Eliminating the impracticable, I had already narrowed down the methods of employing these fresh forces to one of the following four:—
- (a) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the peninsula,
- to force a way forward to the Narrows.
- (b) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a
- march on Chanak.
- (c) A landing at Enos or Ibrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of
- the Isthmus at Bulair.
- (d) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,
- combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong
- push to capture Hill 305 [971], and, working from that dominating
- point, to grip the waist of the peninsula.
As to (a) I rejected that course—
- 1. Because there were limits to the numbers which could be landed
- and deployed in one confined area.
- 2. Because the capture of Krithia could no longer be counted upon
- to give us Achi Baba, an entirely new system of works having
- lately appeared upon the slopes of that mountain—works so
- planned that even if the enemy's western flank was turned and
- driven back from the coast, the central and eastern portions of the
- mountain could still be maintained as a bastion to Kelid Bahr.
- 3. Because if I tried to disengage myself both from Krithia and Achi
- Baba by landing due west of Kelid Bahr my troops would be
- exposed to artillery fire from Achi Baba, the Olive Grove, and
- Kelid Bahr itself; the enemy's large reserves were too handy;
- there were not fair chances of success.
As to (b), although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the peninsula would be weakened; our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells; the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements would not run to a double operation. I mean that, unless I could make a thorough, whole-hearted attack on the enemy in the peninsula I should reap no advantage in that theatre from the transference of the Turkish peninsular troops to reinforce Asia, whereas, if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the peninsula.
To cut the land communications of the whole of the Turkish peninsular army, as in (c), was a better scheme on paper than on the spot. The naval objections appeared to my coadjutor, Vice-Admiral Robeck, well-nigh insurmountable. Already, owing to submarine dangers, all reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies had to be brought up from Mudros to Helles or Anzac by night in fleet sweepers and trawlers. A new landing near Bulair would have added another 50 miles to the course such small craft must cover, thus placing too severe a strain upon the capacities of the flotilla.
The landing promised special hazards, owing to the difficulty of securing the transports and covering ships from submarine attack. Ibrije has a bad beach, and the distance to Enos, the only point suitable to a disembarkation on a large scale, was so great that the enemy would have had time to organize a formidable opposition from his garrisons in Thrace. Four divisions at least would be required to overcome such opposition. These might now be found; but, even so, and presupposing every other obstacle overcome, it was by no manner of means certain that the Turkish army on the peninsula would thereby be brought to sue for terms, or that the Narrows would thereby be opened to the fleet. The enemy would still be able to work supplies across the Straits from Chanak. The swiftness of the current, the shallow draft of the Turkish lighters, the guns of the forts, made it too difficult even for our dauntless submarine commanders to paralyse movement across these land-locked waters. To achieve that purpose I must bring my artillery fire to bear both on the land and water communications of the enemy.
This brings me to (d), the storming of that dominating height, Hill 305 [971], with the capture of Maidos and Gaba Tepe as its sequel.
From the very first I had hoped that by landing a force under the heights of Sari Bair we should be able to strangle the Turkish communications to the southwards, whether by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the fleet. Owing to the enemy's superiority, both in numbers and in position; owing to underestimates of the strength of the original entrenchments prepared and sited under German direction; owing to the constant dwindling of the units of my force through wastage; owing also to the intricacy and difficulty of the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were well founded. So much at least had clearly enough been demonstrated by the desperate and costly nature of the Turkish attacks. The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows.
From the naval point of view the auspices were also favourable. Suvla Bay was but one mile further from Mudros than Anzac, and its possession would ensure us a submarine-proof base, and a harbour good against gales, excepting those from the south-west. There were, as might be expected, some special difficulties to be overcome. The broken, intricate country—the lack of water—the consequent anxious supply questions. Of these it can only be said that a bad country is better than an entrenched country, and that supply and water problems may be countered by careful preparation.