For example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two matters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book, of the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same intelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as mixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions mean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent? No, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we discover of the first two, that the first statement was made during the Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case of such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and his denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian period, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first was Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of development of doctrines at different periods of his life.
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Let us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of matter.
The first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may be described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with the subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme hovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding us of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double soul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of good.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says, "if this were all," there were no evil. We find a threefold division of the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the treatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the King of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380] and the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382] acknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the Stoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary existence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in itself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of being, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter as flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's image[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and infinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material part of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness, which is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387] Plotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost the same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as supporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the world is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12. Plotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all qualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392]
In the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is original, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared from the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the Gnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood good. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394] he asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible matter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396] to argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical substrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems to undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was surely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and possibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible for the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view. Anaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly Numenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399] and that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another Plotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture, approved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus, it is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault. Intelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea of doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find the Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the conceptual seminal logoi, and the "Koinê ousia" of matter; but in his psychology he uses "logos" and "noêsis," instead of "nous" and "phronesis," which are found in the Escorial section, and which are more Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or potentiality.
In the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another treatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a rejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the treatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of "energeia" and "dunamis," or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic term hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is again a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian double name[406] of Being and Essence ("ousia" and "to on").
We now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most extensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it in connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial, we shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely noting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of matter, a Stoic idea.
For Numenius as author we note:
a. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point of stretching definitions.[408]
b. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is repeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a participation, even in the intelligibles.[410]