ever had in my life before; and when I say, ‘I,’ I beg to state that I ought to state, ‘we,’ for all my partners are in the same situation.”
Now, what does this come to? This gentleman tells you, that out of many hundred thousand pounds, a few trifling orders are sent to the coast of Africa; he is asked in 1842 if he knows of their correspondent being engaged in the slave trade, and he says he does only from common report; and in another part of the evidence, when his attention is more particularly called to it, he says, “I had no reason to know any thing of the kind; but since these transactions have been mooted I have known more of their connexion with the slave trade.” What is the meaning of this? I do implore you to remember that we are here upon a grave crime, the effect of a conviction upon which would expose this young man to utter and irremediable ruin, and bring disgrace upon his family; he is called upon after a loose examination upon the subject to explain what he has in a long examination loosely admitted, that a man was a slave trader, and also that these goods were to be so used. Looking at it fairly, what is it?—I had no reason to know it four years ago; but since these matters have been discussed I have inquired more about it, and have found, from the evidence of Captain Denman, that an event took place there which made the Gallinas, and in the character of the trading there, a matter of as much notoriety as the battle of Waterloo, or any other great event.—It appears that this officer of Her Majesty’s navy descended upon the coast and burnt every slave establishment upon the spot, and the consequence is, that reclamations have been made and actions have been brought; it was the subject of investigation before this Committee, and is the subject of proceedings in Courts of Justice, and the attention of every body has been called to it, and of course that brings to the mind of this young gentleman a great deal of knowledge of the character of the place, and those who have lived in it, more than he ever possessed before; and I put it to you, if this was a civil instead of a criminal case, and in which a man was to pay a sum of money, whether the fair inference is not, that, they shipped these goods without knowing that they were to be employed in the slave trade, that they did not know that Martinez was engaged in it till it became the subject of discussion; and I ask you, what is there to establish that it was so notorious that Martinez was a slave dealer, that Mr. Zulueta must have known that the goods were to be so employed? I ask you, why may not Mr. Zulueta, as much as any other merchant or manufacturer in the kingdom, who is asked to sell goods to go to the coast of Africa, why may he not, when there is an immense extent of lawful trade to that coast, have supposed that they were to be used in the lawful trade as in the unlawful trade, which it would be criminal in him to promote? I say that in a civil case, but in a criminal case, if there is a shadow of doubt upon your minds whether he is innocent or guilty—and in this I shall be sanctioned by my Lords the Judges—if doubt be left in your minds, when it was the duty of the prosecutor to remove that doubt, the prisoner must have your verdict. It is not because it is probable or possible that the goods might have been so employed—it is not because there is something doubtful in the transaction—you must be satisfied that he knew they were to be so employed, and that he shipped them with that object—and unless you are convinced of that, there is no case fora verdict of guilty. I say the whole question rests upon the notoriety of the place and the character of the parties, and upon that you find that this gentleman knew nothing at the time of these transactions either of the nature of the trade or the character of the persons there.
Then they talk about the ship, and so on. Then Mr. Forster says, “Your house had nothing to do with any letters that might be put on board the Augusta after she sailed from this country?—Nothing whatever.” And that is the way that was perfectly disposed of, and so the Judges have held in rejecting the letters put on board after the vessel left the country. He says, “The Augusta was seized on the coast of Africa, on the charge of slave trading?—I believe that was the case.” Then he is asked, “Have you reason to suppose that the whole of that large commerce is subservient to the carrying on of the slave trade by the house of Blanco and Martinez at the Havannah?—I do not know; I know that they have large transactions in general business. I know that a short time ago I got 40,000l. or 50,000l. of Spanish bonds in the market for Martinez. I know that he is a large speculator in Spanish bonds and in securities of state.” Then he names the house for whom that was done. Then he goes on, “Have you been employed by the house at the Havannah to ship manufactured goods from this country to Havannah, suitable for the African trade?—We have sometimes shipped goods to the Havannah of the same kind as those that were in the ‘Augusta;’ cotton goods and other things of that sort.” Would that make it felony if you shipped goods to the Havannah, if the persons there used them in the slave trade? Where is it to stop? It is essential that it should be so understood by juries, as well as mercantile men; there must be some clear and distinct rule. Men are not, while carrying on their fair and mercantile transactions, to be treading on the verge of transportation every moment of their lives, which they would be if they deal in these goods which are sent in these ships, and may be so employed or engaged.
Then he is asked, “Have you been employed by the house at the Havannah to ship manufactured goods from this country to Havannah, suitable for the African trade?—We have sometimes shipped goods to the Havannah of the same kind as those that were in the ‘Augusta;’ cotton goods, and other things of that sort.” “Have you sent any goods of that description since you first began to send goods out direct to the coast of Africa?—They have been mixed; I cannot draw a distinction between the two destinations; some have gone to the Havannah, some to the Gallinas.” Then he is asked, “How long have you conducted the trade upon the coast of Africa?—As I said before, I do not think we have conducted any trade on the coast of Africa, either legal or illegal.” He persists in maintaining, as I do on his behalf, that his transactions were closed at Liverpool; he knows nothing more about it. Then he is asked, “How long have you acted as agents for Martinez, on the coast of Africa?—As long as we have had any connexions with Martinez; it is part and parcel of other operations; that is to say, in the multitude of other operations that have intervened we have shipped goods as I have said.” And it would be a strange thing if these gentlemen, for the sake of putting into their pockets an inconsiderable sum of money by this purchase—I am afraid to calculate it, for fear I should fall into an error—were to put themselves in jeopardy of an indictment for a felony, and transportation for fourteen years. If they have done so, it must be from some strange ignorance. To suppose they would do so for that which would not pay their clerks’ salary for a day, when they have stood so far above suspicion, is absolutely incredible and impossible.
Then he is asked, “Have you ever received consignments from them, or on their behalf, of palm oil, gold dust, or ivory, from the coast of Africa?”—He says, “Never; we never have received any thing from the coast of Africa whatever. With regard to all these transactions, it will perhaps appear strange to the Committee that I should not know more of the coast of Africa, having shipped things there; but if we had shipped to the amount of 100,000l. to the coast of Africa, or carried on any considerable trade there, we should certainly have known more about the coast of Africa; but in transactions of a very large amount, an invoice occasionally of about 2,000l. or 3,000l. of goods was a thing that we sent as a matter of course, and did not trouble our heads about, especially as the remuneration we got was a mere trifle, not of itself worth pursuing, if it had not been for the general business we had?”