Now we do not find that the Serjeant made any use of this topic in his speech. He might have surely urged that this “wily and experienced widow” was eager for a husband, that having been “thrown over” by her baker and stung by the mortification, she resolved, as it were,
to rehabilitate herself and prepare this “plant” for her unsuspecting lodger. As Sir Henry Irving says in the play, “I don’t like widows; they know too much.” F. C. B., as I have said, has treated this baker theme and developed it regularly in his amusing operetta “Pickwick.”
The little epitome given of Snubbin’s speech shows how weak were his topics, and that he, in fact, considered that there was no defence.
Serjeant Snubbin then addressed the jury on behalf of the defendant; and a very long and a very emphatic address he delivered, in which he bestowed the highest possible eulogiums on the conduct and character of Mr. Pickwick. He attempted to show that the letters which had been exhibited, merely related to Mr. Pickwick’s dinner, or to the preparations for receiving him in his apartments on his return from some country excursion. It is sufficient to add in general terms, that he did the best he could for Mr. Pickwick; and the best, as everybody knows on the infallible authority of the old adage, could do no more.
This was no more than speaking “in mitigation of damages.”
Mr. Phunky made no speech, which was just as well, as he might have but damaged the case, as no witnesses had been called on his side. For the same reason, the Court had not the pleasure of hearing Skimpin, who would no doubt have “torn the Defendant’s case to tatters.”
CHARGE AND VERDICT.
The regular formula is this. The judge begins to read his notes, and makes “running comments” as he goes along. “We have first, gentlemen, the statement of Mrs. Cluppins, she tells you, &c. Of course she comes as the friend of the Plaintiff, and naturally takes a favourable view of her case. If you are satisfied with her statement, it is for you, gentlemen, to consider what value you will attach to it. Then we come to the question of damages. This is entirely a matter for you. You must take into account the position in life of the Defendant, and what the Plaintiff has lost by his default. On the other hand they must be reasonable in amount. If you believe the promise has been clearly established, you should give substantial though not excessive damages, on a scale sufficient to repay the Plaintiff for the wrong. On the other hand—should it seem to you doubtful whether the promise had been made—you will give the Defendant the benefit of the doubt. These are questions entirely for you—not for me. On the whole case, you will ask yourselves, whether a promise such as would satisfy reasonable men, has been supported by sufficient evidence. If so, Plaintiff is entitled to damages—on the other hand, if this is not proved to your satisfaction, you will find for the Defendant.”
Mr. Justice Stareleigh, however, as we are told, then “summed up in his old established and most approved form. He read as much of his notes as he could decypher on so short a notice, and made running comments
on the evidence as he went along. If Mrs. Bardell were right, it was perfectly clear that Mr. Pickwick was wrong, and if they thought the evidence of Mrs. Cluppins worthy of credence, they would believe it, and if they didn’t, why they would’nt. If they were satisfied that a breach of promise had been committed, they would find for the Plaintiff, with such damages as they thought proper; and if, on the other hand, it appeared to them that no promise of marriage had ever been given, they would find for the Defendant, with no damages at all.” Such was this lucid direction—which is really, not in the least, an exaggeration.