III. The emperor, though he gratified the people by this well-deserved execution, yet bore no malice against any one else of his personal enemies. To please the people he at first allowed them to address him at public spectacles as “Nero”; and he allowed several statues of Nero to be replaced in public. Claudius Rufus states that the diplomas,[630] or imperial despatches, which were sent to Spain by the hands of public couriers, were inscribed with the name of Nero as well as with that of Otho. However, as he perceived that this practice gave offence to the first and most powerful citizens, he put a stop to it. The soldiers of the prætorian guard were extremely dissatisfied with the moderate manner in which Otho began his reign, and they warned him to be on his guard, and cut off all disaffected persons, either out of a genuine anxiety for his safety, or merely as a pretext for causing disturbances and civil wars. One day Otho sent Crispinus[631] to Ostia to bring back the seventeenth manipulus[632] from thence. As Crispinus, while it was still dark, began to make preparations for the journey, and loaded waggons with the men’s arms, some of the most daring soldiers openly declared that he had come with disloyal intentions, that the Senate meditated a coup d’état, and that the arms were meant to be used against Otho, not for him. As many took up this idea and became much excited, some seized on the waggons, others killed Crispinus and their own two centurions who tried to oppose them, and all, in confusion, calling upon one another to come to the rescue of Cæsar, marched to Rome. Hearing that Otho was entertaining eighty of the senators at dinner, they rushed to the palace, exclaiming that now was the time to put to death all the enemies of Cæsar at one stroke. The city was panic-stricken, expecting at once to be pillaged by the troops; the palace was filled with confusion and alarm, and Otho himself terribly perplexed as to what to do; for while he feared for the safety of his guests, some of whom had brought their wives to the banquet, they mistrusted him, and he saw them watching his every movement in silent terror. He therefore ordered the prefects of the guard to go and pacify the soldiers, while at the same time he dismissed his guests by another door. They were scarcely gone when the soldiers burst tumultuously into the dining-hall, asking what had become of the enemies of Cæsar. Otho now mounted on a couch and addressed them; and by entreaties, and even by tears, at last prevailed upon them to retire. On the following day, having presented every soldier with twelve hundred and fifty drachmas, he entered the camp, where he praised[633] their zeal on his behalf, and begged them to join him in punishing a few whose intrigues had made both his clemency and their own steady loyalty to be questioned. As all approved, and bade him do so, he, after selecting for punishment two men whose fate no one could regret, left the camp.

IV. Some of the soldiers believed that Otho’s character was really changed, and admired him for his conduct; while others bethought that he was only courting popularity perforce, because of the war which was impending. It was indeed reported that Vitellius had already assumed the imperial title and authority; and couriers were constantly arriving with the news of some fresh accession to his forces, though other messengers came who stated that the troops in Dalmatia, Pannonia, and Mœsia had, with their officers, declared for Otho. Soon also friendly letters reached him from Mucianus and Vespasianus, the former of whom was at the head of a great army in Syria, and the latter in Judæa. Encouraged by these, Otho wrote to Vitellius, bidding him act like a loyal soldier, and promising that he would bestow on him a great sum of money and a city in which he might dwell in the utmost peace and happiness. Vitellius replied at first with dissimulation, but soon they became irritated, and overwhelmed one another with abuse, which each well deserved, though it was ridiculous for either of them to reproach the other with vices which were common to them both.[634] Indeed it was hard to say which of them was the more profligate or the more effeminate, which had the least experience of war, or which had been plunged the more deeply in debt by his former poverty.

At this time many prodigies[635] and omens were reported, many of which were vague and could not be traced to any trustworthy source, though all men saw the reins fall from the hands of the figure of Victory in the capitol, who is represented driving a chariot, as though she were no longer able to hold them; and the statue of Caius[636] Cæsar, which stands upon the island in the Tiber, without any wind or earthquake, was turned round, so as to face east instead of west. This is said to have taken place about the time when Vespasianus openly pretended to the throne. Many also regarded the flooding of the Tiber as an evil omen; for though it was the season of the year at which rivers usually are full of water, yet it never rose so high or did so much damage before; for it laid a great part of the city under water, especially in the corn-market, and caused great scarcity of provisions for several days.

V. About this time news was brought to Rome that Cæcina and Valens, acting as the lieutenants of Vitellius, had seized the passes of the Alps. The prætorians also conceived suspicions of the loyalty of Dolabella,[637] a man of patrician family. Whether Otho feared him or some one else is uncertain: however, he assured him of his friendship, and sent him to reside at the city of Aquinum. Otho now selected the officers who were to company him on his campaign. Amongst these was Lucius, the brother of Vitellius, whom he neither promoted nor removed from the rank in the army which he held. He also took especial care of the mother and wife of Vitellius, that they might not have any fear for their own safety. He entrusted the government of Rome to Flavius Sabinus, either because he wished to show his respect for Nero (for Sabinus had been appointed to this post by Nero, and had been deprived of it by Galba), or because by the promotion of Sabinus he declared his good will and confidence in Vespasianus. He himself remained at Brixellum, a city of Italy situated upon the river Padus, and sent on his forces under the command of Marius Celsus, Suetonius Paullinus, and of Gallus and Spurinna, who were all generals of renown, but who, on account of the want of discipline of their troops, were unable to conduct the campaign, according to the plans which they had arranged. Indeed the soldiers of the guard refused to obey any authority except that of the emperor himself, for he alone, they declared, had the right to command them. Nor were the enemy’s troops altogether obedient and well-behaved, but the same causes rendered them also swaggering and untrustworthy. Yet they possessed experience of actual war, and were accustomed to fatigue; whereas Otho’s troops were weak from their life of unwarlike leisure, for they spent most of their time in the theatres and at public shows, or else in their quarters, and affected such a degree of insolence that they refused to perform the necessary labours of a campaign, alleging that to do so was beneath their dignity, not that it was beyond their strength. Spurinna, when he endeavoured to force them to do their duty, came within a very little of losing his life. The soldiers insulted him grossly, and set no bounds to their language, calling him a traitor to Cæsar and the ruin of his cause. Some of them actually got drunk and went to Spurinna’s tent at night to demand money for a journey; for they said they must go and impeach him before Cæsar.

VI. However, the cause of Otho, and Spurinna with it, received some advantage from the abusive language which these same soldiers met with at Placentia. Here the Vitellians who were besieging the city ridiculed Otho’s men whom they saw on the battlements, calling them stay-at-home soldiers, sword-dancers, and spectators of games, declaring that they had never seen or tasted of real war, but were full of pride at having cut off the head of an unarmed old man, meaning Galba, though they dared not come out and fight like men. The soldiers were so furiously exasperated by these reproaches that they eagerly besought Spurinna to employ them in whatever service he pleased, assuring him that they would not shrink from any toils or dangers. When the enemy furiously assaulted the walls, and brought up many battering engines,[638] Spurinna’s men won the victory, drove back their opponents with great slaughter, and saved from ruin one of the most famous and prosperous cities of Italy.

The generals of Otho were found both by cities and by individuals to be much less offensive to deal with than those of Vitellius. Among the latter was Cæcina, a man who neither spoke nor dressed like a citizen of Rome, but was harsh and overbearing, of great stature, wearing the Gaulish trousers and sleeves, and using signs[639] even when addressing Roman magistrates. He was accompanied by his wife[640] who rode with him in a showy dress, escorted by a picked body of cavalry.

The other general, Fabius Valens,[641] was so avaricious that neither the plunder which he took from the enemy, nor yet the thefts, which he committed or the bribes which he received from the allied states could satiate him; and he was even suspected of having been too late for the first battle of the war because he delayed his march to amass wealth for himself. Others blame Cæcina, because in his haste to win a victory before Valens came up, he, besides other blunders of less consequence, began a battle so unseasonably and conducted it so remissly that he very nearly brought the cause of Vitellius to ruin.

VII. After Cæcina’s repulse at Placentia he proceeded to Cremona, another large and flourishing city. Meanwhile Annius Gallus, who was on his way to Placentia to reinforce Spurinna, hearing while on the march that the troops at Placentia had been victorious, but that Cremona was in danger, changed the direction of his march towards that place, and encamped close to the enemy. Here Cæcina concealed many foot-soldiers in rough and wooded ground ordering his cavalry to ride forward and, if they fell in with the enemy, to retire little by little so as to draw them into the ambuscade. This plan was betrayed to Celsus by deserters. Celsus attacked them with the best of his cavalry, pursued them with caution, taking care to avoid the ambuscade, and then surrounded the troops in ambush, and threw them into confusion. He now sent for his infantry from the camp: and it was thought that if they had come up promptly after the cavalry, the whole army of Cæcina might have been destroyed; but as it was, Paullinus brought them up slowly and too late, and tarnished his glory as a general by overcaution. The mass of the soldiers charged him with treason, and tried to exasperate Otho against him by boasting that they had won the victory, but that their success was not followed up owing to the cowardice of their generals. Otho, though he did not believe their accusations, yet feared to be thought to disbelieve them. He accordingly sent his brother Titianus to the army, and with him Julius Proculus[642], the prefect of the prætorians, who virtually had the supreme command, though Titianus was the nominal chief, while Celsus and Paullinus were given the titles of counsellors and friends, but were not allowed the least real power or authority.

The enemy also showed want of discipline, especially in the army of Valens. These men, when they heard of the ambuscade and the defeat to which it had led, were greatly enraged at not having been there in time to prevent so great a slaughter of their friends. Valens[643] was forced to beg for his life; for the soldiers were preparing to stone him. He pacified them with difficulty, and led them to join the forces of Cæcina.