FOREWORD
Several survivors of St. Clair’s Defeat wrote vivid accounts of their experiences during that terrible battle. These personal reports detail one of the worst defeats ever suffered by an American army. Encouraged by victories over the forces of Generals Harmar and St. Clair, the Indians preyed upon the defenseless frontier. Therefore, the success of General Wayne’s expedition, undertaken in 1792 to subdue the redskins, was of primary importance to the development of the West.
The first of the three articles in this pamphlet contains the accounts which Henry Howe included in his HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF OHIO, first published in 1847. Sources of quotations used in Howe’s COLLECTIONS are not always clear, but the material is considered of sufficient historical significance to warrant reprinting without exact citations. The second item appeared in the INDIANA HERALD on April 13, 1864. The third article is a brief newspaper report which was published in the INDIANA STATE JOURNAL on September 27, 1851.
The Boards and the Staff of the Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County present this publication in the hope that it will prove interesting to the general public as well as to students of the history of the Old Northwest. Grammar, spelling, and punctuation have been changed to conform to current usage.
The great objective of St. Clair’s campaign was to establish a military post at the Miami village (the site of the present city of Fort Wayne) at the junction of the St. Mary’s and St. Joseph rivers. Intermediate posts of communication were to be maintained from that place to Fort Washington at Cincinnati. This was felt to be the only way to prevent future hostilities.
Acting under instructions, St. Clair proceeded to organize his army. At the close of April, 1791, he was at Pittsburgh where troops and munitions of war were being collected. On the fifteenth of May he reached Fort Washington. The expedition was expected to start before the first of August, but mismanagement in the quartermaster’s department and other hindrances prevented the departure for many weeks. From Fort Washington the troops advanced only six miles to Ludlow’s Station. The army of 2,300, exclusive of the militia, remained there until September 17, when it moved forward and built Fort Hamilton on the Great Miami River. From there the army marched forty-four miles farther and built Fort Jefferson. On the twenty-fourth of October the toilsome march through the wilderness began. We copy below from the NOTES ON THE EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN TERRITORY by Judge Jacob Burnet.
“During this time 300 militiamen deserted and returned to their homes. The supplies for the army were still in the rear, and General St. Clair was afraid that the deserters might seize them for their own use. He decided very reluctantly to send the first regiment back for the dual purpose of bringing up the provisions and, if possible, of overtaking and arresting some of the deserters.
“After that arrangement had been made, the army resumed its march; and on the third of November, it arrived at a creek flowing toward the southwest. This stream was thought to be the St. Mary’s River, one of the principal branches of the Maumee River; but it was afterward ascertained to be a branch of the Wabash River. Since it was late in the afternoon and the men were fatigued by the laborious march, they encamped on a commanding piece of ground by the creek.
“General St. Clair intended to occupy that position until the first regiment arrived with the provisions. According to a plan he had made with Major Ferguson, he intended to begin work on a fort the next day; but he was not permitted to do so. Half an hour before sunrise on the fourth of November, just after the men had been dismissed from parade, the Indians attacked the militiamen posted at the front. By rushing back into camp with the Indians close upon their heels, they threw the army into disorder from which it could not recover. In a short time the Indians were checked by the fire of the first line, but they immediately concentrated a very heavy fire on that line; and in a few minutes they extended their fire to the second line.
“In each case their heaviest fire was directed into the center of the line where the artillery was placed, and men were frequently driven from the center with great slaughter. Bayonets were resorted to in that emergency. Under orders from St. Clair, Colonel Darke made a spirited charge with a part of the second line. The Indians instantly gave way and were driven back several hundred yards. But there was not a sufficient number of riflemen to preserve the advantage, and the enemy soon renewed the attack and forced our troops to retreat.