CLEINIAS: Nothing can be more true.
ATHENIAN: Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: In the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?
CLEINIAS: We must.
ATHENIAN: And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of evil.