A philosophicall essay for the reunion of the languages

by Pierre Besnier

But it is not a single and easie reflexion, that can absolutely determine whether two letters have resemblance and proportion, because there are some of them that being made up of the movements of severall organs, maybe differently alter'd according to their various resemblances, so the letter H. carrys not only the resemblance of a gutturall as it is pronounc'd by the assistance of the muscles of the throat, but also as an Aspiration besides the regard it hath to the whispers of the tongue, and the 6. Aspirates of the Lips, Teeth, and Palate. However if the precipitance or forwardnesse of any, hath by chance brought into use, other methods of altering sounds, as they have not so certain a foundation in reason, so neither can they be receiv'd within the Compas of this Art, at least being not establisht by a regular and constant analogie.

From the sound of words, I passe to their signification, which in the same dialect may be call'd the soul of a word, as the sound is its body; to expresse it in other terms, then what seem to rellish the dry and unpleasant humour of the Pedant or Grammarian; I suppose that words being the expressions of our thoughts, and our thoughts the representations of objects, the different significations that are given to words, principally depend upon the various conceptions, that every Nation frames of the same objects, agreeable to what seems most neerly to concern it.

This ingageth me to explaine the intire sequel, and naturall dependances of our Ideas, and the manner of their forming; of which the world hath yet receiv'd a very imperfect account. In order to this, you may understand what those objects are, of which we have proper Ideas, and what those are which we conceive by forreigne images, and that we do not name but in figurative terms; whence ariseth that alliance and resemblance of our Ideas, and why the greatest share of our words if refer'd to their first originall, are but metaphors which represent objects to us in such terms as are proper to another, with which it hath some agreement, or neere relation, and withall what are the grand principles of metaphors; either of Attribution or Proportion, that do not only make op the beauty, but almost the intire body of the Language.

Our Ancestors that gave no names to things, but by a directing prudence, purposing to distinguish the works of Nature and Art, had an especiall regard to the naturall resemblance they had with any thing that was most known to them, and that was already distinguisht by its character, or to any one of their most prevailing properties, or to the principall action that distinguisht them from other beings. They made use of almost the same artifice, to impose names upon things more expressive of their properties, by considering them only with reference to their operations, of which they were the immediate principles. As for the operations, themselves being not æqually knowne, nor æqually obvious to sense they plac't the same subordination in the terms they made use of to represent them, that Nature hath establisht in our apprehensions and cognisances.

There being therefore nothing in the world of which they could have fram'd a more distinct Idea, then of the motion of bodies; which is obvious to all the senses, we must not wonder if considering Locall motion as the first and principall object of their knowledge, they afterwards gave no names to the Operations of each being, but such as seem'd to express some relation either to motion in generall, or to its different species, or to some one of its dependances such as are place, figure, situation, extention, Union and seperation, in a word to all the resemblances and agreements that in any way or kind relye upon motion. For if Modern Philosophy that Studies Nature by a closer application then formerly, pretend to a clear and evident explication of Naturall effects in the referring them all to the Sole movement of matter as their true cause; there is much more reason that in order to the giveing an account of all that is to this day past among the Languages, we should have recours to such terms as are expressive of motion, since it is not to be doubted but that all others that are reducible, may be referr'd hither as to the first principle of their signfication.

Besides motion is allow'd a far greater Scope and extent among the Languages then in Nature for 'tis to that we referr our most refin'd and spirituall conceptions I mean such as we frame of the operations of our souls and the propensions of our wills, So when we say that the mind or understanding applyes it self to think, to conceive, to discours, to explaine, to disimbroile, to disingage a businesse, to discover a truth; when we talke of troubles, aversions, of hurries and consternations of the soul, to expresse such actions as are most remote from sense, we make use of such Images as are corporeall in their first originall, although for the most part they have lost their proper significance to assume another that is purely figurative.

'Tis by their Principles I reduce to naturall reason all imaginable ways by which words alter their primitive signification to imbrace another, either more inlarg'd or reserv'd, or never so little diversifi'd either in Proportion or Alliance; for tis no easie matter for words to travell from one Country to another without meeting with the same casualties, that use to befall forreign Plants which, are seldome remov'd into a new soile, but degenerate and either lose some of their Native virtue, or acquire some new. But most people having met wich this generally proposall, to expresse at first appearance, what they think with as little trouble as is possible, it thence falls out that to ingrosse a great deal of sense in a few words, they scarce allow enough precisely to marke out the simple ideas of their minds, fitted out to all their severall resemblances, they that are most simple in themselves, are commonly compounds in their significations, neither is there any one of the least considerable, but what is diversify'd in each Language by a thousand different modifications.

From thence proceed all the methods of inflexion, derivation, and composition that give being to the most subtle kind of Sophistry; all the species and forms of Nouns, Verbs, and particles that make up the œconomy of a Language, together withall diversity of Numbers, Genders, Cases, tenses, Modes, and Persons which have more of Art than at first sight is imagin'd, for the Custome of Nations hath not only authoriz'd these inventions to vary the Cadence of words, but with an admirable facility to expresse all the deflexions, by which an Idea of the same object may be represented to our conceptions according as it admitts of a mixture of resemblances, which it may have either to its effects or Causes, or as it is related to the severall estates, wherein it subsists, to the differences of time or place, and to all the circumstances that may accompany it, either within or without us. As the more sensible differences of the Languages principally consist in all these modifications; so one of the greatest secrets of this Art is to know how choisly to select and distinguish, both in our ideas and in the words that expresse them, that which is principall and essentiall from what is purely accessory, subtly to difference the first ideas from the second, the second from the third, the simple from the Compound, the primitive and Originall signification from its dependences and references, its modifications and divers restrictions, in one word (if I may so expresse it) not to confound the habit with the person. For in a manner these modifications are the same words, that the habit is to the body; this new dresse that is given to forreign words to fitt them up alamode to the Country, for the most part time so disfigures them and renders them so obscure, that they impose as well upon our eyes as ears, and passe for origalls and Natives of the Country, although in reality they are borrow'd from our Neighbourhood, and sometime from beyond the seas.

To make a secure judgement therefore of the originall, there remains nothing but to consider them all, naked and intirely disspoil'd of all that trompery that disguis'd them; and that this may be done with more safety we must follow them step by step in their travels, and espie out the different ranges they have taken and the habits they have shifted, to come thus vizarded and masqued to us.

These are the most inlarg'd principles and infallible ways by which I discover this secret and misterious accord of the Languages which without doubt will appear so much the more admirable, as haveing been never to this hour been believ'd that they had any such close tie or relation: But these principles may be apply'd severall ways, and therefore least they should continue undermin'd, I make it appear by the sequel, what in particular must be done in each Language in conformity to its genius and proper Character. This is that which obligeth me to make an exact inquirie into the nature of those Languages I pretend to reduce, I do not content my selfe infallibly to take my draught either in the generall consent of nations, which are as often cheated in their Ideas they have of the Language of each Nation as they are commonly in its manners, or from the particular sentiments of the more knowing or Learned, who without any preoccupation of mind have studied their own Native Language with more then ordinary care. But to make all yet more certain, I principally form my examinations from the very history of the Languages, which is the most æquall rule we can take our measures from, in relation to the present designe.