The problem of the domination of Eastern Asia is not solved; the two great races, the white and the yellow, with their conflicting interests, are striving for the mastery as before.
The Peace of Portsmouth might more justly be called an armistice. A truce has been concluded, and we hope that this truce may be of longer duration than the last. And, above all, let us hope that it may really tend to the well-being of the countries interested, and of cultural and moral advantage for the nations concerned.
Though the Peace of Portsmouth may be unimportant, the moral influence of its articles is all the more real from a purely material point of view. Japan, in spite of her admirable self-restraint, has become one of the Great Powers, and she shows her strength, her security, and her power, more especially by her moderation and self-control. The renunciation of certain points and the ratification of many conditions required, undoubtedly, a self-control and a political foresight which this young nation has lately proved she possesses. After an unexpected succession of brilliant victories—when the fleet of her rival had been annihilated, the forts of Port Arthur laid in ruins, the hostile armies forced back step by step—it was hardly credible that Nippon would refrain from insisting upon complete evacuation of Manchuria, annexation of Saghalien, and at least a certain amount of war indemnity.
Was it not natural that Count Witte should inform his depressed countrymen with satisfaction, that Russia is still as much a Great Power in the Far East as she was before? Was it not pardonable if this piece of news, and many others of a similar kind with regard to Russia's diplomatic acquisitions, gave rise to tumult in the streets of Tokio, and, at any rate among the lower classes of Japan, to loud expressions of dissatisfaction? Such spontaneous manifestations of a people's feelings are easily understood and cannot be taken amiss; but these people, in spite of their dissension, will daily recognize more and more what uncommon astuteness has been displayed by the envoys of the nation, in their acceptance of the present and, to some extent, unsatisfactory terms of peace.
Time will prove what were the motives which chiefly determined the Japanese Government to desist from further prosecution of the war. Certainly the rôle played by the leading Powers must have been an important one. It seemed increasingly doubtful if the forms of future loans would ensure the same interest for the groups concerned. Anglo-American credit, which Japan apparently possessed to an unlimited extent at the outbreak of the war, became circumspect and cautious to a degree. Further financial undertakings, which, in consequence of the unexpected and decisive defeat of Russia, might have resulted in insolvency, could of course not be agreeable to the French and Continental stockholders.
COUNT WITTE
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From an international point of view it was desired that the situation, at any rate as far as appearances went, should remain unchanged. What was aimed at was equilibrium, not preponderance. Opinions which made themselves heard, not only in Central Europe, but also in the English and American newspapers, showed more and more plainly how critical the situation would be if Japan alone possessed undisputed paramount power in Eastern Asia. The leading papers, which at first had been so enthusiastic and described with such unbounded admiration Japan's gallant battles and unexpected victories, grew gradually reserved as the question of how far Japan's ambitions might one day extend, became doubtful.
Economic acquisitions were feared even more than the actual strategic conquests. Already a portion of the commerce of the Far East has left European hands and fallen to the share of Japan, and evidently this will more and more be the case. The vicinity of the country, the cheap rate of wages, the simplicity of social conditions and those of labour, even at the present day, all contribute to give Japan the advantage in the competition. What their Government chiefly covet, at any rate just now, are new commercial spheres—safe markets—to profit by the great wealth of neighbouring states. By adroit commercial treaties with China, exploitation of the mineral riches of Manchuria and the Korean mines, Japan may, in a very short time, not only make good her war expenditure, but consolidate the economical condition of the empire and increase the general well-being.
From a political point of view, it can no longer be denied that the Pacific Ocean will be, at least on the eastern half, dominated by the Japanese fleet. In short, it is this point which is the essential one.