Let us take that class, he said.
The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
Yes.
There may be simple thirst or qualified thirst, having respectively a simple or a qualified object. And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the [E]thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?
Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.
[438]Exception: The term good expresses, not a particular, but an universal relation. But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.
Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.
Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some 130 [B]have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.
I do not know what you mean.
Illustration of the argument from the use of language about correlative terms. Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?