As against this right, there is naturally a corresponding duty on the part of the inhabitants to conduct themselves in a really peaceable manner, in no wise to participate in the conflict, to abstain from every injury to the troops of the power in occupation, and not to refuse obedience to the enemy’s government. If this presumption is not fulfilled, then there can no longer be any talk of violations of the immunities of the inhabitants, rather they are treated and punished strictly according to martial law.
Of the humanity of the Germans and the barbarity of the French.
The conception here put forward as to the relation between the army and the inhabitants of an enemy’s territory, corresponds to that of the German Staff in the years 1870–71. It was given expression in numerous proclamations, and in still more numerous orders of the day, of the German Generals. In contrast to this the behavior of the French authorities more than once betrays a complete ignorance of the elementary rules of the law of nations, alike in their diplomatic accusations against the Germans and in the words used towards their own subjects. Thus, on the outbreak of the war, a threat was addressed to the Grand Duchy of Baden, not only by the French Press but also officially (von amtlicher Stelle),[83] “that even its women would not be protected.” So also horses of Prussian officers, who had been shot by the peasants, were publicly put up to auction by the murderers. So also the Franctireurs threatened the inhabitants of villages occupied by the Germans that they would be shot and their houses burnt down if they received the enemy in their houses or “were to enter into intercourse with them.” So also the prefect of the Cote d’Or, in an official circular of November 21st, urges the sub-prefects and mayors of his Department to a systematic pursuit of assassination, when he says: “The Fatherland does not demand of you that you should assemble en masse and openly oppose the enemy, it only expects that three or four determined men should leave the village every morning and conceal themselves in a place indicated by nature, from which, without danger, they can shoot the Prussians; above all, they are to shoot at the enemy’s mounted men whose horses they are to deliver up at the principal place of the Arrondissement. I will award a bonus to them (for the delivery of such horses), and will publish their heroic deed in all the newspapers of the Department, as well as in the Moniteur.” But this conception of the relation between the inhabitants and the hostile army not only possessed the minds of the provincial authorities but also the central government at Tours itself, as is clear from the fact that it held it necessary to stigmatize publicly the members of the municipal commission at Soissons who, after an attempt on the life of a Prussian sentry by an unknown hand, prudently warned their members against a repetition of such outrages, when it [the central government] ordered “that the names of the men who had lent themselves to the assistance and interpretation of the enemy’s police be immediately forthcoming.”[84] And if, on the French side, the proclamation of General von Falckenstein is cited as a proof of similar views on the German side—the proclamation wherein the dwellers on the coast of the North Sea and the Baltic are urged to participate in the defense of the coast, and are told: “Let every Frenchman who sets foot on your coast be forfeit”—as against this all that need be said is that this incitement, as is well known, had no effect in Germany and excited the greatest surprise and was properly condemned.
* * * * *
What the Invader may do.
Having thus developed the principles governing the relation between the hostile army and the inhabitants, we will now consider somewhat more closely the duties of the latter and the burdens which, in a given case, it is allowable to impose upon it. Obviously a precise enumeration of every kind of service which may be demanded from them is impossible, but the following of the most frequent occurrence are:
1. Restriction of post, railway and letter communication, supervision, or, indeed, total prohibition of the same.
2. Limitation of freedom of movement within the country, prohibition to frequent certain parts of the seat of war, or specified places.
3. Surrender of arms.
4. Obligation to billet the enemy’s soldiers; prohibition of illumination of windows at night and the like.
5. Production of conveyances.
6. Performance of work on streets, bridges, trenches (Gräben), railways, buildings, etc.
7. Production of hostages.
As to 1, the necessity of interrupting, in many cases, railway, postal, and telegraph communication, of stopping them or, at the least, stringently supervising them, hardly calls for further proof. Human feeling on the part of the commanding officer will know what limits to fix, where the needs of the war and the necessities of the population permit of mutual accommodation.
As to 2, if according to modern views no inhabitant of occupied territory can be compelled to participate directly in the fight against his own Fatherland, so, conversely, he can be prevented from reenforcing his own army. Thus the German staff in 1870, where it had acquired authority, in particular in Alsace-Lorraine, sought to prevent the entrance of the inhabitants into the French army, even as in the Napoleonic wars the French authorities sought to prevent the adherence of the States of the Rhine Confederation to the army of the Allies.
A man may be compelled to betray his Country.