Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy. Fabius goes to Rome, leaving the command to M. Minucius.Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.
[95.] While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships left him by his brother, Spain, B.C. 217. and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.
[96.] But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the enemy were bearing down upon him, Roman success at sea.Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.
In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.
[97.] When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on Iberia, Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province, is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships: early in B.C. 217. but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia, and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia, effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance.
When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum, they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their fleet was coasting down parallel with them.
[98.] Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, Treason of Abilyx. from the Iberian towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx, who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen, and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now crossed the Iber, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it, and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this; but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in heaping favours on the author of such a service.” By these and similar arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.
[99.] Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought, in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.
[100.] Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the Falernian plain. Hannibal takes Geronium. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither by way of Mount Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword; but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade. Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every day was very great.
[101.] When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first kept along the line of hills, Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B.C. 217.feeling certain that he would sooner or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him, and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near, and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it. At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but, after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn: being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his cavalry.