The first Central American Conference, which met in Honduras on January 1, 1909, selected San Salvador as the place for holding the second Central American Conference, which was underlined for January 1, 1910. For unavoidable reasons the members of the Conference could not meet in San Salvador on the date prescribed, and the President of the Republic, acting in conformity with Article II. of the aforesaid Convention of the Peace Conference, postponed the meeting of the second Central American Conference until February 1 of the same year, which met on that date and concluded its work on the fifth day of the same month.
The results obtained by the Conference were the celebration of six Conventions, all of which were signed on February 5 of last year. The first of these Conventions provides for the establishment in Costa Rica of a pedagogic institute for Central America; the second, for the unification of the Consular service abroad of the five Republics; the third provides for monetary uniformity on a gold basis; the fourth, for Central American commercial reciprocity; the fifth, for the adoption of the metric system of weights and measures; and the sixth defines the functions of each Government toward the Central American bureau in Guatemala.
CHAPTER X
Latin-American trade and British diplomacy—Serious handicap inflicted by the Government—Sacrificing British interests to American susceptibilities—The British Foreign Office's attitude towards its diplomatic representatives—Why British trade has been lost to Salvador—Free Trade and its advocates—The Salvadorean view—German competition—Methods of bribery in vogue—The Teutonic code of trade honour.
If ever the secret veil which shrouds diplomacy in all countries from betrayal could be drawn aside, and some wholesome sidelights could now and again be thrown upon the proceedings of our responsible Ministers, a great many disquieting, and even alarming, things would come to light. These would show, for example, that the great declension in British trade during the past few years has been in a very considerable measure due to the astounding character of the British Government's instructions to representatives abroad in regard to the attitude of the United States of America. It will be news—and very disquieting news—to the general public to know that every effort has been made by our Government to consult the wishes and the feelings of the United States in reference to almost every trade treaty which has been either suggested or entered into. The failure of our diplomats abroad to carry to a successful issue a commercial treaty proposed or desired has not infrequently been attributed to the neglect, or perhaps to the inability, of the particular Minister employed. In practically every case, however, it would be fairer to place the blame for the failure upon the shoulders of the Foreign Office.
I know of several cases in which this is the undoubted and undeniable cause of the breakdown of our negotiations in the very moment of their imminent success. A craven and absurd desire not to "hurt the feelings" of our greatest rivals and our most clever competitors—the Americans—has dictated a policy which has resulted in the earnest efforts of our skilled and able diplomatic representatives abroad being absolutely wasted, and they themselves being placed in a deeply humiliating position, which I need not say has been as keenly resented.
This was the case with a highly important treaty which we were upon the point of completing with Cuba; it has been the case with a similar agreement entered into tentatively with the Republic of Honduras, and it has been so likewise with the Republics of Guatemala and Salvador. With how many other possible excellent trade markets it has also had effect I do not know; but it is not very difficult to imagine.
So pronounced has this policy become of late, that it is now having a decidedly bad effect upon our commercial and financial relations generally with the Latin-American Republics. Formerly these small independent States looked upon Great Britain as the one Power to whom appeals could be made in all matters of dispute, no matter about what or between whom, with a moral certainty of a just and impartial decision being given. This was in the days when Great Britain still preserved her dignity and independence of thought, and before her Government had learned to truckle to the bluff of the Roosevelt-Philander Knox diplomacy. To-day, although there is more reason than ever to ask for the calm and disinterested advice of Great Britain in the numerous, and even dangerous, questions which are continually arising between the Latin-American Republics and the United States of America, it is recognized by the former that it is entirely useless to appeal to Cæsar any longer, since Cæsar has become an advocate for, or a creature of, the United States, and, so far from acting as judge, merely now pleads as an amateur attorney.