Leopold R.
The King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria.
ENGLAND AND FRANCE
LOUIS PHILIPPE'S POLICY
Trianon, 19th October 1837.
My dearest Victoria,—... There is a great disposition here to be on the best possible terms with England. As it has but too often happened that the diplomatic agents of the two countries have drawn, or been believed to draw, different ways,COUNT MOLÉ I recommended strongly to Count Molé71 to give strong and clear instructions to his people, particularly at Madrid, Lisbon, and Athens.... He is going to read them to Lord Granville, and also to communicate as much as possible all the despatches of the French diplomats to the English Government. This will be a proof of confidence, and it will besides have the advantage of giving often useful information, enabling thereby the English Government to hear two opinions instead of one. It cannot be denied that the idea that the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries were following two different lines of policy has been hurtful to the causes of the two Queens in the Peninsula. To put a stop to this double action is the only benefit which the Queens will at present derive from a better understanding between England and France; but as it is, it will be still of some importance to them, and take away from the different political parties the possibility of using the pretended misunderstanding against the Government of the Queens. I trust that you will tell your Ministers to meet this friendly disposition with frankness and kindness. The wish of the King here is, to have matters concerted between the Plenipotentiaries of both countries. In this way it would become difficult for the parties in Spain or Portugal to say that the two Plenipotentiaries support different candidates for Ministerial power, and the division in the parties connected with the Queens might be in this manner prevented or reconciled. Many and many are the ill-natured hints thrown out against the King's policy here, and because he is clever, he is suspected of having ambitious schemes without end; it may not be without some importance to set this, in your mind at least, to rights. Whatever may have been the King's views immediately after the revolution of July72 I will not decide; perhaps he may a moment have wished to be able to do something for France. Supposing this for the sake of argument to have been so, two months of his reign were sufficient to show him that the great question was not to conquer territories or foreign influence, but to save Monarchy. He saw clearly that though he might begin a war, necessarily it would soon degenerate into a war of propaganda, and that he and his family would be the first victims of it. His struggle has constantly been to strengthen his Government, to keep together or create anew the elements indispensable for a Monarchical Government, and this struggle is far from being at its end, and most probably the remainder of his life will be devoted to this important task; and whatever may be the more lively disposition of the Duke of Orleans, great part of his reign if he comes to the throne, and perhaps the whole of it, will, bon gré mal gré, take the same turn. That it should be so is very natural, because of what use would be some foreign provinces if they would only add to the difficulty of governing the old? Therefore, knowing as I do all the proceedings of the King and his Cabinet, even more fully than I do those of your Government; seeing constantly in the most unreserved manner the whole of the despatches; knowing as the nearest neighbour the system that they constantly followed up towards us, I must say that no one is more against acquiring influence in foreign States, or even getting burthened with family aggrandisement in them, than he. He rejected most positively the marriage of Joinville with Donna Maria because he will not have anything to do with Portugal. He rejects a mille times the idea of a future union of the Queen of Spain with Aumale, because he will not have a son where it is not his intention to support him.
His fear of being drawn into a real intervention has been the cause of his having been so anxious not to have a French Legion in Spain. He may be right or wrong on this subject—I do not decide this, as I was of a different opinion last year; but his fear of being drawn too far, like a man whose clothes get caught by a steam-engine, is natural enough. His dislike to the ultra-Liberals in the Peninsula is also very natural, because they uphold principles of Government which render Monarchy impossible, and the application of which to France would be the ruin of the King. England, from the peculiarity of its position, can do many things which in France would upset everything.... I must close my letter, and shall answer yours to-morrow. God bless you! Ever, my dearest Victoria, your devoted Uncle,
Leopold R.
Footnote 71: French Premier and Foreign Secretary.
Footnote 72: 1830.