[CHAPTER XVIII]

THE PETROLEUM CONSORTIUM

At the beginning of the War, the French State possessed no reserves of petrol or petroleum: a new example of the unpreparedness so often remarked!

The "refineries" disposed of a stock amounting at the end of July 1914, according to the Customs statistics, to:—

408,200 quintals of crude oil,
433,560 quintals of refined oil,
342,090 quintals of petrol.

To meet the earliest needs, these were requisitioned. But, from the month of September, this method was changed for that of contracts with the "Ten." The cartel undertook to meet the needs of France; it made itself responsible for purchases from abroad. The State was thus a mere customer enjoying the rights of priority over other customers.

The consumption was then unimportant. At the time of the first battle of the Marne, France had 22 squadrons of 6 aeroplanes (= 132), with engines of 80 or 100 horse-power; 110 motor-lorries and 50 tractors (= 160). The Germans had 70,000![42]

At the time of the battle of Champagne, France had 4,000 aeroplanes and 8,500 motor-lorries; that compelled her to increase her reserves of oil from 22,000 to 40,000 tons. But the crisis as regards supplies began in April 1916. Payments to foreign countries were more than could be met by the cartel, which, having just paid an account of a hundred million francs for purchases made by the State, could advance no more money. The position grew steadily worse and reached its culminating point after the United States came into the War in November 1917. The original little fleet of tankers quickly proved as inadequate as the size of the docks provided in our ports, which were intended for boats of 4,000 to 5,000 tons while the American tank-steamers were of 10,000 to 15,000 tons. On December 5, 1917, the Cartel of Ten had to confess its impotence and resign to the State a task which was too much for its powers. The stocks ran grave risk of becoming too completely exhausted on March 1, 1918. It was imperative "to effect a reorganization which history will record as one of the most substantial triumphs of the Entente at the decisive moment, and which resulted—thanks to the pressure on behalf of France which President Wilson put on the Standard—in doubling the figures of our importations of oil and petrol" (Report addressed to M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, in April 1918). Mr. Wilson, as soon as he received M. Clemenceau's moving appeal, summoned Bedford and W. Teagle to his room, and insisted that a certain number of their ships should be taken off their usual routes and sent to France. Eight days later, three magnificent tank-steamers entered a French port, bringing 30,000 tons of petrol. And since then, thanks to a new system of rotation of ships, France was enabled to receive annually a quantity which, finally, exceeded a million tons. (Each boat was made to do one extra voyage a year; that gave a gain of 160,000 tons.) Consumption steadily increased; the requirements at the front rose, at certain times, to 1,800 tons a day. France consumed:—