The Transvaal from Within: A Private Record of Public Affairs

by Percy Fitzpatrick

{31} See [Appendix G]. It will be noted that in his declarations Commandant Cronjé modifies his terms very considerably. It was impossible for any reasonable person to accept the explanation preferred by him, that the promise to spare the lives of the surrendered force was only to hold good until they could be handed over to the Commandant-General. In fact, it is well known that Commandant Cronjé only took up this attitude after an extremely acrimonious discussion had taken place between him and Commandant Malan—a quarrel in which they went the length of making charges against each other in the public press of treachery and neglect of duty whilst in the field. The Commandant Cronjé referred to here is the same gentleman who commanded the Boer forces at Potchefstroom in the War of Independence, and his record is an extremely unpleasant one, his conduct of operations having earned for the Potchefstroom commando the worst reputation of any. Apart from the execution of several British subjects who were suspected and, on wholly insufficient grounds, summarily shot as spies, there are the unpleasant facts that he caused prisoners of war to be placed in the forefront of the besieging operations and compelled them to work in the trenches in exposed positions so that they should be—and actually were—shot by their own comrades. There was also the incident in which he refused to allow one or two of the ladies who were among the beleaguered garrison, and who were then in extremely bad health, to leave the fort to obtain such food and medical attendance as would enable them to live. One of the ladies died in consequence. But the incident which has more bearing on Jameson's surrender than any other is that connected with the armistice, when Commandant Cronjé, in defiance of treaty obligations, withheld from Colonel Winslow and the besieged garrison the news that an armistice had been arranged between the Boer and British forces, and continued the siege until the garrison, in order to save the lives of the wounded and the women and children refugees, were obliged to surrender. It will be remembered that this incident was too much even for Mr. Gladstone, and that on its becoming known after the terms of peace had been settled, the Transvaal Government were required by Sir Evelyn Wood to allow a British force to march up from Natal and re-occupy Potchefstroom as a formal acknowledgment of Cronjé's treachery. Mr. Kruger and his party, who were in the greatest fear that the settlement would not be effected, and that Sir Evelyn Wood's action might provoke a renewal of hostilities, agreed to the terms, but with grave apprehensions as to the results. However, no contretemps occurred.

{32} Once when out hunting on foot—a young man then—Mr. Kruger, after climbing to the top of a kopje, found that he had been seen by a number of hostile natives who were then running towards him, some to climb the hill, others branching out to surround it. He knew that those on the flat could cut him off before he could descend and that his only chance lay in 'bluff.' Stepping on to the outermost ledge in full view of the enemy he calmly laid down his rifle, drew off first one and then the other of his velschoens (home-made hide shoes, in those poorer days worn without socks) and after quietly knocking the sand out of them drew them on again. By this time the natives had stopped to observe him. He then picked up his rifle again, and turning to an imaginary force behind the kopje waved to the right and then to the left, as though directing them to charge round each end of the hill. The next instant the Kaffirs were in full retreat.

CHAPTER VII.

AFTER DOORNKOP.

The news of Dr. Jameson's surrender was received in Johannesburg towards mid-day, at first with derision, but as report after report came in, each confirming and supplementing the other, no room for doubt was left and a scene of the wildest excitement ensued. It is not too much to say that not one person in a hundred, no matter what his political leanings were, had doubted for a moment Dr. Jameson's ability to force his way into Johannesburg. There is not the slightest indication in the newspapers of the time, which without doubt reflected every varying mood and repeated every rumour which it was possible to catch from an excited people, that there was in any man's mind a suspicion that the Boers would be able to stop the invader. In the first place no one believed that they could mobilize sufficiently quickly to oppose him, and in the second place, he was understood to have a force of 800 men so admirably equipped and trained that it would not be possible for 5,000 Boers hurriedly called together to intercept him. All this, however, was forgotten when it came to accounting for the disaster; or rather, the previous convictions only added strength to the rage of disappointment. The public by that time knew of the letter of invitation; it had been taken on the battle-field and news of it was telegraphed in, and apart from this the writers had made no secret of it. But what the public did not know, and what, if they had known it, would not have appealed with similar force, was the efforts made to stop Jameson and the practical withdrawal of the letter before he had started. It was sufficient for them during the few remaining hours of that day to recall that Jameson had come in, that he had fought against great odds, and that when almost reaching his goal he had been taken prisoner for want of assistance. It is perfectly true that in their rage of grief and disappointment men were willing to march out with pick-handles to rescue him, if there were not rifles enough to arm them. While the excitement lasted this was the mood, and the Reform Committee were the scapegoats. The attitude of the crowd was due to ignorance of the circumstances and natural emotion which could not be otherwise vented. The excitement had greatly abated by the following morning, and it was realized then that the position was practically but little worse than that which the Reform Committee had offered to take up when they tendered their persons as security for the evacuation of the country by the invading force, and had proposed to continue the struggle without their aid.

The reports received by the Johannesburg people were to the effect that the surrender had been conditional upon the sparing of the lives of the force. Indeed the first reports agreed that Jameson upon receipt of the High Commissioner's proclamation, had laid down his arms; but upon the return of Mr. Lace (whose mission has been explained) it was realized that this was not the case. A later account showed that Jameson had surrendered to Commandant Cronjé on the condition that the lives of all should be spared, and this version of the surrender was published in the Johannesburg newspapers. When further accounts were received from Pretoria and Krugersdorp, stating that the surrender had been unconditional and that there was grave doubt as to what would be done with Dr. Jameson, it was surmised as an explanation that he had declined to bargain for his own life and had merely stipulated that those of his followers should be spared.

On Friday the news that it was contemplated to shoot Dr. Jameson caused a frenzy of horror and excitement in the town. Every effort was made by the Reform Committee and its supporters to maintain strictly the position which the Government had suggested through their Commission on Wednesday, lest some untoward incident should turn the trembling balance against Dr. Jameson and his men; nor were the Committee alone in the desire to maintain that position. On Friday and on Saturday communications were received from the local Government officials, and from Commandant-General Joubert through the British Agent, drawing the attention of the Committee to alleged breaches of the arrangement. The allegations were satisfactorily disproved; but the communications clearly indicated that the Government were most desirous of maintaining the position in relation to Johannesburg which they had laid down before the first battle with Dr. Jameson's forces.

Information was received on Thursday that the High Commissioner would leave Capetown for Pretoria at 9 p.m. that night. It had been a matter of surprise that, the arrangement having been entered into with him early on Wednesday, he had not found it convenient to start for some thirty-six hours. Considering how seriously he had interfered with the movement—first by his proclamation, and next by concerted action with the Government for a peaceful settlement—it had been naturally assumed that he would not lose a moment in leaving Capetown for the scene of trouble. Such however was not the case.

It has been alleged that the arrangement made between the Transvaal Government and the High Commissioner with a view to a peaceful settlement bore only upon Dr. Jameson's action, and that it was not contemplated that there should be any interference between the Government and its own subjects in Johannesburg. In answer to this it may be noted that the High Commissioner had in the first place offered his services, and that those services had been declined by the Transvaal Government; but that the latter, on realizing the seriousness of the position which they were called upon to face, and acting, it is stated, upon the advice of Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr, the recognized leader of the Dutch Africanders in the Cape Colony, reconsidered this refusal and urgently besought the High Commissioner to go up to Pretoria and use his influence to effect a peaceful settlement. This arrangement, together with the promise of the redress of grievances, had been made known to the deputation of the Reform Committee by the Government Commission in Pretoria, as has already been stated—the Government well knowing that Johannesburg was in arms and a party to the arrangement with Dr. Jameson.