The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 2 (of 2)

by Polybius

[6.] The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy required much consideration on their part.Meeting of Achaean statesmen to consider their policy, B.C. 169. They therefore called to council such men as were of one mind in other political questions,—Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and Apollonides of Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original Lycortas is for complete neutrality.view: which was that they should send no help to either Perseus or Rome in any way, nor, on the other hand, take part against either. For he held that co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power which the successful nation would possess; while active hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had Apollonides and Stratius for suppressing rash declarations for Rome, and yet not openly opposing her.already in former times been in opposition to many of the most illustrious Romans in their state policy. Apollonides and Stratius did not recommend open and avowed hostility to Rome, but thought that “Those who were for plunging headlong into the contest, and wished to use the action of the nation to secure their own personal favour at Rome, ought to be put down and boldly resisted.”The Strategus Archon is for bending to the storm, and acting frankly for Rome. Archon said that “They must yield to circumstances, and not give their personal enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow themselves to fall into the same misfortune as Nicander, who, before he had learnt what the power of Rome really was, had met with the gravest calamities.” With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed.Polybius Hipparch. It was thereupon decided that Archon should go without delay to his duties as Strategus, and Polybius to those of Hipparch.

[7.] Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made up his mind that the Achaeans must take active part with Rome and her allies,Embassy from Attalus to the Achaeans desiring the restoration of the honours formally decreed to his brother Eumenes. See 27, 18. it happened most conveniently that Attalus made his proposal to him and found him ready to accept it. Archon at once eagerly promised his support to Attalus’s request: and when thereupon that prince’s envoys appeared at the next congress, and addressed the Achaeans about the restoration of king Eumenes’s honours, begging them to do this for the sake of Attalus, the people did not show clearly what their feeling was, but a good many rose to speak against the proposal from many various motives. Those who were originally the advisers of the honours being paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of their own policy; while those who had private reasons for animosity against the king thought this a good opportunity for revenging themselves upon him; while others again, from spite against those who supported him, were determined that Attalus should not obtain his request. Archon, however, the Strategus, rose to support the envoys,—for it was a matter that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus,—but after a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought to be giving his advice from interested motives and the hope of making money, because he had spent a large sum on his office. Amidst a general feeling of doubt and hesitation, Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But that part of it which best fell in with the feelings of the populace was that in whichSpeech of Polybius. he showed that “The original decree of the Achaeans in regard to these honours enacted that such honours as were improper and contrary to law were to be abolished, but not all honours by any means. That Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile to Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erections put up in honour of the king; and in doing so had gone beyond the meaning of the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond the powers entrusted to them, and, what was worst of all, beyond the demands of justice and right. For the Achaeans had not resolved upon doing away with the honours of Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his hands; but had taken offence at his making demands beyond what his services warranted, and had accordingly voted to remove everything that seemed excessive. As then these judges had overthrown these honours, because they had a greater regard for the gratification of their private enmity than for the honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the conviction that duty and honour must be their highest consideration, were bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustifiable insult inflicted upon Eumenes: especially as, in doing so, they would not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on his brother Attalus also.” The assembly having expressed their agreement with this speech, a decree was written out ordering the magistrates to restore all the honours of king Eumenes, except such as were dishonourable to the Achaean league or contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this time, that Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the Peloponnese....

[8.] Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his court, and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to king Genthius,Early in B.C. 169,[159] after taking Hyscana in Illyria, Perseus advances to Stubera, and thence sends envoys to king Genthius at Lissus. Livy, 43, 19. with instructions to inform him of what he had achieved in his war with the Romans, Dardani, Epirotes, and Illyrians up to the present time; and to urge him to make a friendship and alliance with him in Macedonia. These envoys journeyed beyond Mount Scardus, through Illyria Deserta, as it is called,—a region a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order to make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia difficult for the Dardani. Their journey through this region was accompanied by much suffering; but they reached Scodra, and being there informed that Genthius was at Lissus, they sent a message to him.Genthius temporises. He promptly responded: and having been admitted to an interview with him, they discussed the business to which their instructions referred. Genthius had no wish to forfeit the friendship of Perseus; but he alleged want of means as an excuse for not complying with the request at once, and his inability to undertake a war with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and his colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at Stubera, and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while waiting for the return of Pleuratus and Adaeus.A second mission to Genthius. On their arrival with the answer from Genthius, he immediately sent another mission, consisting again of Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his bodyguards, and the Illyrian (Pleuratus) also, because he knew the Illyrian language, with the same instructions as before:Perseus goes back to Hyscana in Illyria. on the ground that Genthius had not stated distinctly what he wanted, and what would enable him to consent to the proposals. When these envoys had started the king himself removed with his army to Hyscana.[160]...

[9.] The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without having accomplished anything more than the previous envoys,Genthius being unpersuaded by the second mission, Perseus sends a third, but still without offering money. and without any fresh answer; for Genthius remained of the same mind,—willing to join with Perseus in his war, but professing to be in want of money. Perseus disregarded the hint, and sent another mission under Hippias to conclude the treaty, without taking any notice of the main point, while professing a wish to do whatever Genthius wished. It is not easy to decide whether to ascribe such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual delusion. For my part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual delusion when men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and yet neglect the most important point in their plans, though they see it all the time and have the power to execute it. The dislike of Perseus to give money turned out happily for Greece. For I do not think it will be denied by any man of reflection that, had Perseus at that time been willing to make grants of money either to states as such, or individually to kings and statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but even to a moderate extent, they would all—Greeks and kings alike—have yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take that course, which would have given him, if successful, an overweening supremacy; or, if unsuccessful, would have involved many others in his disaster. But he took the opposite course: which resulted in confining the numbers of the Greeks who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis to very narrow limits....

[Perseus now returned from Stubera to Hyscana, and after a vain attempt upon Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for the rest of the winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marcius Philippus began his advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp in Perrhaebia. Perseus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias to defend two passes of the Cambunian mountains, while he himself held Dium, which commanded the coast road from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius however, after only a rather severe skirmish with the light-armed troops of Hippias, effected the passage of the mountains and descended upon Dium. The king was taken by surprise: he had not secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut off the Romans from retreat; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q. Marcius occupied Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, to get provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupied Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q. Marcius took Heracleum, which was between Phila and Dium, and made preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C. 169-168) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing that the roads through Thessaly were put in a proper state for the conveyance of provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.]

[10.] Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the Romans into Macedonia, Perseus found fault with Hippias.Perseus lays the blame of his failure on his generals. Livy, 44, 8. But in my opinion it is easy to find fault with others and to see their mistakes, but it is the hardest thing in the world to do everything that can be done one’s self, and to be thoroughly acquainted with one’s own affairs. And Perseus was now an instance in point....

[11.] The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very peculiar manner. The city wall at one partThe testudo. Livy, 44, 9. and for a short distance was low. The Romans attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a protection for their heads by locking their shields together over them so closely, that they presented the appearance of a sloping tiled roof....

This manœuvre the Romans used also in mock fights....

While C. Marcius Figulus, the praetor, was engaged in Chalcidice, Q. Marcius sent M. Popilius to besiege Meliboea in Magnesia. Perseus sent Euphranor to relieve it, and, if he succeeded, to enter Demetrias. This he did, and was not attacked at the latter place by Popilius or Eumenes—scandal saying that the latter was in secret communication with Perseus. Livy, 44, 10-13, B.C. 169.