The gunboat mentioned was one of six warships which Nicaragua at that date possessed, and which composed the whole of the Nicaraguan "Navy." The vessel was capable of transporting 1,000 troops, and the facility with which these landed and seized the port of Acajutla is explained by the fact that the Salvadoreans were entirely unsuspicious and unprepared for such an outrageous act upon the part of the treacherous Zelaya, with whom they had every reason to consider themselves at peace. The civilized world has denounced the Nicaraguans' act of aggression, and unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that President Zelaya had committed a grave violation of international ethics in opening hostilities against Salvador without having made a preliminary declaration of war or giving any reasons for such an action.
CHAPTER VI
Outbreak of hostilities between Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala—Discreditable conduct of Nicaragua proved—Failure of United States and Mexican intervention—Dignified and loyal attitude of General Figueroa—Warning to Honduras—President Dávila used as Zelaya's cat's-paw—The latter's subsequent regret—Central American Court of Justice trial of claim for damages, and result of judgment.
The true friends of interstate peace, of whom there are as many in Latin America as other parts of the world—although, from the frequent turmoils which occur in that part of the globe, one might be excused for doubting it—were much distressed by the serious quarrel which broke out between the neighbouring Republics of Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, in the years 1907-08. This was not by any means the first conflict which arose between Salvador and Honduras, for the two States were at war in 1871, when General Miranda invaded Honduras with the object of proclaiming General Xatruch as President in place of General Medina; again in 1872, when were fought the famous battles of Sabana Grande and Santa Bárbara; and in 1873, when Salvador sent an armed expedition against President Celio Arias, and in order to restore General Ponciano Leiva to the Presidency of the neighbouring Republic. Although the relations between Nicaragua and its adjoining States had long been on a questionable basis owing to the ambitious projects of General J. Santos Zelaya, its President, there was no reason to anticipate any disturbance, more especially as at the most critical time, owing to the intervention of the United States and Mexico, the cloud had blown over, and to all appearances peace reigned.
The worthlessness of the intervention, and the absolute ineptitude of the United States to effect any permanent improvement in the prevailing conditions, was, however, proved conclusively a few months after the Treaty of Peace and Amity had been signed, amid somewhat premature rejoicings at Washington, on December 20, 1907. Almost before the ink was dry upon the document, Honduranean and Nicaraguan troops had violated the terms and conditions, and continued, moreover, to do so in spite of all diplomatic reminders and serious warnings from the United States. In these "warnings," however, Mexico took no part, merely using the good offices of President Diaz to effect what the threat of the Big Stick had failed to accomplish. Eventually peace was proclaimed, and since then it has been strictly maintained as between the different Republics, although not by any means so within their own borders, as witness what has recently occurred, and is still occurring, in Honduras, and, alas! within Mexican territory, also. It seems a cruel irony that Diaz the Dictator should so soon have become the Deposed. The fact recalls forcibly the poet Burns's well-known words:
"And may you better reck the rede, Than ever did th' adviser!"
The true history of these Republics' quarrels of recent times would at this stage be somewhat difficult to record, since an immense quantity of official documents would have to be translated and given in full. To do this, however interesting, would prove impracticable within the limits of a single volume. The matter has been sketched by me from personal knowledge, and I trust that I shall escape the charge of prejudice or unfairness to any of the parties involved.
For the facts set forth abundant evidence can be procured, and possibly, if my account be compared with the many versions which have been from time to time adduced by others, who have spoken and written from authoritative or personal information, it will not be found to vary very much in the main particulars. I have patiently listened to the accounts of all that took place both on Salvadorean and on Nicaraguan territory, and, furthermore, the incidents which both led up to and followed the clash of arms were related to me by the participants when all feeling of animosity and bitterness had disappeared, and the usual friendliness between the members of this strangely mercurial people had been restored. Thus very little for spirit of resentment—although perhaps something for the vainglorious spirit of the individuals concerned—need be allowed. Il est difficile toujours d'estimer quelqu'un comme il veut l'être.