(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg force.
(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by Johannesburg.
(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.
[How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland; nothing in the Letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which they wrote at 11 a.m. Wednesday; nothing in the message sent by Bugler Vallé, who was despatched on Thursday before daybreak after the Krugersdorp light? How is it that if the forces were to meet at Krugersdorp Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Dr. Wolff to meet him en route, so as to decide whether to turn off 20 miles before reaching Krugersdorp and march direct on Pretoria or go into Johannesburg first?]
I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp, marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under 70 hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of which the men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically without food or water, having had their last meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17 miles from Krugersdorp.
The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone.
(2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of the force marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of 494 men and officers (exclusive of staff).
(3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of the bivouac on the night of January 1st.
I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very great gallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers under my command in the field and on the march under most trying circumstances.
COMPOSITION OF FORCE.