He had hardly left the capital before the first symptoms of insurrection began to be observable in the working-class quarters. The factories went on strike, and the movement spread rapidly during the days following. The population of Petrograd had suffered great privations during the winter, for owing to the shortage of rolling-stock the transport of food and fuel had become very difficult, and there was no sign of improvement in this respect. The Government could think of nothing likely to calm the excitement, and Protopopoff merely exasperated everyone by the measures of repression—as stupid as criminal—taken by the police. Troops also had been employed. All the regiments being at the front, the only troops at Petrograd were units under instruction, whose loyalty had been thoroughly undermined by organised propaganda in the barracks in spite of counter-measures. There were cases of defection, and after three days of half-hearted resistance unit after unit went over to the insurgents. By the 13th the city was almost entirely in the hands of the revolutionaries, and the Duma proceeded to form a provisional government.
At first we at Mohileff had no idea of the scale of the events which had occurred at Petrograd. Yet after Saturday, March 10th, General Alexeieff and some officers of the Czar’s suite had tried to open his eyes and persuade him to grant the liberties the nation demanded immediately. But once more Nicholas II. was deceived by the intentionally incomplete and inaccurate statements of a few ignorant individuals in his suite[56] and would not take their advice.
By the 12th it was impossible to conceal the truth from the Czar any longer; he understood that extraordinary measures were required, and decided to return to Tsarskoïe-Selo at once.
The Imperial train left Mohileff on the night of the 12th, but on arriving at the station of Malaia-Vichera twenty-four hours later it was ascertained that the station of Tosno, thirty miles south of Petrograd, was in the hands of the insurgents, and that it was impossible to get to Tsarskoïe-Selo. There was nothing for it but to turn back.
The Czar decided to go to Pskoff to General Russky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. He arrived there on the evening of the 14th. When the General had told him the latest developments in Petrograd the Czar instructed him to inform M. Rodzianko by telephone that he was ready to make every concession if the Duma thought that it would tranquillise the nation. The reply came: “It is too late.”
Was it really so? The revolutionary movement was confined to Petrograd and its suburbs; in spite of propaganda, the Czar still enjoyed considerable prestige in the army, and his authority with the peasants was intact. Would not the grant of a Constitution and the help of the Duma have been enough to restore to Nicholas II. the popularity he had enjoyed at the beginning of the war?
The reply of the Duma left the Czar with the alternatives of abdicating or marching on Petrograd with the troops which remained faithful to him: the latter would mean civil war in the presence of the enemy. Nicholas II. did not hesitate, and on the morning of the 15th he handed General Russky a telegram informing the President of the Duma that he intended to abdicate in favour of his son.
A few hours later he summoned Professor Fiodorof to his carriage and said:
“Tell me frankly, Sergius Petrovitch. Is Alexis’s malady incurable?”
Professor Fiodorof, fully realising the importance of what he was going to say, answered: