And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.
That which has the quality of vision clearly.
And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note: the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek), 'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.] Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):—
'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:—
'I hope that you the enemy may slay.
'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.
'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar sees.
'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.
'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the speaker are the subject of speech.
'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'