The reason for this persistent conflict is due in the first place to the popular assembly being hostile to the Government of the clansmen, and in the second because it is displeased that the Ministers are not responsible to it. Whilst professing the greatest respect for the Emperor, the Chamber considers that the Government should possess a Parliamentary majority in order to retain power. It, moreover, complains of a certain lack of respect, Ministers rarely troubling to appear before it, and that it is seldom, if ever, addressed by any but high functionaries, appointed Government Commissioners for matters within their several departments. In a word, there exists considerable friction in the popular assembly against this state of affairs, which reduces it to the position of a mere debating society.

Now, all successive Cabinets have resolutely refused to consider the Lower Chamber in any other light, which gave rise to some curious incidents during the Ministerial and Parliamentary crisis of December, 1897, and January, 1898, which I had the good fortune to witness. The Cabinet, persuaded that the majority was hostile to it, determined to avoid even the semblance of dependence upon the Chamber, and therefore did not wait for the passing of a vote of censure, but dissolved the Chamber and offered their own resignation to the Emperor, to whom alone they considered themselves responsible.

Consequently, on December 24th the Emperor, according to custom, came in person to read the Speech from the Throne to the two united Chambers, who forthwith voted the usual answer. These two documents were very short, and the second, containing merely protestations of respect and loyalty, was unanimously adopted. On the morrow, scarcely had the order of the day been read and certain financial projects of the Government presented, than the doyen of the Chamber, Mr. Suzuki, asked leave to speak, and proposed the amendment, so as to enable the House to discuss a vote of censure. This amendment, which did not come as a surprise, being unanimously passed, the same gentleman returned immediately to the tribune and read out the following resolution, ‘That the Chamber of Deputies declares it has no confidence in the present Ministry,’ whereupon somebody presented a folded paper to the President, who silenced the speaker by announcing that he had just received an Imperial rescript, the tenor of which he informed the Chamber was as follows: ‘In virtue of Article 3 of the Imperial Constitution, We hereby ordain that the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved forthwith.’ The House rose, having met for only seven minutes, and simultaneously the Upper House was prorogued. Two days later, on the 27th, the Emperor received the resignation of Count Matsukata and his colleagues. On the evening of the same day the Marquis Ito, who had already twice been Premier, in 1886–88 and in 1892–96, and who is certainly the best known living Japanese statesman, was summoned to the palace. At first he hesitated about accepting the leadership of the Government under such very difficult circumstances, especially with respect to foreign affairs, Japan being at that time at the acute stage of her Chinese question, while home matters were embarrassed by several economical and financial obstructions of a very serious character, but nevertheless, the Marquis finally accepted. After ten days’ fruitless negotiations, he was obliged to give up his difficult task; but he was able, however, by the 12th of January to compose another Cabinet containing some excellent names, but it was a clan Ministry, including four Choshius and two Satsumas. In June he was obliged to dissolve Parliament, and the Ito Cabinet had to give way to another, formed under the Presidency of Count Okuma, a statesman of very progressive views, which may be described as the only genuine Parliamentary Cabinet Japan has yet known. The new Cabinet was not composed from a single party, but by a coalition of the two already existing, and leagued against the clans. It lasted but a short time, and towards the end of 1898 the Satsuma and Choshiu parties returned to office under the Premiership of Marshal Yamagata.

As in the case of the clans, the parties are formed of groups of persons and interests. They have no defined programmes, but are constantly changing their views, and are mere cliques surrounding one or two influential politicians who aspire to replace the clan in office merely for the sake of the advantages to be obtained, and to be able to distribute posts among their relatives and friends. In the Parliament which was dissolved in 1897 by Count Matsukata the most important of these groups was that of the ‘Progressives,’ including some 90 to 95 members out of 300; then came the ‘Liberals,’ with about 80 adherents; then the ‘National Unionists,’ 25 to 30; and, lastly, some twenty other subdivisions, besides the ‘Independents.’ The Progressives are more consistent, possibly because they have only been in existence since 1896. The Liberals, although the oldest group, have almost completely lost their influence and cohesion during the last two or three years.

If you question a Japanese about the programmes of these different parties he will give very vague answers, and, for the matter of that, they are hardly distinguishable one from another. The demands presented by the Progressives to Count Matsukata in the autumn of 1897 were formulated in the vaguest terms, and confined to generalities, such as reforms in the administration, a magnanimous system of government, etc. The National Unionists are somewhat conservative in their tendencies, but their programme is also extremely nebulous. On one point, however, everybody seems agreed, and that is a horror of any attempt to increase taxation, and not even the most seductive of projects will induce the Chamber to budge an inch in this direction—an economical consistency which is a distinct virtue considering the youth and inexperience of the Japanese House of Representatives.

The influential politicians do not form a part of the Chamber, nearly all of them having been ennobled, and, what is more, with one exception, they are not avowed chiefs of any party. If Count Itagaki, an old Radical, is the official leader of the Liberals, Count Okuma, by far the most original statesman in the Empire, does not profess to be the leader of the Progressives, although he is extremely intimate with them. Neither does Marshal Yamagata openly declare his influence over the National Unionists. This action on the part of those who in any other country would be popularly known as leaders of the various parties undoubtedly weakens the influence of the several groups in the Japanese Parliament. As to the representatives of the two clans in power in the House, needless to say, the feeling of clanship carries all before it, even party interests. Three Satsuma deputies who belong to the Progressives immediately withdrew when this party in a preliminary meeting declared opposition to the Matsukata Ministry.

The men of the Southern clans have now governed Japan for over thirty years, and governed her well. The able and energetic statesmen of the first days of the Restoration have been succeeded by others of equal ability, and of the same school. They are surrounded, however, by a bureaucracy which existed in Japan even in the days of the last Shoguns, and closely resembles that of Prussia, which, although arrogant, is highly educated and progressive. They are supported by a powerful and well-disciplined army, a navy whose officers are for the most part members of the same clans as the Ministers, and the heads of the Civil Service. These men have led their country happily through a series of unexampled changes, transforming her from a feudal to a modern State administered on advanced principles. They have placed her in an excellent financial position, they have covered her with military glory, and have assured her a period of extraordinary prosperity and economic development. These observations force themselves upon the impartial spectator who visits Japan with the object of studying the remarkable progress she has made in so surprisingly short a time.

It is impossible not to feel some anxiety lest affairs should be wrenched from the hands of such experienced statesmen as those of the Satsuma and the Choshiu clans, only to be scrambled for among the groups into which the Chamber is at present divided. This, however, need not make us despair of the success of Parliamentary Government in Japan. We must not forget that the British Parliament was not shaped in a day, and that in all countries in which this particular form of government has been accepted many years have had to elapse before it attained anything approaching perfection, and it is but natural that Japan should go through the same experience. To be just, however, considerable progress has lately been made in the right direction. The parties which possess any kind of adhesion have occasionally participated more or less directly in the Government. Marquis Ito brought Count Itagaki into the Cabinet of 1895, and at the end of his Ministry was himself supported in the Chamber by the Liberals. Then, again, in 1896 Count Matsukata came into power in company with Count Okuma, favoured by the Progressives. Throughout the whole of the Session of 1896–97, thanks to their support and to that of the secondary groups, the Government possessed a decided majority which did honour to the political acumen of the Ministers and to the wisdom of the members. Unfortunately, in the autumn of 1897 the Progressives grew tired of a Cabinet which did not fulfil its promises, and withdrew, carrying with them Count Okuma; but this attempt showed on the one hand that the Government had recognised the importance of an understanding with a party, and on the other that such an understanding possessed some staying power. Since the month of October, 1898, the Yamagata Ministry has had to deal with a very reasonable Parliament, which has unhesitatingly passed those laws which were required to extricate the country from its financial difficulties, and also divers measures necessitated by recently concluded treaties with European Powers. All this seems to indicate that under certain grave circumstances the Japanese Parliament is quite capable of rising to the occasion, and possesses the great quality, as I have said once before, of a spirit of economy often, unfortunately, absent from the more experienced Parliaments of Europe. If the Japanese Parliament ever returns to its old turbulent and boisterous humours, and insists upon governing instead of controlling, and if its irreconcilable Opposition incurs the risk of compromising the interests of the country, it is not at all improbable that the Constitution may be seriously embarrassed by a series of crises, but at present there is not much chance of exceptional measures creating any serious trouble. If the voters of Japan are apt to display an over-exuberance at elections, this is due in the main to the fact that they are new to their business, and moreover they form but a very small proportion of the population. The masses are absolutely indifferent to political agitation. The newspapers, which are read in the towns, make but slight reference to politics, and are mainly filled with gossip, novels and anecdotes, while to the vast majority of the people the Emperor is still a demi-god, and the last thing the commercial classes would approve would be a series of riotous scenes in the Chamber.

CHAPTER IX
JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AND HER MILITARY POWER

The military forces of Japan—The part they may play in the Far East—Japanese army and navy—Excellent qualities and sound instruction of the troops—Remarkable power of organization displayed during the war with China—Importance of a Japanese alliance for the Powers interested in China—The feeling of Japan towards foreign countries—Her conservative policy in China since the war—Her policy hostile to Russia and favourable to England—The Korean Question—Motives which might lessen her feeling of hostility towards Russia—Japan the champion of the integrity of the Celestial Empire.