'I am convinced,' wrote Sir A. Cunynghame, June 12, from Pretoria, 'that had this country not been annexed, it would have been ravaged by the native tribes. Forty square miles of country had been overrun by natives, and every house burned, just before the annexation.' And he wrote again, July 6: 'Every day convinces me that unless this country had been annexed it would have been a prey to plunder and rapine from the natives on its border, joined by Secocoeni, Mapok, and other tribes in the Transvaal. Feeling the influence of the British Government, they are now tranquil.'
So much for the reality of the danger. As to the causes of it and the alleged responsibility of Natal, Sir Bartle Frere, in a letter to General Ponsonby, made the following remarks:
The fact is, that while the Boer Republic was a rival and semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus as one might a tame wolf, who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly; and now that both flocks belong to us, we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf's ravages.
Sir B. Frere realized fully the dangers, and gave his testimony as to Boer opinion. On December 15, 1877, he wrote, concerning his policy towards the Zulus:
My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I am satisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is to show that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state of great apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontier districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom to hold themselves in readiness, should I find it necessary to call upon them for active service.
Sir T. Shepstone also wrote, concerning the reality of the danger, under date December 25:
The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad, in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief which Cetewayo's conduct has caused.
I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetewayo. He received directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal.
Sir T. Shepstone rushed the annexation. He plucked the fruit that would have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waited until the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. That might have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have been humanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leaders at the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce and determined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems to be that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of the annexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of the Republic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers were quite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and the prosecution of the Kaffir wars. The Treasury was empty—save for the much-quoted 12s. 6d. The Government £1 bluebacks were selling at 1s. Civil servants' salaries were months in arrear. The President himself—the excitable, unstable, visionary, but truly enlightened and patriotic Burgers—had not only drawn no salary, but had expended his private fortune, and incurred a very heavy liability, in the prosecution of the unsuccessful Secocoeni war. No amount of ex post facto evidence as to the supposed feelings and opinions of the Boers can alter a single one of the very serious facts which, taken together, seemed to Sir Theophilus to justify the annexation. But it all comes down to this: If the passive acquiescence in the annexation coincided strangely with the Republic's failure to defeat its enemies and pay its debts, it is no whit less odd that Lord Carnarvon's anxiety for the Republic's safety synchronized with his attempt to confederate South Africa.