[718] This means a prætorship before the age at which a man could regularly hold the office. Cato returned from Cyprus in B.C. 56. He was now thirty-eight years of age, for he died B.C. 46, when he was forty-eight.
[719] The order of the words in the original makes the meaning appear somewhat ambiguous. The passage might be translated, as it is by Dacier, "for the colleague of Philippus paid no less respect to Cato on account of his merit, than Philippus did on account of his relationship."
[720] Cicero returned from exile B.C. 57, in the month of September of the unreformed calendar.
[721] This was the meeting at Luca in B.C. 56. See the Life of Pompeius, c. 51; and the Life of Cæsar, c. 21.
[722] This was the second consulship of each, and was in B.C. 55. Cato lost the prætorship, and Vatinius was elected instead of him (Dion Cassius (39, c. 32).
[723] As to Caius Trebonius, see the Life of Pompeius, c. 52.
[724] One would suppose that a less time would have been more than enough, though not for Cato. Dion Cassius (39. c. 31) says that Favonius spoke for an hour before Cato did, and took up all the time in complaining of the shortness of his allowance. It would be a fair inference that he had little to say against the measure itself.
[725] Dion Cassius (39. c. 35) tells us more particularly how it happened that P. Aquilius Gallus was in the senate house. Gallus was afraid that he should be excluded from the Forum the next day, and accordingly he passed the night in the senate house, both for safety's sake and to be ready on the spot in the morning. But Trebonius, who found it out, kept him shut up for that night and the greater part of the following day.
[726] Cato was prætor in B.C. 54. It does not appear that he ever was prætor before, and it is not therefore clear what is meant by the "extraordinary prætorship" (c. 39). In place of the word "Rostra," in the fifth line of this chapter, read "tribunal." Plutarch uses the same word (βῆμα) for both, which circumstance is calculated occasionally to cause a translator to make a slip, even when he knows better. The "tribunal" was the seat of the prætor, when he was doing justice. But lower down (line 8 from the bottom) Rostra is the proper translation of Plutarch's word (ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῶν ἐμβόλον) and it was the place from which Cato spoke, after he had got up. In c. 43, when Cato gets up to speak, Plutarch makes him mount the Bema (βῆμα), by which he means the place when the orators stood at the Rostra. The Rostra were the beaks of the Antiate galleys, with which, it is said, this place was ornamented at the close of the Latin war (Livy, 8, c. 14).
[727] The reason according to Plutarch why people envy the man who has a high reputation for integrity, is because of the power and credit which it gives. Whatever then gives power and credit should be also an object of envy, as wealth; and so it is. The notion of envy implies a desire to see the person who is the object of it humbled and cast down. The Greeks attributed this feeling to their gods, who looked with an evil eye on great prosperity, and loved to humble it. But the feeling of envy, if that is the right term, towards him who has power and credit by reason of his high character for integrity, is not the same feeling as envy of the wealthy man. The envious of wealth desire to have the wealth both for itself and for its uses. The envious of character desire to have the opinion of the character, because of the profit that is from it, but they may not desire to have that which is the foundation of the character. If they did, their desire would be for virtue, and the envious feeling would not exist. Courage and wisdom are less objects of envy than good character or wealth, and perhaps, because most men feel that they are not capable of having the one or the other. The notion of envy implies that the person has, or thinks he has, the same capability as another who has something which he has not. A man who is not a painter does not envy a great painter; a man who is a painter may envy a great painter. The mass may admire the honest man who is of higher rank than themselves, even if they have no regard for honesty; but they do not envy; they wonder as at something which is above them. But if the honest man is of their own station in life, and has a character of integrity, they may envy him for his superiority. It appears that if there is a number of people who are generally on a footing of equality, any superiority which one may acquire over the rest, makes him an object of envy. If high character for integrity brings power and credit with it, there must be some persons with whom the power and the credit prevail, but these are the persons who are farthest removed from rivalry with him who has the credit. Those who are nearer to him are the persons who envy, who feel that the superiority of one man makes their inferiority. Plutarch assumes the existence of a class who love the just and give them credit, and of a class who envy them; but the two classes of persons are not the same.