11. Let us now pass to quantity and quantitatives. When treating of quantity, we have already said that it consists in number and dimension, in so far as some thing possesses such a quantity, that is, in the number of material things, and in the extension of the subject.[380] Here indeed we are not treating of abstract quantity, but of a quantity which causes a piece of wood to measure three feet, or that horses are five in number. Consequently, as we have said, we should call extension and number (considered from the concrete viewpoint) "quantitatives"; but this name could could be applied neither to time nor space; time, being the measure of movement,[381] re-enters into relation; and place, being that which contains the body,[382] consists of a manner of being, and consequently, in a relation. (So much the less should we call time and place "quantitatives," as) movement, though continuous, does not either belong to the genus of quantity.
LARGE AND SMALL ARE CONCEPTIONS BELONGING TO QUANTITY.
Should "large" and "small" be classified within the genus of quantity? Yes: for the large is large by a certain dimension, and dimension is not a relation. As to "greater" and "smaller," they belong to relation; for a thing is greater or smaller in relation to something else, just as when it is double. Why then do we sometimes say that a mountain is large, and that a grain of millet is small? When we say that a mountain is small, we use the latter term instead of smaller; for they who use this expression themselves acknowledge that they call a mountain small only by comparing it to other mountains, which implies that here "little" stands for "smaller." Likewise, when we say that a grain of millet is large, this does not mean "large" in any absolute sense, but large only for a grain of millet; which implies that one compares it to things of the same kind, and that here "large" means "larger."[383]
BEAUTY IS CLASSIFIED ALONG WITH THE RELATIVES.
Why then do we not also classify the beautiful among the relatives? Because beauty is such by itself, because it constitutes a quality, while "more beautiful" is a relative. Nevertheless the thing which is called beautiful would sometimes appear ugly, if it were compared to some other, as, for instance, if we were to contrast the beauty of men with that of the gods; hence the expression (of Heraclitus's[384]): "The most beautiful of monkeys would be ugly if compared with an animal of a different kind." When beauty is predicated of something, it is considered in itself; it might perhaps be called more beautiful or more ugly if it were compared to another. Hence it results that, in the genus of which we are treating, an object is in itself great because of the presence of greatness, but not in respect to some other. Otherwise, we would be obliged to deny that a thing was beautiful because of the existence of some more beautiful one. Neither therefore must we deny that a thing is great because there is only one greater than it; for "greater" could not exist without "great," any more than "more beautiful" without "beautiful."
QUANTITY ADMITS OF CONTRARIES (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE).[385]
12. It must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries. Even our thought admits of contraries when we say "great" and "small," since we then conceive of contraries, as when we say, "much and little"; for much and little are in the same condition as great and small. Sometimes it is said, "At home there are many people," and by this is intended a (relatively) great number; for in the latter case it is a relative. Likewise it is said, "There are few people in the theatre," instead of saying, "there are less people," (relatively); but when one uses the word "many" a great multitude in number must be understood.
HOW MULTITUDE IS CLASSIFIED WITH RELATIVES.
How then is multitude classified among relatives? It forms part of relatives in that multitude is an extension of number, while its contrary is a contraction. Likewise is it with continuous dimension; we conceive of it as prolonged. Quantity therefore has a double origin: progression of unity, and of the point. If either progression cease promptly, the first one produces "little," and the second, "small." If both be prolonged, they produce "much," and "large." What then is the limit that determines these things? The same question may be asked about the beautiful, and about warmth; for there is also "warmer"; only, the latter is a relative, while Warm, taken absolutely, is a quality. As there is a "reason" of the beautiful (a reason that would produce and determine the beautiful), likewise there must be a reason for the Great, a reason by participation in which an object becomes great, as the reason of the Beautiful makes beautiful. Such are the things for which quantity admits contraries.