In the course of their report to the executive, the Commissioners very properly speak of it as a grave question, how far it is justifiable to mingle convicted criminals (however afflicted) amongst the meanest whom the hand of God has visited with mental derangement, or how many insane criminals can be sent there without seriously jeopardizing the best interests of that institution, and risking the safety and well being of its inmates. They add, “that no wards can be specially appropriated to the class particularly under notice, and as a consequence the insane criminal must be in contact directly with the insane innocent.”
In the absence of a hospital constructed with exclusive reference to the custody and treatment of convicts deprived of their reason, and considering “the great security afforded by the penitentiary and the character of its arrangements,” the Commissioners are of the opinion, that “it will be quite possible, inside its enclosure, to make the limited number of this class now confined there, more comfortable than they could be in any ordinary hospital, for the reason, where a just regard to the safety of others would require a much closer degree of confinement,” in which opinion we cordially coincide.
As this is the first proceeding under the provision of the law, it has received particular attention in the report of the Inspectors, and may claim a brief notice in our pages.
And we must in the first place take exception to the phraseology in a clause of the Act of Assembly, which is open to misconstruction. “A certain class of prisoners” is mentioned, “whose mental and physical condition may require, in the opinion of the Inspectors, a temporary relaxation of the separate confinement system.” The framers of this paragraph were probably unaware that all the provision which any body ever considered necessary for the class of prisoners alluded to, may be enjoyed without any “relaxation (temporary or permanent) of the separate confinement system.”
It is the unbroken solitude which, by an existing law, should be relieved two or three times a day, but in some past periods has not been relieved for days together; it is the confinement to an unwholesome or stultifying trade; it is the brooding over a seven or ten years’ sentence, a ruined and helpless family, and a blasted reputation,—these are the causes, and not separation from other convicts that threaten to undermine the health and derange the reason of convicts of a peculiar temperament. Now, if the money appropriated could be expended in a few extra lodges, with ample exercising yards, and perhaps one-tenth of it for an additional attendant or two, to have charge of enfeebled prisoners (whether they were so when admitted, or became so as a natural effect of prison-life) this provision of the section would be very reasonable. The separation, however, may safely and should certainly remain intact.
But there is another class of convicts whose case is embraced by a proviso. It is those who “develope such marked insanity as to render their continuance in the penitentiary improper, and their removal to the State hospital necessary to their restoration.” In order to determine whether a convict answers to this description, a competent Board is appointed to examine and report.
Now we will suppose a case is presented of a prisoner who was committed for safe keeping merely. This is certainly not a case within the proviso. No matter how marked the insanity is, it was developed before commitment, and his continued confinement is, therefore, in no sense “improper.” Competent authorities disposed of him with due reference to all the circumstances of the case, and the Act of the Legislature is not designed to disturb the acts judiciary.
Another case is presented to the Board, and they are satisfied that it is a “manifest” development of insanity, but that with proper medical treatment, and such out-of-door exercise as is quite compatible with the discipline of the institution, the party may be restored. This is clearly not within the proviso, for it is only such cases as make “a removal to the State Hospital necessary to their restoration,” that are to be transferred. It is evident, therefore, that the medical Board are not to be restricted to the inquiry, whether there is or is not a development of insanity, but whether the case presented is one which the proviso meant to include. The medical Board are presumed to know the provisions of the act from which they derive their authority, and they cannot read it without perceiving that they are to decide not only whether a prisoner is insane, but also whether his insanity is of such a type or character as to render his continuance in the prison improper, and a removal to the State hospital indispensable to his recovery. Now, suppose they are satisfied of the insanity, and also that his removal to the State hospital or elsewhere would not be likely to restore him. This is the very point for which their professional knowledge and experience is required—quite as much as (if not more than) to determine the naked question of insanity. Surely a wise Legislature could not have meant to ask a medical Board to determine the question of insanity, and leave it to the Inspectors to say whether the insanity might be safely and properly treated in the prison, or whether a removal to the State Hospital would be likely to issue in restoration!
On the whole therefore it must be obvious, we think, to any candid mind, that the Legislature designed to give the Inspectors the benefit of the official judgment of a competent Board, as to the manner in which they should treat or dispose of insane convicts.