STRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it has no soul which contains them?
THEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them?
STRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?
THEAETETUS: All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.
STRANGER: Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to any one.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.
THEAETETUS: How so?